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OPTIMIZING WORKFORCE SUCCESS THROUGH 
IMPROVED LEADERSHIP: 
LEADING BEYOND THE BIAS BARRIER 
Lena Kaman
Women, Peace, and Security Conference 2017
INTRODUCTION 
Diversity is a defining attribute of a successful organization.  Corporate America and the United 
States military alike realized that what began as an ethical effort to curb discrimination led to a 
key talent management tool in creating a flourishing business model.1  While a homogenous all-
white, all-male demographic dominated the professional setting a few decades ago, current 
corporate and government organizations are now reflective of a much broader demographic in 
their employee populations.2  Industry leaders value greater diversity in age, race, culture, 
religion, and gender identity groups for providing increased productivity, enhanced morale, and 
improved organizational effectiveness.3 
In recognizing the strategic importance of diversity management, organizational leaders reshaped 
and redefined diversity policies.  For example, Apple’s diversity policy advances the company’s 
belief that “individual backgrounds, perspectives, and passions help us create the ideas that move 
all of us forward.”4  As for the government sector, Department of Defense (DoD) policy states, 
“We gain a strategic advantage by leveraging the diversity of all members and creating an 
inclusive environment in which each member is valued and encouraged to provide ideas critical 
to innovation, optimization, and organizational mission success.”5  However, a specific area of 
diversity management across private and public sectors requiring greater attention is gender 
diversity.  One barrier preventing the gender gap from closing completely is the unconscious 
gender bias.  Formally defined as, “mental shortcuts based on social norms and stereotypes,” 
unconscious biases are innate to peoples’ thought patterns.6  They influence behavior without 
conscious knowledge.  In addition to gender, biases can involve race, weight, religious 
preference, nationality, a name, an accent, marital status, and any other defining attribute of a 
1 David Thomas and Robin Ely, “Making Differences Matter:  A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity,” 
Harvard Business Review, accessed January 30, 2017, https://hbr.org/1996/09/making-differences-matter-a-new-
paradigm-for-managing-diversity. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Lena Buettner, “An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator 
Career Decision Choices,” (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master’s graduate capstone requirements, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 1. 
4 “Inclusion & Diversity,” Apple Inc., accessed June 30, 2017 at https://www.apple.com/diversity/. 
5 Department of Defense, “Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017”, 2012, accessed January 30, 2017 
at http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%20of%2019 
%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf. 
6 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 2. 
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person.  Biases cause people to inadvertently favor one demographic group over another.7  
Unconscious gender biases sneak into the workplace environment, causing leaders, both male 
and female, to make decisions that positively influence men to the detriment of women 
counterparts.   
Organizations, both corporate and military, have identified leadership support of workforce 
diversity, including gender diversity, as necessary for operational success.  Unconscious gender 
biases undermine organizational progress that has been achieved through federal legislative 
action and diversity policy initiatives.  Therefore, it remains incumbent upon leadership to 
recognize and confront the unconscious gender bias barrier as one means of maintaining a viable, 
high-quality, diverse workforce where women can thrive and contribute their maximum potential 
to the organization.  Examining gender bias inequalities, understanding their consequences and 
limitations on the workforce, and implementing effective solutions begin with an organization’s 
leaders. 
THE UNCONSCIOUS GENDER BIAS 
In striving to achieve gender inclusion, leaders must first fully understand and recognize the 
psychology behind unconscious biases.  Unconscious biases are rooted in the brain to serve the 
purpose of providing people with an immediate safety mechanism to counter fear and threats.  
During ancient times, beings who were different were perceived as life-threatening.  Thus, 
forming a quick judgment against a being with dissimilar attributes and deciding to fight or flee 
was a matter of life or death.8  However, in modern day life, the context of making organizational 
leadership decisions does not involve an immediate life or death risk.  People do not face the 
same challenges as they did during prehistoric times.  Yet, gender biases are inherent and 
ingrained patterns of brain activity; through recognizing their existence and taking proactive 
steps to halt automatic brain processing, leaders can work toward eliminating the harmful effects.   
Leaders need to be aware of another psychological aspect of biases.  Based on pre-conceived 
ideas and experiences, the human brain organizes people of other identity groups under certain 
categories.  For instance, the brain can assign a person to any of the following types of category 
tags based on his or her age, race, culture, religion, and/or gender:  good or bad, safe or unsafe, 
lazy or productive, assertive or bossy, intelligent or foolish, strong or weak, and so on.9  Biases 
function to streamline the thought process by grouping people together for our brain to quickly 
sort out.10  However, gender inclusion is jeopardized when biases influence leaders to 
automatically categorize males as having positive characteristics and females as having neutral 
or negative characteristics instead of forming decisions based on objective measurements. 
With an understanding of the basic theory behind the unconscious gender bias, leaders can 
benefit from examining specific bias tendencies leading to gender inequality.  An example of a 
gender bias experienced during infancy illustrates the point.  Emily R. Mondschein, Karen E. 
Adolph, and Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda of the New York University researched the impacts 
                                                           
7 Ibid., 2. 
8 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 5. 
9 Ibid., 5. 




of gender bias on infant motor development.  The authors submit that while boys tend to surpass 
girls in physical growth and activity skills during early childhood, boys do not outperform girls 
during infancy.  Infants develop equally, regardless of gender.11  Gender biases, however, sway 
mothers’ estimations of their babies’ crawling ability.  Through test questions such as “What is 
the steepest slope your baby can really crawl down successfully, without any help and without 
falling or sliding?” and “What is the steepest slope your baby will attempt to crawl down, 
regardless of whether he/she will fall or require assistance?” the researchers found that mothers 
overestimate boy infants’ ability to crawl while underestimating girl infants’ ability to crawl.12  
Mothers incorrectly expect the genders to differ.  Biases can persuade leaders to conclude similar 
expectations.  Inherent preconceptions and expectations of gender abilities can detrimentally 
affect female development, beginning at an early age in the home and continuing through 
adulthood in the workplace.   
CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITATIONS OF GENDER BIASES 
Organizations have embraced a top-down approach to gender diversity management.  For 
example, as emphasized in a report from the McKinsey Global Institute prepared for 
commercial, public, and social sector leaders, “$12 trillion could be added to global [Gross 
National Product] GDP by 2025 by advancing women’s equality.”13  Leaders recognize that 
developing and including gender facts and insights into business decisions could have positive 
economic impacts.  In supporting a Presidential Executive Order, the DoD Diversity and 
Inclusion Strategic Plan states, “We are in a ‘Battle for Talent’ to ensure we are able to recruit 
and retain the best our nation has to offer.”14  Female backgrounds bring different experiences 
and perspectives to the boardroom and to the battlefield, giving leaders a wider knowledge base 
when making decisions in support of the mission.  The ability of an organization to seize full 
economic potential and achieve mission goals is weakened without gender inclusion.       
Unconscious gender biases serve to stymie leaders’ best diversity policy and management efforts 
by inhibiting females from achieving their full potential.  Similar to mothers underestimating 
their female babies’ ability to crawl, unconscious gender stereotypes can cause leaders to 
underestimate their female members’ ability to perform.  A specific example is the potential for 
leaders to possess the inherent notion that women do not welcome a challenge.15  Often, leaders 
automatically offer demanding positions and tasks to men.  Conversely, women must either 
                                                           
11 Emily R. Mondschein, Karen E. Adolph, and Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda, “Gender Bias in Mothers’ 
Expectations about Infant Crawling,” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 77, (2000):  305, doi:  
10.1006/jecp.2000.2597. 
12 Ibid., 207. 
13Jonathan Woetzel, Anu Madgavkar, Kweilin Ellingrud, Eric Labaye, Sandrine Devillard, Eric Kutcher, James 
Manyika, Richard Dobbs, and Mekala Krishnan, “The Power of Parity:  How Advancing Women’s Equality Can 
Add $12 Trillion to Global Growth,” McKinsey Global Institute, September 2015, 
file:///C:/Users/Lena%20Kaman/Downloads/MGI%20Power%20of%20parity_Full%20report_September%202015.
pdf. 
14 Department of Defense, “Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017”, 2012, accessed January 30, 
2017 at http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as 
%20of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf. 
15 Julie Indvik, “Women and Leadership,” in Leadership Theory and Practice, ed. Peter Northouse (Thousand 
Oaks:  Sage Publications, Inc, 2001), 228. 
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specifically ask for and express an interest in challenging assignments or remain silent.16  
Similarly, an unconscious bias can compel leaders to categorize females as less competent than 
males.  In this case, leaders develop male careers by affording them job experience.  Again, 
females must either choose to repeatedly prove themselves and earn trust by performing well in a 
specific role before being given added responsibility or remain stagnant in job opportunity.17  
When a certain demographic is underutilized and not provided equal opportunities to achieve its 
full potential, the entire organization suffers.   
In addition to unrealized potential, another consequence of unconscious gender biases is a lack of 
gender diversity in top leadership positions.  According to a June 2017 report, only 6.4 percent of 
Fortune 500 companies were run by a female Chief Executive Officer in 2016.18  Military 
statistics display a comparable shortage.  As of May 2017, every service had 10% or less female 
representation in the active duty flag and general officer wardrooms.  The Navy led the services 
with 10% of admirals, while Marine Corps females only comprised 1% of its general officer 
corps.  The Army and Air Force had 6% and 8%, respectively.19  All too often, achieving gender 
diversity in senior management and senior military ranks becomes difficult due to biased 
perceptions among women themselves of how they can fit into the organization.  They do not see 
a large complement of other women in upper leadership positions and thus assume climbing the 
organization’s ladder is not a viable option for them.  They may exit the organization and leave 
promising careers, thinking it will be too challenging for them to reach a senior level position.20  
By confronting unconscious biases, leaders can minimize female talent drain, set the bar higher 
for achievement, and foster a culture of limitless potential for females. 
Overall, a lack of diversity caused by gender bias consequences may result in an unwillingness to 
challenge practices and procedures that no longer optimize the organization’s goals.21  If the 
employees have similar backgrounds, they will tend to think alike because they are drawing upon 
similar experiences.  People with a broad array of experiences offer diverse communication 
styles and different methods of solving problems, managing assets, and tackling obstacles.22  
Gender diversity produces these options for new solutions and development which can increase 
                                                           
16 Ibid., 228. 
17 Ibid., 228. 
18 Jena McGregor, “The Number of Women CEOs in the Fortune 500 is at an all-time high – of 32,” The 
Washington Post, June 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/06/07/the-number-
of-women-ceos-in-the-fortune-500-is-at-an-all-time-high-of-32/?utm_term=.aca7bc4c3fbd. 
19 Daniel Sagalyn, “Report:  U.S. Military Leadership Lacks Diversity at Top,” PBS Newshour (blog), March 
11, 2011 (5:11 p.m.), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/military-report/. 
20 Julie Indvik, “Women and Leadership,” in Leadership Theory and Practice, ed. Peter Northouse (Thousand 
Oaks:  Sage Publications, Inc, 2001), 227-229. 
21 Lena Buettner, “An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator 
Career Decision Choices,” (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master’s graduate capstone requirements, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 8. 
22 David Thomas and Robin Ely, “Making Differences Matter:  A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity,” 





the likelihood of positive results and growth.23  Therefore, when leaders confront biases, the 
organization can achieve more success than if leaders ignore biases. 
EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO GENDER BIASES 
After recognizing gender biases and understanding their consequences and limitations, 
implementing effective workforce solutions is another step for leaders in the continuous process 
of challenging the unconscious gender bias to create positive organizational outcomes.  Research 
indicates that even when people believe prejudicial and stereotyping behaviors are wrong and 
harmful, they still fall prey to harboring unconscious biases.24  Gender biases must be unlearned 
by slowing the brain’s automatic processes.25  First and foremost, the unconscious must become 
conscious through training and education efforts.  Organizations can take a cue from industry 
leaders such as Google who have incorporated unconscious bias training into their employees’ 
toolkits.  Google offers training workshops and hands-on sessions to arm employees with 
productive ways to tackle unconscious gender biases.26  According to Brian Welle, Google’s 
Director of People Analytics, “Now it’s part of the daily conversation at Google with employees 
owning it and challenging each other all the time.”27  In response to the DoD decision in 
December 2015 to allow women to serve in all roles, the Marine Corps has already taken this 
first step by dispatching mobile training teams to educate the Corps on unconscious prejudices 
and presuppositions. 28  The other military services can follow suit in electing to provide 
education to their members.29  Training opens the aperture to begin instilling positive techniques 
for leaders. 
Inclusive resolutions also begin with open dialogue between top leaders and members of 
demographic groups.  For example, focus groups, surveys, and online networking sites are 
valuable methods for leaders to begin a discussion with women and learn first-hand examples of 
gender biases they have experienced.30  Facebook groups, such as the Female Navy Officer 
group, exemplify social networking sites that cultivate discussion between junior and senior 
membership.   Often, feedback from junior members highlighting experiences of unconscious 
bias in the workplace results in leaders acting to promote awareness of the behavior.   Thus, 
leadership turns the experiences into teaching points for the benefit of the wholistic organization 
moving forward.31  Additionally, corporate organizations, as well as the military, have embraced 
                                                           
23 Ibid. 
24 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 2. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Jessica Guynn, “Google’s ‘bias-busting’ Workshops Target Hidden Prejudices,” USA Today, May 12, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/05/12/google-unconscious-bias-diversity/27055485/. 
28 Tyler Main, “All Marines to Get ‘Unconscsious Bias’ Training as Women Join Infantry,” military.com, 
March 18, 2016, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/03/18/all-marines-unconscious-bias-training-women-
join-infantry.html. 
29 The author acknowledges that the Marine Corps is the service branch with the lowest percentage of female 
representation in the flag and general officer ranks, making its efforts to educate the Corps on the unconscious 
gender bias even more meaningful.   
30 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 9. 
31 Facebook, Female Navy Officers, social networking group, accessed June 30, 2017, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/femalenavyofficers/. 
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networking groups patterned after Facebook Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg’s “Lean In 
Circles.”32  In September 2015, the Lean In circles began occurring at the Pentagon with DoD 
buy-in to encourage women to hold similar networking groups across the force.33  While 
obstructions caused by biases will not be resolved in one linear step, continual monitoring by 
leaders can create a culture change that recognizes the difference between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.  Having the ear of senior leaders to inculcate change is a crucial measure 
to eliminate unconscious biases.   
Another step in solving unconscious bias problems is to view leadership qualities as gender 
neutral.  As asserted in the study The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership: Damned 
if You Do, Doomed if You Don’t, men are inherently viewed to have more “take charge” 
characteristics and women are inherently viewed to have more “take care” characteristics.  
Leaders view “take charge” behaviors as more effective in activities such as delegating, 
influencing superiors, and problem-solving.34  The misconception that females do not possess 
“take charge” skills becomes problematic for females; they not only have to perform their job, 
but also have to concentrate on disproving the biased theories.  To complicate the situation, when 
women do violate the expected behavior and display desirable “take charge” skills, leaders may 
then unconsciously penalize them for being too masculine and unconventional.  Hence, women 
experience the double-bind, defined by the research organization Catalyst as, “a psychological 
impasse created when contradictory demands are made of an individual so that no matter which 
directive is followed, the response will be construed as incorrect.”35  Leaders may view women 
as too soft and incompetent or too masculine and unlikeable, but rarely view them as both 
competent and likeable.36  Moreover, a study of Swedish government venture capitalists 
conducted by the Harvard Business Review observed similar patterns of leaders assigning 
gendered leadership qualities to entrepreneurs.  The leaders routinely questioned the females’ 
“credibility, trustworthiness, experience, and knowledge” while labeling males as “assertive, 
innovative, competent, experienced, knowledgeable, and having established networks.”  
Specifically, a male was described as “young and promising” while a female was described as 
“young, but inexperienced.”37  Leaders will serve to strengthen their organizations by removing 
preconceived gendered notions of employees’ leadership qualities.  Valuing the broad range of 
characteristics women possess and refraining from punishing those who violate entrenched 
normative traits are critical behaviors for leaders to follow to institute culture change.    
                                                           




34 Catalyst, “The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership: Damned if You Do, Doomed if You 
Don’t,” last modified 2007, 
http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Double_Bind_Dilemma_for_Women_in_Leadership_Damned_if_You_D
o_Doomed_if_You_Dont.pdf, 5. 
35 Ibid., 1. 
36 Ibid., 19. 
37 Malin Malmstrom, Jeaneth Johansson, and Joakim Wincent, “We Recorded VCs’ Conversations and 






In preventing the unconscious gender bias from hindering an organization’s optimal talent 
management, leaders can also seek to gender neutralize human resource activities, such as 
interviewing and hiring.38  First, gender neutral standardization precludes leaders from asking 
gender biased questions during an interview.39  For example, a military leader may be concerned 
about employees’ childcare plans during deployments and periods of extended work hours; an 
unconscious gender bias could cause the leader to associate characteristics of childcare provision 
with only female employees but not male employees.40  A standard interview question posed 
indiscriminately to all members of the command, regardless of gender, of their childcare plans 
stifles the bias.  Second, gender neutralized hiring practices ensure impartiality and thwart 
leaders from selecting candidates based on gender, rather than qualifications.  A study by 
Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rose illustrates how gender-blind auditions, an audition with a 
screen between the musician and hiring director, helped orchestras overcome the unconscious 
bias when hiring musicians.  From the data, the authors conclude that a blind audition “increases 
the probability a woman will be advanced and hired,” accounting for a 50% increase in 
probability the female will advance from a preliminary round and for a 30% increase in the 
proportion of female new hires.41  Another data point underscored in a Lean In discussion guide 
shows the odds of getting hired are improved by 61 percent if a female name is replaced with a 
male name on a résumé.42  While not practical in all settings, particularly those requiring final 
face-to-face or phone interviews, companies should not pre-screen applicants by gender.  
Implementing gender neutral and gender blind procedures in human resource processes promises 
success in hiring and retaining the most qualified and talented candidate, regardless of gender.     
Finally, leadership needs to actively promote mentorship of female members.  As the culture 
changes and more women remain in industry, there will be more female role models and mentors 
from whom potential new hires and recruits may glean knowledge and experience.  A group 
mentoring environment where females feel comfortable seeking advice and support is ideal.43  
Professional women’s leadership conferences, such as the private sector’s Global Women’s 
Leadership Summit and the military’s Joint Women’s Leadership Symposium, offer an excellent 
venue for women to connect with, learn from, and mentor each other.  Leadership endorsement 
of conference attendance, mission permitting, is imperative.  A formal social support system with 
buy-in from top leadership would allow females to flourish and minimize the number of females 
who leave the business.  
A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE OF GENDER DIVERSITY 
Some may argue that seeking gender diversity approaches is not as inclusive as it purports to be.  
For example, by eliminating biases to empower the minority gender, leaders could disempower 
the majority gender.  When men witness an organization’s continual focus on the inclusion of 
                                                           
38 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 8. 
39 Ibid., 8. 
40 A female military officer reported her experience of being asked about childcare plans on a post in the 
Female Navy Officer Facebook group. 
41 Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rose, “Orchestrating Impartiality:  The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female 
Musicians,” The American Economic Review 90, no. 4 (2000): 715, 738. 
42 “Tips for Managers,” Lean In, accessed June 30, 2017 at https://leanin.org/tips/managers. 
43 Horace McCormick, “The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” 9. 
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women, they could feel excluded or marginalized.44  Consequently, males may become resentful 
and not serve to their full potential, negating diversity’s goal of increasing productivity and 
improving morale.  Diversity, however, is about integration and inclusion.  Leaders need to 
approach diversity discussions and situations as an opportunity to bring together the two genders 
to form a better organization for everyone’s benefit.  Through supporting an un-biased 
perspective, leaders embolden both genders to maximize the skills they need to succeed.  Leaders 
are cautioned against pitting one gender over the other.45  Likewise, organizations need to apply 
integration principles beginning at the foundational level of recruitment.  Instead of employing a 
recruiter or human resource manager to specifically hire females, for instance, organizations 
need to incorporate recruiters and managers who canvas the nation’s population pool looking for 
a diverse mix of merit-based talent.46  Through leaders’ appropriate actions, they can instill a 
culture of integration in the members of the military instead of an adversarial culture of one 
gender being superior to the other. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizations benefit from properly incorporating diverse cultures into their workforce.  
Corporate America and the military recognize that diverse populations, including females, are 
vital to mission success.  Organizations aim to create and sustain a culture that fully values and 
leverages a diverse workforce.  Diversity management plans ensure industry leaders not only 
implement, support, and encourage diversity out of fairness and equality but also out of necessity 
to achieve organizational goals and missions.47  Leaders’ endorsement of team diversity is 
critical for an organization to function at its peak and to capitalize on increased and sustainable 
results.   
Unconscious gender biases can permeate the minds of workforce leaders however, counteracting 
the benefits of diversity policies and causing adverse effects to talent management decisions.  
The biases impede development, retention, and advancement of women in the workforce.  
Leadership can break the barriers of biases and instill improvements to the workplace by 
consciously identifying their existence, understanding their harmful effects, and applying 
meaningful solutions to combat them.  Organizations will prosper in ways never thought possible 
through the enriched creativity, innovation, and teamwork that gender diversity brings to the 
organization.  
 
                                                           
44 Ruth Mayhew, “Pros and Cons of Diversity Management in the Workplace,” Chron (blog), accessed 
February 5, 2017, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/pros-cons-diversity-management-workplace-3028.html. 
45 David Thomas, “Making Diversity Part of the Organization,” Yale Insights, accessed February 6, 2017, 
http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-do-leaders-need-to-understand-about-diversity. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Lena Buettner, “An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator 
Career Decision Choices,” (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master’s graduate capstone requirements, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 12-13.  
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THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WOMEN: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 
CDR Alissa N. Clawson, USN 
INTRODUCTION 
Though the collapse of the Soviet Union is often attributed to the arms race under President 
Reagan that economically strained the Soviet economy, the Human Rights agenda started by 
President Ford with the Helsinki Accords and continued under President Carter, had a 
significant impact that holds its own place in ending the Cold War.1  
In 1975, the Helsinki Accords was initiated by Russia to settle border disputes in Europe and, 
under the Ford Administration, the U.S. decided to include the protection of human rights as 
part of the accords, not knowing what impact it would have, if any. However, dissidents 
throughout Eastern Europe used the Helsinki Accords to hold their governments accountable 
for human rights abuses. The Human Rights Campaign changed the atmosphere in Eastern 
Europe and Soviet Russia. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev instituted glasnost (political 
freedoms) and perestroika (economic reforms) in the Soviet Union. Also in the late 1980s, a 
series of demonstrations across Eastern Europe started and, unlike the previous typical 
response by the USSR – the rolling of tanks across the lands, the governments of Eastern 
Europe were encouraged to reform. One of the culminating moments was when millions of 
Eastern Germans were allowed to cross the Berlin Wall and stream into West Berlin, guards 
choosing not to fire into the crowds. There was no going back – 9 million East Germans visited 
the West within the first week, eventually leading to the end of the German Democratic 
Republic and eventually to the end of the Soviet Empire.2 
Human rights as a strategy was not the sole cause of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 
nor did it address the immediate concerns of “hot crises” around the world where Soviet 
aggression manifested itself. However, it did lay the foundations for some of the eventual 
proximate causes that contributed to the end of the communist hold on Eastern Europe. It was a 
cause of unrest in the populations of the Warsaw Pact nations and a basis for Glasnost and 
Perestroika within the Soviet Union.  
With the current resurgence of an aggressive Russia and the destabilization Russia is fomenting 
in Ukraine, addressing the physical security of women is a similar means of indirectly 
influencing the course of events to lay the foundations for stability in Ukraine.  
THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE: 
Today, in what began as a protest against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych when he 
dropped plans for trade agreements with the European Union, Ukraine is in a crisis of open 
hostilities in the East Ukraine where pro-Russian separatists are fighting the pro-West 
Government of Ukraine. The separatists are actively backed by Russia, something Russia 
denies. Russia’s motivations, ostensibly, include not wanting to see the expansion of European 
influence into its former ally of the Soviet period. This is one of many aggressive actions that 
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Russia is conducting in Eastern Europe, such as the annexation of Crimea, invasion of Georgia, 
and the harassment of NATO forces in the Balkans.  
The instability in Eastern Ukraine has many foundations, including the ethnic and language divide; 
political divisions (pro-Russian verses pro-European), and an overall poor economic situation and 
accusations of corruption in the government.3 This paper will also show that the poor physical 
security of women is a foundational factor to the instability in the region; an instability that Russia 
has easily exploited for its own agenda of maintaining influence in its former Soviet republic and 
maintaining distance between European influences and Russia’s border.  
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS 
Addressing the physical security of women in Ukraine is a human rights imperative in the short 
term, but is a foundation for stability in the region in the long term, similarly to how the Human 
Rights Campaign was a contributor though not the main effort in the fight against the Soviet 
Union. To ensure the security of women in the conflict-ridden areas of Eastern Ukraine is 
addressed, women must be actively sought out to participate in any negotiations that discuss 
the process for peace or reconciliation. Inclusivity in the peace process will improve the 
legitimacy of the final agreements and the stability of the government from addressing the 
needs of women will improve the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, a necessary 
condition when fighting insurgencies.  
Some may argue that, while the protection of women is a noble cause, it will not affect the 
security of the theater without willing cooperation from its major aggressor, Russia. This is 
true. Addressing the physical security of women, by itself, will not solve the current crisis in 
Ukraine. However, the security of women is a long-term foundational issue, and it can take 
generations for the culture to change enough for its effects to take hold.  
IMPROVING STABILITY BY ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 
In a much-referenced study conducted in 2009, Valerie Hudson, Professor of Political Science at 
Texas A&M University, and her colleagues have discovered that “The physical security of 
women…is strongly associated with the peacefulness of a state, the degree to which the state is of 
concern to the international community, and the quality of relations between the state and its 
neighbors.”4 Hudson and colleagues compared the physical security of women to other known and 
accepted indices of stability in a nation (per capita gross domestic product, level of democracy) and 
found that the physical security of women was a stronger correlation. This study was one of the 
first, if not the first, to equate the security of women with the security of a state.  
“If a scholar or policymaker had to select one variable – level of democracy, level of wealth, 
prevalence of Islamic culture5, or the physical security of women – to assist them in predicting 
which states would be the least peaceful or the most concern to the international community or 
have the worst relations with their neighbors, they would do best by choosing the measure of 
the physical security of women.”6 Applying this finding to regional security, one can conclude 
that reducing the violence against women is a contributor to a longer-term goal of preventing 
future hostilities and is highly relevant to the shaping strategy of any theater campaign plan. 
Preventing the escalation of violence in a conflict can prevent the exacerbation of instability – 
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preventing the new norm of increased rate of violence against women, which would lead to a 
more aggressive nation-state.  
To demonstrate the relationship of the physical security status of women in the current situation 
in Ukraine and Russia, Table 1 shows the status of women in those two states, as well as other 
example nations from other representative regions of the world. The source is the WomanStats 
Project, an academic database of statistics on women around the world, established by Valerie 
Hudson and colleagues to collect data on women and security. The data itself comes from a 
variety of sources, such as the United Nations or independent researchers. Table 1 uses a multi-
variable scale created by Dr. Mary Caprioli that merges many different variables that describe 
women’s security into a single factor that can compare the security of women in different 
nation-states, with “0” being the most secure and “4” being the least. There are no countries 
with a factor “0”, and only eight countries at a factor of “1”. This data comes from a collected 
dataset on 175 nation-states.7 A cursory review shows that known unstable or aggressor nations 
fall towards the higher end of the scale and the most stable at the lowest.  
Physical Security
of Women
1    2    3  4
Nations
0 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are enforced; there are no 
taboos or norms against reporting these crimes, which are rare.  There are no honor killings or femicides 
(the targeted killing of females because they are female).
1 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are generally enforced; 
there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), 
which crimes are not common. Honor killings and femicides do not occur. 
2 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are sporadically enforced;
there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes),
which are common. Honor killings and/or femicides are quite rare, occurring only in small pockets of the 
population, and are condemned by society.
3 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, but not necessarily marital rape; these laws are rarely 
enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable 
crimes), which affect a majority of women.   Honor killings and/or femicides may occur among certain 
segments of society but are not generally accepted within the society.
4 – There are no or weak laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape, and these laws are not 
generally enforced. Honor killings and/or femicides may occur and are either ignored or generally 
accepted. (Examples of weak laws — need 4 male witnesses to prove rape; rape is only defined as sex 
with girls under 12 — all other sex is by definition consensual, etc.)     
   
Table 1. Physical Security of Women in Ukraine, Russia and other sample 
nations.8 
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PHYSICAL SECURITY STATUS OF WOMEN IN UKRAINE: 
Even before the conflict in Eastern Ukraine started, Ukrainian women were often victims of 
violence. In 2010, the United Nations reported a rate between 20-44% of Ukrainian citizens 
being affected.9 Another set of Ukrainian government statistics was that greater than 44% of 
women in Ukraine had experienced domestic violence at least once, in comparison to 25% 
average for European women.10 The Ukrainian national parliament has even held special 
hearings on the discrimination of and violence against women.11 
Ukraine is ahead of its peer nations on laws addressing violence against women. It was the first 
former Soviet nation to criminalize human trafficking and to pass laws targeting domestic 
violence, to include provisions for providing services to victims.12 Ukraine has, at least in 
rhetoric and laws, recognized the need to address issues of violence against women, though 
much work is still necessary to ensure budgets are in place to make the laws effective in 
practice, and to ensure the culture at home changes to reflect the goals of the laws.  
The UN Secretary General’s Report on Women, Peace, and Security states, “where cultures of 
violence and discrimination against women and girls exist prior to conflict, they will be 
exacerbated during conflict.”13 This trend is true in Ukraine as well. Due to the hostilities in 
Eastern Ukraine, domestic violence has increased. In 2014, International Women's Rights 
Center in Kiev (a national hotline for victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, and 
gender discrimination) received a total of 7,000 calls, 80 percent related to domestic violence. 
In the first three months of 2015, the center received more than 2,600 calls, one and a half 
times the rate of 2014.14 Women with husbands returning from the war are saying they don’t 
recognize their husbands – they were never violent before. Men are also experiencing their own 
sexual assaults as a result of combat, including castration as a part of the torture and violence. 
Since the culture doesn’t support the mainstreaming of therapy, men turn to alcohol instead, 
and ultimately to violence. Women who call the hotline from outside the conflict area can get 
support, but those that call from within the conflict zone can only talk with counselors over the 
phone; no police assistance is available to remove them from the situation.  
Domestic violence was an issue before the war that has been exacerbated by the conflict. Other 
issues come from the nature of war itself. According to the United Nations Secretary General’s 
report on women, peace and security, “during conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all 
forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation, including torture, rape, mass 
rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and trafficking.”15 In Serbia, 
another former Eastern European communist state, rape was used as a weapon of war – often 
organized and in camps, with estimated numbers of around 20,000 to 50,000 women being 
affected. The tragedy in Serbia was also the first time that the rape and sexual enslavement 
were declared as crimes against humanity, “challenging [for the first time] the widespread 
acceptance of rape and sexual enslavement of women as intrinsic part of war.”16 For Ukraine, 
the statistics are hard to gather due to the ongoing conflict and current lawlessness of the 
region. Reports and allegations for both sides of the conflict are being made, reported by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.17 Rape is occurring, 
though it currently appears to be crimes of opportunity rather than an orchestrated tactic of war 
ordered by higher authority, such as what happened in Serbia. This does not mean it cannot 
change, especially as the violence continues.  
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Finally, though the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have varied between 
reports, all reports agree that women make up a large percentage of the IDPs. “The on-going 
conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk has increased insecurity and 
violence, deepened gender inequality and disproportionately affected women, who make up 
over 63% of the country’s estimated 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).”18 Women 
are often the ones forced to bear the burden of care for families with reduced resources, taking 
care of children and the elderly. Women in Ukraine already suffer discrimination in the 
workplace. Additionally, IDPs from the Luhansk and Donetsk are also being discriminated 
against when searching for employment elsewhere in Ukraine. These two factors coupled 
indicate that displaced women are at increased risk of being exploited as they desperately seek 
sources of income to take care of themselves and their families.  
As conflict continues in Eastern Ukraine, these vectors of physical violence against women 
(and the violence against men) demonstrate the need to have a gendered perspective when 
addressing the human rights needs of the war-torn region. Additionally, as discussed with the 
study by Hudson et al, the physical violence against women needs to be addressed to ensure the 
escalation due to the conflict does not become a new norm. Since the physical security of 
women is a strong correlation with the stability of a nation (peacefulness, relations with 
neighbors), addressing the physical security of women in Ukraine as a whole and in the conflict 
regions, in particular, is a foundation for future stability. 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1325: 
In October 2000, the United Nations (UN) passed the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)19. The resolution recognizes that while women are affected by 
war, they are often not part of the decisions associated with war: its initiation, its conduct or its 
resolution. Women and children are often the primary sufferers as the collaterals of war, whether as 
unarmed civilians caught in the conflict, as displaced persons/refugees, or as victims of targeted 
attacks, such as rape when used as a tactic of war. As such, one of the primary tenets of the 
resolution urges signatory states to consider how war affects men and women differently, requiring 
a gendered perspective in decisions about the conduct of war, its aftermath and in peacekeeping 
operations. Gendered perspective is a consideration by both the men and women who are decision-
makers. It is not the sole responsibility of women who participate.  
The resolution also acknowledges the role that women need to have in “conflict prevention, 
conflict resolution, and post-conflict recovery, and peace-building.”20 While women suffer 
from war and are instrumental in bringing stability to post-conflict regions, they are often not 
included in decision-making roles in its resolution, due to the lack of representation in senior 
leadership positions, politically or militarily. Often, only the combatants are negotiators in 
peace settlements, though the discussions often have a vast impact on civilian matters of 
stability and governance. Without the presence of women in the negotiations, atrocities 
committed against women have often been given immunity without the consent of the victims. 
UNSCR 1325 argues that not only is a gendered perspective required, but the active inclusion 
of women is necessary to both ensure the needs of women are addressed, but to ensure lasting 
peace due to the unique perspectives on community, stability, and negotiations that women 
bring to the table.  
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Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are all signatories of UNSCR 1325. As of 2016, sixty 
countries have instituted National Action Plans in support of UNSCR 1325, including the 
United States and Ukraine. Though Russia is a signatory on the resolution, it does not have a 
National Action Plan to ensure its implementation within Russia.21 NATO is also committed to 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and has claimed numerous benefits to their operations. “It 
has given us better access to the local population, more popular support, better information, 
better situational awareness, and smarter interventions with less risks and better outcomes.”22
NATO has appointed a Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security, who has 
actively engaged with Ukraine and with their adoption of their National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace, and Security.23 
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS: 
The UN Secretary General report on Women, Peace, and Security, states that “peace 
negotiations and peace accords lay the foundation for rebuilding societies after conflict. They 
commonly determine the political, civil, economic and social structures in post-conflict 
situations. Concerns specific to women do not always reach the negotiating table. This is 





major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 and analyzed them for gender participation, 
[they] found that women made up only 4 percent of signatories, 2.4 percent of chief mediators, 
3.7 percent of witnesses to peace agreement signings, and 9 percent of negotiators… In 2011, 
only 4 of 14 UN-supported mediation processes included any women as members of the 
negotiating parties.”
26 
Without actively seeking out women for participation, they will most
likely not be present at the negotiating table. 
“Peace agreements that focus solely on ending the fighting fail to address the vital tasks 
necessary for sustaining a genuine peace, including: providing security and basic services, 
reintegrating combatants into society, building trust amongst opposing parties, fostering 
institutions that can uphold the rule of law, and promoting legitimately-elected leadership.”
27  
A
case study of women participating in North Ireland’s peace talks between the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) and the British government is a success story resulting in the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA). The mediator, U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, 
suggested multiparty talks including the top 10 political parties by vote versus just the largest 
and main political parties – this enabled local political parties to participate. Women’s groups 
in Northern Ireland saw their opportunity to participate and formed a non-partisan party that 
spanned the IRA/British divide and ended up being the key negotiators between the two main 
opposing factions. Final hesitancy by the IRA to give up violence was eradicated when 9/11 
tragedy of the United States proved the horrors of violence. In July 2002, in the spirit of the 
GFA, the IRA made a “first ever public statement of apology to the families of noncombatants 
that were victims of their attacks over the time period of the Troubles.”
28 
“If [the Northern
Ireland Women’s Coalition] had not been at the table, there may not have been a chapter on 
reconciliation. It was the women’s coalition that put those words in [the agreement] and talked 
about paying attention to young people and resources for our youth in the future.”
29 
Though
there is still disagreement in Northern Ireland about the future, e.g. remain in the United 
Kingdom versus a United Ireland, the divergent parties have both agreed not to pursue violence 




The Lusaka Protocol ending Angola’s civil war is an example of peace negotiations that 
neglected women in the peace process.  It was originally touted as “gender neutral” in that 
there was no discrimination against women in any provision of the agreement. However, there 
was no advocacy for women’s issues either. Of the forty members of the talks, zero were 
women, and there was no discussion on addressing internal displacement, sexual violence, 
abuses by the government, or the rebuilding of social services. Amnesty was given to atrocities 
committed during the war, which included rape, and no thought was given for the reintegration 
of the male combatants back into their communities, causing increases in “alcoholism, drug 
abuse, divorce, and domestic violence.”
31 
Society was not rebuilt, nor was true peace restored.
These and other issues of instability all contributed to the even breakdown of the peace and 
violence erupted again. Though the conflict and the cultures in Angola and Ukraine are 
dissimilar, lessons can still be drawn. Reintegration issues causing increased domestic violence 
is a known issue in Ukraine, and amnesty given to human rights atrocities is something to 
ensure does not happen in Ukraine. 
Evidence that women’s participation in peace negotiations strengthens the peace process is 
currently empirical, i.e. there are plenty of case studies. However there is a lack of hard data 
and academic analytics – women’s role in security has been neglected as a topic of interest in 
academia (one of the reasons why the 2009 Hudson study is considered groundbreaking). 
However, there is plenty of “hard data” on how women’s involvement and gender equality 
improves the performance in other areas such as economics, agricultural productivity, food 
security, water and sewage services, and corruption in government.
32
 Additionally, there is
research that “has found a correlation between more inclusive and open models of negotiations 
and a higher likelihood that the resulting agreements will hold, preventing a relapse into 
conflict.”
33 
Women who do participate tend to look towards their own interests, such as quotas
for elections, land and property rights, redress for sexual and gender-based crimes, and 
equitable distribution of jobs.  Nonetheless, complying with these demands not only addresses 
the atrocities committed against women but also improves the social stability of their 
communities. Women’s employment in the public sector ensures greater access to services to 
the overall population.
34 
Since women make up a significant percentage of heads of households
during conflict, giving them access to jobs reduces their dependency on high-risk/low pay 
employment, which women are otherwise forced to seek. The money women do earn goes into 
the caretaking of their families, again improving the stability of the community.
35 
“Countries
with only 10 percent of women in the labor force are nearly 30 times more likely to experience 
internal conflict than states with 40 percent of women in the labor force.”
36 
These additional
findings backed by academic research strengthen the empirical data regarding women’s 
important role in negotiations. 
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN UKRAINE: 
If national level or military leadership is the source of participants for the peacemaking process 
in Ukraine, women may not be present. Women have a traditional role in Ukrainian society, 
and this traditional view of women’s role in society manifests itself in low representation at 
higher levels of government and other senior leadership positions.
37 
In a 2011 study by the
Ukrainian Women’s Fund, found no woman holding chairmanships posts in a variety of 
regional and national councils, Cabinet of Ministers or Parliament.
38 
However, this is not due to
a lack of women’s interest in politics.  At the local levels, women are 51% of village councils, 
46% of town councils, and 28% of municipal councils.
39
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In the current political climate, Ukraine can be described as a nation in transition. There are 
examples of the Ukrainian government making progress towards gender equality, while at the 
same time evidence that there still remains a long road until it becomes real. Ukraine is ahead 
of its neighbor, Russia, in its rhetorical commitment to improving women’s status and ahead in 
actual actions including protection under the law. “Faced with the foreign aggression, Ukraine, 
in close cooperation with its international partners, is making efforts to address gender 
imbalances and to modernize its national gender policies with the view to promoting the full-
fledged and effective participation of women in public and politico-military life.”40 The 
government of Ukraine is, at least notionally, calling for the empowerment of women. 
“Ukraine was one of the first countries in the world to adopt a constitutional guarantee of 
gender equality,”41 and at least under the law, women have the same status and rights as men.42  
Lt Gen Victor Muzhenko, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has 
called for the removal of barriers preventing women from serving in greater numbers and in a 
greater variety of roles within the military. Ukraine’s military is currently 8.2% women, 
compared to a NATO average of 10.3%. He has appointed a Gender Advisor (though only at 
the rank of Army Captain) to the Minister of Defense to oversee the implementation of 
Ukraine’s National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace, and Security.43  
Based on the Ukrainian government’s previous actions to address gender equality, the inclusion 
of women in the peace process would most likely be met openly and willingly, though may not 
be independently pursued. When opportunities for peace present itself, women must be actively 
sought out to have a place at the negotiating table, with particular attention paid to local 
leadership who have insight into grievances of and have relationships with the local population. 
The separatists and their Russian backers would also have to be encouraged to include women 
at the negotiating table. The fact that Russia is a signatory on UNSCR 1325 can be used as 
leverage to remind Russia to bring women to the table.  
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION: 
Some may argue that Russia’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine is a problem with roots much 
deeper than just how women area treated domestically. While the protection of women is a 
noble cause, it will not affect the security of the theater without the willing cooperation from 
Russia. Additionally, even with the inclusion of women into peace negotiations, creating a 
notable agreement, there is no guarantee that Russia will value the document anymore that the 
value of the paper it is written on. Russia has started a trend of ignoring past treaties and 
negotiations in its pursuit of regional hegemony.  
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The situation in East Ukraine is one that was exploited by Russia to foment unrest. However, 
negotiations with the separatists in Eastern Ukraine is not quite the same as negotiating with 
Russia itself. Since one of the tenets of counterinsurgency is the importance of legitimacy of 
the government, the role of the peace negotiations is to bring resolution to the grievances of the 
separatist Ukrainians. The aim is to reduce the instability that Russia was able to exploit. 
Bringing women into negotiations is about improving the likelihood that grievances of the local 
community are addressed and improving the legitimacy of the ensuing peace, reducing but not 
necessarily eliminating the likelihood of relapse.  
Addressing the physical security of women is not being claimed as an immediate solution to 
the region’s insecurity – it is a long-term foundational issue and can take generations to take 
hold. Addressing the security of women in Ukraine is important to improve the stability of 
Ukraine, but it is also necessary within Russia, as well. However, addressing Russia’s issues 
will require finesse in the use of the diplomatic levers of national power since they are not 
actively seeking Western support. Russia’s domestic violence is a serious problem – even with 
the prevalence of underreporting on domestic violence, official statistics from Russia show a 
staggering 17,000 women per year die as a result of domestic violence, compared to 1,300 
women in the United States44. Russia’s laws are in desperate need of updating to make domestic 
violence a specific crime; they also need to implement a budget that can fund support to 
victims, such as call centers or shelters, and to prosecute crimes.45 Addressing the physical 
security of women in the short term is a human rights concern, which is an end in and of itself. 
Like the human rights campaign in the Cold War, women’s rights can be leveraged as a non-
provocative issue when engaging Russia diplomatically.  
CONCLUSIONS 
As Senator Robert Menendez said to Secretary Kerry, urging him to implement the Ukraine 
Freedom Support Act, “…the ultimate long-term defense against Russian aggression is a 
strong, democratic Ukrainian government and civil society.” 
46 
Ukraine is working to set itself
up on the path towards becoming a stronger, democratic nation-state.  While the insurgency in 
Eastern Ukraine continues, Ukraine and any foreign support must ensure that the tenets of 
UNSCR 1325 are included as one on the lines of effort for countering the insurgency, 
stabilizing the area and setting the foundations for a lasting peace. 
The physical violence against women is a strong indicator of the aggressiveness of nations. 
Addressing this problem during the crisis and in the negotiations for peace will set foundational 
principles for long-term stability as well as the moral imperative of addressing any human 
rights abuses caused by the conflict. 
]UNSCR 1325 provides guidance on how to address the physical security of women in the 
situation in Ukraine. Based on its tenets, a gendered perspective is required during any 
operations in Luhansk and Donetsk, whether from external help (NATO, UN Peacekeeping, 
US Central Command) or by Ukraine itself as it seeks to resolve the crisis. Additionally, 
beyond just having a gendered perspective, women must be active participants during any 
discussion or negotiations for peace or reconciliation. Women’s participation is strongly 
correlated with stability of the ensuing peace and brings legitimacy to the process.  Due to the 
lack of women in senior political or military positions in Ukraine, they must be actively sought 
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out for participation. The fact that Russia is a signatory of UNSCR 1325, must be used as 
leverage to encourage separatists to also bring women to the negotiating table. 
Addressing physical security of women is not a short-term fix for the aggressiveness in Russia. 
However, Russian does have a poor set of laws and weak support to women as victims of 
domestic violence. Leveraging diplomacy, getting Russia to address the physical security of 
women domestically should be a non-provocative means to sow the seeds for long-term 
stability for the region. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A gender advisor is necessary at the various levels of planning and execution (i.e. strategic, 
operational, tactical). The advisor is there to ensure that the different needs and experiences of 
men and women are taken into consideration when planning for and executing any 
counterinsurgency or peacekeeping operations. 
In addressing physical violence of women, seek out support from civil authorities, international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations for their expertise. 
In any opportunity for further negotiations for peace, ensure women are participants. Several 
options to increase inclusion include: seek out local women’s groups that are familiar with the 
community and women’s specific needs; require a quota for the negotiating parties; or increase 
the number of representative parties to increase the likelihood that local community leadership, 
including women, will be elected to participate in the negotiations. 
Ensure rape as a weapon of war is treated as a crime against humanity, properly prosecuted and 
not included in any amnesty packages. 
Provide advice and assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces and to the separatists who choose to 
discontinue fighting on how to repatriate combatants into society and how to address trauma 
and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Ensure aid and programs targeting displaced persons and refugees understand the specific 
needs of women and provide adequate security to ensure their safety. 
Encourage Ukraine to continue making progress in addressing women’s issues: both gender 
equality in the government and military, and in addressing crimes against women. 
Leverage the UNSCR 1325 as a means for diplomatic relations with Russia with regard to the 
crisis in Ukraine 
Use diplomatic channels to encourage Russia to promote gender equality and improve laws 
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PAPER ABSTRACT 
Not Just Enablers Anymore: Women in SOF 
According to USSOCOM commander, the past decade of warfare has proven that women are 
necessary on the battlefield for our nation to achieve its objectives.  This coupled with the 
fact that today's battlefields have no defined frontlines has contributed to the recent repeal of 
the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.  This action has opened all 
Special Operations positions up to women.  Despite 98 percent of the U.S. military already 
being integrated, there still exists a significant hesitation to integrate combat units, to include 
Special Operations Forces.  For integration to have the intended benefits to our national 
security posture, we must create an environment that reduces anxiety caused by change, fear 
of the unknown and unfamiliar, misinformation, mistaken perceptions and inaccurate 
stereotypes. Reframing expectations will help reduce these challenges and the reluctance to 
integrate.  In order to efficiently and effectively integrate women into newly opened Special 
Operations Forces positions, expectation management must occur for leaders, existing unit 
members and the women entering these units reinforcing the following: women will meet or 
exceed the standards; gender is an Additional Skill Identifier; leadership will ensure good 
order and discipline; unit cohesion will not change; women bring increased diversity and 
















Not Just Enablers Anymore: Women in SOF 
 
"I never saw a wild thing sorry for itself. 
A small bird will drop frozen dead from a bough 




Expectation management is defined as, "a formal process to continuously capture, document, 
and maintain the content, dependencies, and sureness of the expectations for persons 
participating in an interaction, and to apply the information to make the interaction 
successful."2  The U.S. military has done a poor job in recent times accurately capturing and 
projecting the performance of women in service.  The recent roles of women in service and 
the repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR)  have 
triggered the process of gender integration into Special Operations Forces (SOF).  Through 
dissection of research, dialogue and events, it is clear that expectation management must be 
modernized to efficiently and effectively integrate women into SOF.   
THE EVOLUTION 
Women in Service 
It is well accepted that the frontlines of today's battlefields are undefined.  This has created a 
discrepancy in how the U.S. military traditionally maintains segregation between non-combat 
troops and the enemy.  In 2005, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester was the first female Soldier since 
WWII to be awarded the Silver Star with Valor for her actions in Iraq:  
On 20 March 2005, in Iraq... While serving as the Team Leader for RAVEN 42B in the 
617th Military Police Company, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), 18th Military 
Police Brigade, Sergeant Hester led her soldiers on a counterattack of anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) 
who were ambushing a convoy with heavy AK-47 assault rifle fire, PRK machine gun fire, 
and rocket propelled grenades.  Sergeant Hester maneuvered her team through the kill zone 
into a flanking position where she assaulted a trench line with grenades and M-203 rounds.  
She then cleared two trenches with her Squad Leader where she engaged and eliminated 3 
AIF with her M-4 rifle.  Her actions saved the lives of numerous convoy members.  Sergeant 
Hester's bravery is in keeping with the finest traditions of military heroism and reflects 
distinct credit upon herself, the 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), the 18th Military 
Police Brigade, and the United States Army.3  
Though she was both a Military Police Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), which is 
considered a "combat support" Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), as well as a female, 
the enemy did not show regard to the U.S. 1994 Department of Defense Policy, the Direct 
Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, which excluded women from units and 
positions whose main mission was to engage in direct ground combat.  Military Police units 
are fully gender-integrated and are often used for missions such as presence patrols, cordon 
and searches, convoy security and raids.  One could argue that these missions are direct 
29
2017 Women, Peace, and Security Conference Working Papers 
ground combat missions in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.  Sergeant Hester's 
experience was by no means an anomaly.4  As of 27 April 2016, the Defense Casualty 
Analysis System reported over 1,000 U.S. military women wounded in action, and 160 
making the ultimate sacrifice in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).5  In addition, over 1800 Combat Action Badges have been 
awarded to women.6  
In 2010 a Request for Forces (RFF) from Special Operations Command, Central Command 
(SOCCENT), solidified and officially documented the necessity for female support to Special 
Operations.  The RFF specifically requested female screeners to support all-male Special 
Operations Forces in Afghanistan who were limited in their ability to accomplish mission 
requirements due to cultural sensitivities surrounding gender.  This RFF had come after 
several similar requests by both Army conventional forces and Marine Special Operations 
Command Forces which respectively formed the Female Engagement Teams and the Lioness 
Programs operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  The RFF from SOCCENT formed what 
became known as the Cultural Support Teams (CSTs).7  
The Cultural Support Team program was actively providing female teams to SOF elements 
operating in Afghanistan from 2011 through 2014 before it was officially deactivated due to 
drawdowns.  These female teams were assigned to U.S. Army Special Forces detachments, 
75th Ranger Regiment elements, and Naval Special Warfare SEAL teams to enhance mission 
capabilities by gaining access, building rapport, conducting tactical questioning, conducting 
physical searches, and messaging, with a focus on women and children in theater.  The teams 
supported the full spectrum of operations from Special Warfare to Surgical Strike.8  
Though the CSTs fulfilled mission requirements and then some, the increase in capability by 
female enablers did not come without disadvantages.  The teams were a hasty answer to a 
pervasive battlefield capability gap.  They were thinly deployed on short timelines with 
minimal training and exposure to SOF.  They often arrived with little to no forewarning to 
the units they were enabling and were initially received with hesitation.  As outsiders, time 
was required for the CSTs to prove themselves a worthwhile capability.  In addition, when a 
non-organic asset or enabler is embedded into mission execution, the gaining unit assumes a 
greater amount of risk.  This increased risk is due to non-organic assets lacking experience 
with the gaining unit's operating procedures.  Adding a CST to a small SOF unit meant the 
unit gained an additional person to protect, often compounded by losing a shooter due to 
maximum transportation capacity.  Despite CSTs proving extremely beneficial, they could 
not always be included on every mission.   
The SOF Truths state: Special Operations cannot be mass produced and they cannot be 
created after emergencies occur.  SOF are rigorously assessed, carefully selected and 
exceptionally trained.  There exists a small percentage of people who have the capacity to 
function in the environments demanded of SOF.  In addition, it takes a lot of time to train 
mission ready SOF, deployable on nearly immediate notice.  Undesirably, these SOF truths 
are explicitly contradictory to what the CST program was tasked to do.  The CST program 
was forced to reactively develop a program to recruit, assess, select and train hundreds of 
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female Soldiers under extreme time constraints who would only be temporarily attached to 
SOF units.                 
DGCDAR REPEAL 
After the initial wave of CSTs hit Afghanistan in 2011, COL Ellen Haring and SGM Jane 
Baldwin filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government in May 2012, challenging the 1994 
Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.  The lawsuit claimed violation of 
the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause and requested military assignments to be 
made without regard to gender.9  In addition, during the same year, the Army opened up 
about 13,000 positions to women, shortly followed by another 36,000, including the 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the U.S. Army Special Operations aviation wing.   
On 24 January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and the Chairman of the Joints 
Chiefs of Staff announced the repeal of the DGCDAR which lifted the exclusion of women 
from units and positions whose main mission is to engage in direct ground combat.  Many 
argue that over the past decade, the DGCDAR has become unenforceable and obsolete.10  
Moreover, the DGCDAR also created an obstacle to combat units in meeting mission 
objectives by eliminating access to 50 percent of the population.  On 6 January 2015, the 
Secretary of the Army approved the provisional opening and assessment of the U.S. Army 
Ranger School to begin with Ranger Class 06-15 on 20 April 2015.11  In the fall of 2015, the 
first ever female Rangers, two West Point Military Academy graduates, Captain Kristen 
Griest and 1st Lieutenant Shaye Haver, earned their tabs.  The Commander, U.S. Special 
Operations Command directed all SOF components to review current training standards and 
submit recommendations for gender-neutral standards with a suspense of 1 July 2015.12  
Based on recommendations by the military service secretaries, Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter officially opened all combat jobs to women in January 2016.  As of today, all the 
Special Operations specialties are open to women.   
EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT 
Despite successful gender integration of 98 percent of our military, there still exists a 
significant reluctance to complete integration particularly among all-male combat units.  
Research shows closed-gender units have a pervasive and overwhelmingly inflated 
expectation of increased risk associated with gender integration when compared to mixed-
gender units.13  This inflated expectation of risk includes those members in our military's 
Special Operations units.  Research also shows a "deep and wide" resistance to opening SOF 
specialties to women accompanied by high levels of "deep-seated and intensely felt" 
opposition across all SOF elements.14  Anxiety caused by change, fear of the unknown and 
unfamiliar, misinformation, mistaken perceptions, and inaccurate stereotypes are the 
foundations for reluctance to integrate.  The media has bombarded the public with numerous 
reasons why women should not be allowed in combat units, why it is a bad idea, and why it 
won't work.  There exists the perception that integrating women into Special Operations will 
change the elite culture.  Arguments typically center on women's physical abilities, or lack 
thereof.  Concerns proclaim that integrating women will degrade SOF's effectiveness as well 
as decrease cohesion and morale. Expectations create bias, and bias in this case creates an 
intolerant environment dissuading gender integration.  In order to create an environment 
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where gender integration will have the intended benefit for our military, the military must 
update its expectations.  It is clear our nation's top leadership sees gender integration as 
necessary, but it is our operational and tactical level leadership that need to embrace the 
concept for it to improve and advance our war fighting capability.  In order to efficiently and 
effectively integrate women into newly opened Special Operations Forces positions, 
expectation management must occur for leaders, existing unit members and the women 
entering these units by reinforcing the following: women will meet or exceed the standards; 
gender is an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI); leadership will ensure good order and 
discipline; unit cohesion will not change; women bring increased diversity and collective 
intelligence.   
MODERNIZING EXPECTATIONS  
Women Will Meet or Exceed the Standards   
First and foremost, Special Operations standards for assessment, selection and training will 
not change, period.  The Commander, USSOCOM ensured validation of assessment and 
training standards based on operational requirements.  A single gender-neutral standard will 
be enforced.15  A single standard is the fundamental and proverbial foundation on which 
every aspect of successful integration lays.  Without it, existing unit members will not trust 
new unit members, and new unit members will not have the necessary credibility to be 
accepted.   
Expect the standards will be enforced, and most likely, enforced with extreme rigor.  
Learning from the initial integration of Ranger School courses, research documented that 
standards were not only enforced, they were hardened.   The data on Darby Phase pass 
ratings show a statistically significant anomaly between Go (passing) and No-Go (failing) 
ratings between all-male teams and integrated teams.  Where 31 percent of all-male teams 
received a pass rating on patrol evaluations, only 16 percent of teams with a female on them 
received pass ratings.16  Whether the explanation for this is confirmation bias, pressure from 
non-supporters, or observer bias, data demonstrates that being female or having a female on 
your team decreased the likelihood of receiving a pass rating by 15 percent.  When these 
Darby Phase patrol evaluation statistics are compared to peer evaluations, they become even 
more significant.  Male and female peer evaluations were on par, as were the percentage rates 
of Ranger Assessment Phase (RAP) passes: 47 percent of men passed and 42 percent of 
women passed, the typical RAP week pass rate being 44 percent.17  Arguably, both peer 
evaluations and RAP week events were quantitatively graded equally whereas Darby Phase 
patrol evaluations, which potentially lend themselves to increased subjective biases, were 
(according to statistics) graded more rigorously.  This comparison carries the connotation 
that the standards for women were potentially hardened.       
Second, women will meet or exceed the standards.  There are women capable of the 
requirements to effectively operate in SOF, and they are not an anomaly.  Just as the top male 
contenders are drawn to the elite challenges of SOF, the top female contenders are as well.  
Research shows that training and experience are much more accurate predictors of physical 
performance than are gender generalities.18  In other words, one should remove gender from 
the equation because it creates faulty assumptions based on inaccurate stereotypes.  This 
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flawed way of thinking submits individual abilities to the tyranny of averages and discounts 
an individual's  potential before it can even be evaluated.19  What is traditionally seen in 
gender-integrated units is that overall performance levels increase because the women work 
harder to be accepted by the men and the men work harder not to be outdone by the 
women.20   Expect that gender-neutral standards will be enforced and that women will meet 
or exceed those standards.  
Gender is an Additional Skill Identifier 
Integrating women will increase SOF's effectiveness.  A historical review of warfare 
particularly of the past decade, illustrates the significant role of women on the battlefield.  As 
mentioned earlier, programs such as the Female Engagement Teams, the Lioness Program, 
and the Cultural Support Teams, have illustrated both the requirement for and the advantage 
of women involved in combat operations.  Our enemies have recognized and exploited our 
vulnerability of not having women in combat units.  Reports indicate the enemy's use of 
women, and men dressed as women, to conduct attacks, conceal sensitive items, and hide 
persons of interest because of our inability to engage, search and speak to women.21  Only 
engaging half of the population on the battlefield is an extreme disadvantage in conducting 
operations.  By including women in SOF we are gaining the opportunity to engage the 
"primary conveyer of norms: women."22   
Adding women to Special Operations will increase organic capability.  Women provide 
access and placement that men alone simply cannot achieve.  Women allow teams to engage 
an entire population which facilitates the ability to collect intelligence and increase 
situational awareness.  Women increase security postures by conducting physical searches, 
and deescalating situations.  Women allow for a lower profile when conducting sensitive 
operations.  Women provide ample opportunity in elicitation, network development and low-
level source operations.  As Mullen points out, "the different perception matters."23  Women 
are viewed differently than men, even when working side-by-side.  Culturally, around the 
globe, women are viewed as less threatening which results in a lower profile and increased 
trust.  In summation, women are force multipliers that can add an advantage in virtually 
every SOF activity, mission, or operation. 
Having women organically assigned to units negates a vast majority of the disadvantages 
associated with female enablers as seen with the CSTs.  Organic female operators have the 
added benefit of being a trusted team member with the same training and experience as their 
male counterparts.  They are a primary trigger puller rather than an extra mouth to feed and 
outsider to protect.  They will bring the expected skill sets of an operator first supplemented 
by the additional skill identifier of being female, capable of things a male simply cannot do. 
Steinberg provides the following wisdom:   
If they want to know where the next rebel attack is going to occur, they should not just talk to 
regional governors or military commanders; they should ask the women in the marketplace, 
whose families' safety depends on having the latest information.  If they want to know 
whether reforms of the justice and security sectors are working, they should not just talk to 
the judges or the generals; they should ask women in the community who are seeking justice 
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or who are asking the police and army for protection and safety.  If they want to know 
whether their programs to reintegrate ex-combatants are effective, they should not just talk to 
the camp managers or demobilization organizers; they should ask the women who are the 
eyes, ears, and conscience of the communities where these fighters are being returned.24 
In Admiral McRaven's words, adding women adds diversity to a team and, "diversity begets 
diverse perceptions and observations; situational awareness is enhanced and the SOF 
operators become more effective."25  Expect women to bring increased capabilities and 
increased effectiveness in conducting special operations.   
Leadership Will Ensure Good Order and Discipline 
Special Operations leadership is exceptional and will ensure good order and discipline.  
Special Operations Forces embrace the ethic and culture of being "quiet professionals."  SOF 
is a values-based organization, always mindful that personal and professional conduct 
reflects upon themselves and the nation.  They are focused on contributing to the mission at 
hand and being a well-integrated part of the team, unconcerned with who gets the credit, 
recognizing that much of what SOF does remains in the shadows.26 This deep-seated 
morality and culture is what SOF leaders and SOF operators embody.  This existing 
backbone of SOF culture as articulated by Special Operations Command lends itself to 
gender integration without change.  Professionalism, discipline, mission-focus, teamwork 
and humility are the principle ideals crucial to effective integration and implementation of 
women in SOF.          
Research shows that one of the top concerns of both existing SOF unit members as well as 
the women who would consider entering SOF are issues surrounding sexual harassment and 
sexual assault.  Men are afraid of accusations and women are concerned with becoming 
victims.27  This issue is not one to be taken lightly in that it has the potential to deter women 
from entering the ranks, and preventing effective integration of the women who do.  
Leadership must ensure a balance between discipline and professionalism while avoiding 
gender segregation or alienation.  Leaders must pursue complete integration of all training 
and view all war fighters the same regardless of gender.  Leaders must expect and demand 
open dialogue of any issues from the onset.  Silence, segregation and sexual tension will kill 
a team.  Leaders must demand co-respect and active, open dialogue.  Expect SOF leadership 
to ensure good order and discipline.     
Unit Cohesion Will Not Change 
Cohesion is produced by common experience, not by gender.  Studies show virtually no 
variation in task cohesion levels between integrated and non-integrated units.28   Researchers 
make a distinction between task cohesion and social cohesion.  Task cohesion is the shared 
commitment group members have toward accomplishing a goal whereas social cohesion is 
the extent to which people like each other.29  Time and shared experiences will build unit 
task cohesion.  All members of the unit will have met the same elite standards to obtain a 
place on the team and will be working towards the same objective: mission accomplishment.  
"When the group has some history and members have gained information about each other's 
competence, sex differences in interaction style tend to disappear."30  In other words, 
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research supports the fact that trust and cohesion increase with time as opposite-gender 
personnel work together. 
Losing and replacing teammates before deployment has a significant impact on cohesion and 
unit effectiveness.  Deployment readiness due to pregnancy or female specific issues will be 
of minimal significance.  Statistics show that there are much higher rates of disciplinary 
issues among men affecting readiness such as unauthorized absenteeism and absence from 
actions causing legal detention.31  Percentage wise, military men lose 67 percent more work 
time than women even when including pregnancy.32  Pregnancy is the least of a unit's 
concerns and is unlikely to have impact on unit cohesion.  Expect that unit cohesion will not 
change with gender integration.      
Women Bring Collective Intelligence 
Expect SOF to become more intelligent with the integration of women.  Collective 
Intelligence theory holds that teams are more intelligent and make better decisions when 
women are included.33  Research demonstrates a positive correlation between group 
intelligence and the percentage of women participating.34  Research also shows clear links 
"between organizational success and the number of women in the most successful 
organization."34  One study shows that civilian companies with more women on their boards 
outperformed rivals with 42 percent higher sales returns, 66 percent higher invested capital 
returns and 53 percent higher equity returns.36  Research also demonstrates that including 
women in operations will create longer lasting solutions.  This increase in performance is 
likely due to the fact that diversity enhances a team's effectiveness by bringing "different 
experiences, values, attitudes and cognitive approaches."37  In addition, "varied knowledge 
and perspectives enhance the team's creativity and problem-solving ability," especially when 
it comes to complex tasks.38 The Military Leadership Diversity Commission recognizes that 
"diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness."39  Perhaps more so in SOF than 
anywhere else, this advantage in complex-problem solving ability is priceless.  The human 
element in SOF operations makes nearly every mission a complex problem that requires 
solving.  Success in SOF requires innovative approaches while considering multiple 
perspectives and second and third order effects, an environment in dire need of superior 
intelligence and decision making abilities.  Expect the integration of women to bring 
increased collective intelligence.         
CONCLUSION 
Both academic research and current demands on the battlefield clearly illustrate the 
operational requirement for women at the front.  Our leadership has recognized this and has 
taken actions to fill this vital capability gap.  In order to provide our nation with the most 
effective military force possible, we must make integration a no fail mission.  We must 
maintain an increased level of combat readiness during this critical time while our nation is 
facing a multitude of threats.  Expectation management is a key element that will facilitate 
the integration process to occur efficiently and effectively.  We must recognize, accept and 
be prepared for integration of women that will meet and exceed the SOF standards.  We must 
optimize and exploit the capabilities organic female operators bring to the fight.  Leaders 
must ensure professionalism to mitigate harmful distractions to the integration process.  
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Ensuring absolute integration will reinforce team cohesion and morale.  And last, we must 
use the increase in diversity and collective intelligence to enhance SOF's effectiveness.   
Contrary to some feminist arguments surrounding this topic, traditional gender roles and 
associated stereotypes are still relevant in the U.S. and around the world.  However, at the 
same time, the U.S. has witnessed a dramatic cultural shift surrounding women's gender 
roles.  Decades of trail blazers have shaped strong, capable women who have proven 
themselves as worthy warriors on the battlefield.  In addition, simply by being women, 
female Soldiers bring a set of diverse and unique capabilities to combat operations which 
make them both invaluable and necessary to SOF's mission set.  Fully integrating women 
into our military is an issue of national security.  As members of the U.S. military, it is our 
responsibility to ensure our nation is armed with the most effective fighting force possible.    
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A historical review of women in combat clearly demonstrates that women serving in combat 
is nothing new.  Women have participated in combat since the beginning of war in all female 
combat units, in mixed-gender units, as individual warriors and as military leaders.40  
Looking to history as well as modern lessons learned provides the overwhelming case that 
women strengthen military effectiveness in war and exposes how they have done it.  
Education is key to modernizing gender related expectations.   
The Next Evolution 
So where do we go from here?  Do not change a single standard.  This would be detrimental 
to successful integration.  A single standard is the single most significant factor to mission 
readiness and successful integration.  From identical packing lists, to field conditions and 
combat readiness requirements, warriors are warriors; be gender blind in enforcing standards.  
Educate and train employment of gender as an Additional Skill Identifier.  Recognize when 
and where using female operators will create force multiplying effects.  Exploit the value of 
diversity and collective intelligence in planning and mission execution.  Reinforce 
professional standards of good order and discipline without making gender an issue.  Use 
common sense and emphasize existing SOF values and culture; respect for a teammate is 
respect for the mission.  Actively seek opportunities for team building to prevent segregation 
of team members.  Building both social and task cohesion strengthens a team exponentially.  
And last, be cognizant of your expectations and the effects they create.   
A Message to the Women 
Understand the extremely skewed cultural dynamic into which you are entering.  As Powell 
points out, you are going in as the "token" female.  Because you are highly visible, you will 
face additional performance pressure.  Your "differences" from the men are going to be 
exaggerated.  As a female, you will be stereotyped in a distorted manner.41  Take note that 
the behavior of one "token" is perceived as representative of all tokens in an organization and 
that as a female you will likely, at least initially, have difficulty gaining trust of your male 
counterparts and may be excluded from informal networks.42  You will have to constantly 
demonstrate your competence to reaffirm your fellow Soldiers.43  Be aware of the 
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phenomenon of "boundary heightening" where the dominate group will purposely exclude 
the minority tokens and leave you with few options to respond.  Research articulates that 
tokens typically either accept isolation, opting for friendly but distant relations with the male 
members of the team, or they try to become insiders by defining themselves as exceptional 
members of their sex and turning against other women who attempt to join the group.44  The 
challenge to you is to define a new response by setting the example that you are not an 
exception, and to become a mentor and role model for those who will undoubtedly follow 
you.  Expect challenges in evaluations and promotions, and dismissal of capabilities despite 
meeting the same standards.  Expect to have to exceed the standards to gain credibility.  You 
are in for a hard road ahead in every way you can imagine.  Be prepared physically, mentally, 
emotionally and spiritually.  Though it may not feel like it at times, your nation thanks you 
for taking on this difficult, yet very achievable, challenge.   
A Message to SOF Leadership 
Women in our military are hungry for the opportunity to serve in SOF.  They are extremely 
motivated and ready to train and fight hard.  It would be a mistake not to use this momentum 
to exploit this untapped talent and mental drive to better your units.  When gender is taken 
into account, it should only be done in the context of an added capability.  In order for 
women to be effectively integrated it is critical that command teams up and down the chain 
of command echo the Secretary of Defense and USSOCOM Commander's mantra that 
women are essential to the mission and that the mission could not be accomplished without 
them.45  As Schein points out, "it can be argued that the only thing of real importance that 
leaders do is to create and manage culture; that the unique talent of leaders is their ability to 
understand and work with culture; and that it is an ultimate act of leadership to destroy 
culture when it is viewed as dysfunctional."46  In other words, reframing expectations to 
create an environment conducive to successful integration is your job.  Our nation is 
depending on you to ensure our forces are the best in the world and remain ready to execute 





Ashley White, CST - KIA 10/22/11 Kandahar, 
Jennifer Moreno, CST - KIA 10/6/13 Zhari, 
and those who have paved the way forward for our military 
to be the greatest fighting force in the world.
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DON’T MARRY A PIRATE:  
WOMEN’S GROUPS DETERRENCE  
OF PIRATE ACTION GROUPS IN SOMALIA 
Ben Lawellin and Michaela Monahan 
6/1/2017
Piracy in Somalia has been a problem for the Horn of Africa region, global shipping, seafarers 
from around the world, and for Somalis themselves.  Billions of dollars have been spent on 
combatting piracy, and thousands of seafarers have suffered at the hands of pirates.  On shore in 
Somalia, piracy is exacerbated by problems of illegal fishing and fears of violent extremism.  In 
Oceans Beyond Piracy’s seven years of experience confronting Somali piracy, we have 
understand that women in Somali coastal communities could have a deterrence effect on piracy 
by dissuading youth through familial aspects in Somali culture.  Acknowledging that related 
activities to those discussed in this paper could be going on in Somalia and their sensitivities, this 
paper will not go into depth on these activities. This paper argues that applying Counter Violent 
Extremism (CVE) methods to combatting piracy could be effective, and that a likely course of 
action in CVE could be through engaging women and families in coastal communities in piracy 
prone regions.  
BACKGROUND ON SOMALI PIRACY 
Somali piracy leaped on to the world stage in 2008 with the hijacking of the MV Feisty Gas and 
has continued to draw global attention for years.  Between 2008 and 2017 over 5,000 seafarers 
were held hostage by Somali pirates, many of them for several years at a time.  Seafarer hostages 
were often subjected to both psychological and physical abuse at the hands of their captors. The 
thousands of seafarers who have returned to their regular lives after being held hostage have had 
significant challenges of reintegration and coping with the fear and the uncertainty of their 
experiences.1 
1 After the Release: The Long Term Behavioral Impact of Piracy on Seafarers and Families.  Conor Seyle June 
24, 2016. http://www.oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/after-release-impact-seafarers.pdf 
47
2017 Women, Peace, and Security Conference Working Papers 
 
The State of Piracy Report by Oceans Beyond Piracy has tracked both the economic and human 
costs of piracy since 2010.  At the height of Somali piracy in 2010 nearly 7 billion USD was 
spent on combatting piracy.2 In the intervening years these costs have decreased, the 2016 
economic cost was roughly 1.7 billion USD and the number of seafarers being held hostage is 
only 8 as of this writing.3   
WHAT DOES PIRACY LOOK LIKE IN SOMALIA?  
Somali piracy is organized crime which operates on a fairly complex business model that 
requires multiple elements for success.  In a typical Somali pirate attack, pirate leadership 
organizes an attack team of pirates who set out to sea in a small boat searching for a vulnerable 
vessel.  The vessel is hijacked first by shooting at it and then attempting to board the vessel.  If 
successfully hijacked the pirates will subdue the crew, take over the vessel and steer it back to a 
safe anchorage on the Somali coast.  The safe anchorage is a key feature in the business model as 
it allows the pirates to engage in long term negotiations with the intention of securing a ransom. 
Negotiations can range from months to years in some cases. Once concluded the vessel and crew 
is released.  The safe anchorage is usually a secure harbor controlled by the pirate’s clan. The 
negotiation phase is critical to whether the community supports or rejects piracy. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOMALI COMMUNITIES 
Community, and in particular clan affiliation, plays a strong role in the identity of Somalis.  
Somali communities exist in three broad forms, nomadic pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and urban 
communities.  Coastal communities, which are the focus of this report are the agro-pastoralist as 
these communities are static and generally do not move around along the coastline.  These 
communities’ livelihoods largely depend upon fishing which have been significantly impacted 
by illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.  In a 2016 survey conducted by Oceans Beyond 
Piracy in the Galmudug region of Somalia, a region prone to pirate activity, the survey indicated 
that “Members from the community provide support to piracy operations to gain more profit. 
They provide food, fuel, khat (miraa leaves), and ammunitions to pirates. Those members see 
this as a lucrative business. If they pay a loan of $10,000 in food, khat, fuel, and etc, they may be 
re-reimbursed a $100,000, when pirates receive the ransom.”4  This dynamic exemplifies the 
relationship between the community and the pirates.  As the success of the Somali piracy 
business model rests upon the need for a safe location to anchor the hijacked vessel, the 
acceptance of the community to piracy is critical.  Below we explore why engaging with 
women’s groups in these communities can be a good approach for leveraging community 
support against piracy and improving capacity of women’s groups at the grassroots level. 
WOMEN’S ROLE IN SOMALI SOCIETY 
Life for women in Somalia is especially difficult. They endure an imbalanced burden of the 
conflict, poverty, and other problems that are present in the clan-based Somali culture. These 
women also face high rates of maternal mortality, rape, female genital mutilation, and child 
                                                           
2 2010 Economic Cost of Piracy.  One Earth Future Foundation.  Anna Bowden 
3 2016 State of Maritime Piracy Report.  Oceans Beyond Piracy.  Maisie Pigeon. 
4 Somali Perspectives on Piracy and Illegal Fishing. Oceans Beyond Piracy. 2016.  Peter Kerins. 
http://obp.ngo/publications/somali-perspectives-piracy-and-illegal-fishing  
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marriage. The male hierarchy of this culture is intensified by the religious and cultural 
limitations of females in their society. Males tend to be the head of the household while women 
take care of the children. It is undesirable for a man not to be seen as the head of the house. 
Faced with the financial hardships that accompany war and conflict, many women work outside 
of the home. The women who work outside of their homes have a lot of support from the other 
women in their community when it comes to child care.   
The family is one of the most important facets of life in Somalia. This emphasis on family makes 
marriage an essential step in a young Somali’s life. The average Somali will journey into 
marriage at about 14 or 15. Although women are considered fit for marriage shortly after 
menstruation begins, typically because baring children comes shortly after the wedding. 
Motherhood is highly celebrated in Somali culture, and a female’s prestige in society is greatly 
enriched by the number of children she bears. It is within community norms for women to bear 
8-9 children. 5 
Women and especially mothers are an essential part of Somali society.  Somalis trace clan 
affiliation through the father. Women have an important role in their families as well as their 
clan structure.  This clan affiliation remains true for women even after they are married, allowing 
women to have multiple clan associations.6  This unique role places them in an influential 
position for mobilizing civil society, by giving them the ability to link clans. Somali women can 
act as the first channel of dialogue between clans.  
FAMILIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO DETERRING PIRACY  
Several surveys of prisoners convicted of piracy have found that the family is a key factor in 
individual’s decision to exit piracy and to not return to it.  In 2015 Oceans Beyond Piracy and the 
UN Office of Drugs and Crime conducted a survey of prisoners convicted of piracy in prisons in 
Bosaaso (Puntland), Hargesia (Somaliland) prisons and the Seychelles.  Prisoners were asked if 
they knew anyone who had stopped being a pirate. For those who did know someone who had 
left piracy, family and community pressure were identified as the primary reason. In Bosaaso 
prison “5 of the 10 persons identified by inmates as leaving piracy were reported to have left 
because of family or community pressure, including one prisoner reporting that the former 
pirate’s family had physically taken the pirate out of the group and put him into a rehab center”7.  
In Hargeisa prison the interviewer noted that, “the communities are losing too many men [young 
men] to piracy, due to arrests, imprisonment, lost at sea, etc. So families are starting to fear the 
loss of their kin, and don’t want them to go to sea.”8  These two excerpts highlight the 
importance of families in regards to deterring piracy at the grassroots level.  As mothers, as well 
as sisters and daughters, females are an integral part of the family unit, it stands to reason that 
                                                           
5 EthnoMED- Somali Cultural Profile https://ethnomed.org/culture/somali/somali-cultural-profile 
6 The role of Somali Women in Peacebuilding and Decision making (2011) 
https://www.worldpulse.com/fr/node/2979 
7 Somali Prison Survey Report:  Piracy Motivations and Deterrents. Oceans Beyond Piracy and UN Office of 
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women would have an integral part in deterring young men from entering piracy or quicken their 
departure from piracy. 
WOMEN’S ROLE IN COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Mothers are on the front line of defence in countering violent extremism (CVE) in persons 10-18 
years of age.  A mother can be vital to CVE through detecting early signs of radicalization or 
direct intervention. Women are more willing to act as champions of CVE mainly because they 
are more affected by its results. An EU workshop on effective programming for Countering 
Violent Extremism found that women speaking out about the hardships of violent extremism, 
such as insecurity, loss of income, and separation, provide a powerful narrative against 
terrorism.9 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that women’s 
involvement as activists is crucial. They highlight that women can “provide essential feedback 
on the counter-terrorism efforts of the internal community.”10   OSCE’s recommendations for 
improving counter-terrorism interventions are to take into account women’s role in the 
prevention. The recommendations emphasize engaging women in all stages of counter-terrorism 
or counter-radicalization strategies by providing platforms for women to share resources, 
experiences, and tools for facing radicalization. There is also a focus on the importance of 
supporting women’s grassroots organizations and initiatives. 
Over the years various initiatives have been started that aim to support women’s role in the 
countering of violent extremism. In 2008 Women Without Borders started Sisters Against 
Violent Extremism (SAVE). SAVE has several campaigns that all aim to help women, but more 
specifically mothers, in the battle against extremism. Mothers for Change is an applied research 
project which focuses on the matchless role mothers hold in their homes and communities. It 
studies the process of de-radicalization and seeks to not only identify but also to unlock mothers’ 
capabilities. Mothers MOVE produces mothers’ groups to participate in anti-extremism training.  
This project trains women to recognize the early warning signs of radicalization.  The Women’s 
Dialogue fosters dialogue to create strategies that combats extremism.11 
HOW ARE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND PIRACY RELATED? 
There are many differences between violent extremism and piracy. However, there is a 
connection between the two. Both violent extremism and piracy can result in terrible sufferings 
for their families. Mothers are often the most affected by both violent extremism and piracy. A 
recent survey by MC and Saatchi of Somali pirate prisoners in the Seychelles emphasizes this 
point, “Piracy brought in inflation and breakdown of social order in our communities. Pirates 
                                                           
9 Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. (2012) EU Workshop on Effective Programming for 
Countering Violent Extremism. Final Summary Report 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/documents/20121217_eu_cve_workshop_summary_report.pdf 
10 OSCE (2013). Women and Terrorist Radicalization. Final Report OSCE Secretariat- OSCE ODIHR Expert 
Round Tables. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.  
hhtp://www.osce.org/secretariat/33313?download=true 
11 SAVE's Projects and Programs- sisters against violent extremism –women without boarders  
http://www.women-withoutborders.org/save/ 
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brought with them shameful practices like drugs, alcohol abuse and prostitution in areas they 
operated.”12 The bond mother and child have is in many ways boundless, and in many instances, 
this bond has given mothers the power to stop their children from joining such groups. This 
mother-child bond as is so strong that terror groups have published propaganda for new recruits 
on the topic which advises them to cut all ties with their families.  
In 2012, the Dalhousie Marine Piracy project (DMPP)13 launched a report to study the causes 
and consequences of maritime piracy. Among many findings was an explicit problem with the 
involvement of children in pirate activity. DMPP found that children’s activity served as a 
practical entry point into the general problem of piracy worldwide. The same factors that lead a 
child to wrongdoing, will also render them vulnerable to piracy. “In 2011, the Indian Navy 
announced that 25 of 61 recently arrested pirates were under the age of 15”. And “The United 
Nations envoy for children and armed conflict has reported a trend showing increased use of 
children recruited to seize ships for ransom”.14 Mothers have more direct contact with children 
under the age of 15 giving them a unique role in combating Somali piracy. This points out the 
unique role that mothers can have in deterring Somali piracy as they can have a persuasive effect 
in deterring youth from becoming pirates.  Engaging with mothers can be an effective method in 
building deterrence strategies. 
Factoring in the success mothers have had in CVE, the mother’s role in Somali society, and the 
number of children being recruited for piracy, the campaigns which focus on the mother’s role in 
CVE could be implemented to counter piracy in Somalia. Women are advantageously positioned 
at the epicenter of families where they can diagnose the early warning signs of piracy intent.  By 
empowering mothers with the necessary knowledge and tools they could be placed on front line 
of the battle against piracy. Spearheading grassroots campaigns to educate women and mothers 
on the early warning signs and the consequences of a life of piracy, would make mothers an 
active agent in preventing their children and husbands from going down a path to piracy.   
KEY POINTS 
Community support to piracy is critical to its survival. 
Pressure from mothers can have a particular deterrence effect on young men entering into piracy 
and in their decisions to leave piracy. 
Counter Violent Extremism strategies could have practical applications when applied to 
combatting piracy. 
                                                           
12 MC & Saatchi.  Somali Piracy Research Report 2017.  Zamzam Tatu  
13 Children in Marine Piracy: Our Work in 2013  
http://www.childsoldiers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Children_in_Marine_Piracy-Our_Work_in_2013-
min.pdf 
14 Keeping Children Out of Piracy (2017) http://maritime-executive.com/features/keeping-children-out-of 
-piracy 
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PRACTICAL GENDERED INTERVENTIONS FOR DETERRING SOMALI PIRATE 
GROUPS  
Messaging of Dangers- Many young men have died while engaging in piracy, either due to the 
dangers of the ocean, while attacking vessels; or ended up in prison. Broadly educating piracy 
prone populations on the dangers of piracy would be an effective intervention.  This education 
would seek to alter the risk/ reward dynamic of would-be pirates. Education on these dangers 
combined with additional training on recognizing the signs of extremism could have a positive 
effect on preventing men aged 10-18 years old from joining other violent extremist organizations 
as well.  Distributing this message through the lens of mothers and local women’s groups could 
be more effective as they would have direct access to sons, brothers and husbands who 
potentially could become pirates. Similar counter-piracy messaging campaigns sponsored by the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime have occurred in the past with success, but they have not directly 
targeted women.15 
 Don’t Marry a Pirate- While the ransom proceeds from piracy brought in large amounts of 
cash into coastal communities in Somalia this cash also brought in drugs, alcohol, prostitution 
and other elements which are at odds with the Islamic faith in Somalia. Highlighting these haram 
elements of piracy and encouraging the idea that pirates would make bad husbands or fathers 
could alter the decision making of young men to engage in piracy as becoming a husband and 
father is an important element of masculinity in Somali culture.  Of course this intervention 
would rest upon the idea that women would have a choice in choosing their husband.   
Discussion Groups- Sponsoring and facilitating women’s discussion groups would lead to a 
better understanding of how piracy, and phenomena like illegal fishing, affect coastal 
communities.  The information gained by better understanding the local effects of piracy, 
especially on women could lead to more tailored interventions, especially in support of women, 
This could additionally have a deterrence effect in Somali coastal communities more generally.  
CONCLUSION 
Piracy has shaped much of the modern narrative about Somalia and has impeded its path out of 
conflict and towards prosperity.  Women and particularly mothers can have a positive effect on 
preventing piracy and other forms of violence.  Furthermore connecting women into such piracy 
CVE campaigns could have a positive effect on the situation of women in Somalia, though in a 
small way.  Considering the success of women oriented CVE campaigns in other situations, 
similar campaigns related to piracy in Somalia could have success as well.    
15 UNODC Counter Piracy Programme. Somalia Beyond Piracy-Anti Piracy Advocacy Campaign.  2011 
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"THE NEXT DECADE: AMPLIFYING THE 
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA," 
CYBER VIOLENCE, INTERNET RECRUITING 
AND LINKS TO FEMALE TERRORISM. 
Selina Hayes 
The landscape of conflict continues to look very different. Our enemy in this world of cyber can 
be any age, race, religion or gender, the traditional ways we are acquainted with winning hearts 
and minds are not always relevant and well received. The new “enemy” is a 15-year-old girl with 
a SnapChat or Twitter account, or a young woman deployed as a qualified recruiter trained to 
influence her counterparts equipped with creating the next terrorist attack.  
Over the next decade the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda will need to recognize the 
world of cyber and how it can become a significant neutralizer in that its participants are not 
defined by physical geography or governed by one sovereign state. Rules are fluid and unclear, 
its language is universal, translation is instantaneous allowing for easy communication and the 
spread of messaging. Not only can women and girls operate freely and without the social 
boundaries that may exist in the physical sense, in the world of cyber the “hijab comes off” and 
the ability to create complex social networks that can be influential especially in recruitment 
techniques and influencing, allows for clear exploitation of women by other women or those 
appealing to women.  
There is limited history or experience in how to operate in this new world of cyberspace however 
it adopts the practices and nuances of century old teachings. The ability to build social networks 
outside of our local communities and influence through narratives and images has given rise to 
terrorist groups targeting women. That said, women give rise to their own unique power bases, 
networks, and lines of influence within the cross-sections of this communities. Yet, this female 
perspective and influence are often under-represented in planning and executing decision-making 
even within WPS strategies. Often the title “Women Peace and Security” is an oxymoron in that 
the word “peace” associated with the words women and security can weaken a women’s 
involvement not only in terrorist acts but their significant role within conflict and conflict 
resolution. History shows us that women have not only being influential but involved with 
terrorist acts and inciting violence. However, the view of women’s involvement in this terrorist 
acts is often seen as an aberration and recognizing and understanding women’s role as 
sympathizers or support to combatants has been an elusive thought process. The presence of 
women during the most recent raid in Yemen highlight that women are not only present in the 
battlespace but they are now being recruited, trained and deployed as combatants, not just shields 
to male fighters…..in essence, “they fight back”. In the context of terrorist acts, women have 
long served as enablers to the mission or a pawn used in heinous ways to promote fear into 
society. In most situations, western society sees these women and girls as passive victims, 
however what goes unrecognized is their role as the active participant. This lack of 
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understanding has been deceptive to those developing effective counter strategies, as they have 
failed to recognize that women often provide critical support within insurgency and terrorist 
organizations in addition to being combatants themselves. Despite having both passive and 
active involvement in terrorist acts, women are often the last to be included within the counter-
terror and security dialogue, thus an opportunity is lost in fulfilling campaign objectives meant to 
have positive and changing impact. It could be argued that women have disproportionately 
suffered the consequences of many conflicts through rape, death of their spouse or bread winner, 
their children, loss of their home and chaos within the community however they are also the last 
to be included at the solution table. Oddly enough, though, this indisputable female perspective 
and influence are under-represented in planning and executing decision-making even within 
WPS strategies.  
Terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Al Qaida and ISIS, have enhanced their ability to 
effectively use social media to their advantage, the speed at which their intentions can be 
deployed as a message or “tweet” to influence has also increased exponentially. Also within the 
cyber world there is an ability to move freely without social constraints and appeal to individuals 
that can be easily influenced. Although women are primarily a target it is women that are using 
the space most effectively. This new battle space which includes social media platforms like 
Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, You Tube and now SnapChat are all playing a significant role as 
tools in radicalizing individuals through carefully created narratives. Tweets from insurgency 
groups may appear to be relevant and true however the accuracy of the information being 
transmitted and who is transmitting them cannot often be validated. This has created a new 
standard and set rules and appealed to a new population group of which the insurgency groups 
have taken advantage of “a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using cell phones 
for self- publication”. This new medium serves to connect like-minded people and give them 
voice and potential for direct significant action in spheres of influence where individuals have 
traditionally been shut out of the decision-making process. For women, the cyber world is a 
vehicle as to which they can communicate and control the space while operating in a male 
dominated society.  
Our response and WPS strategy in to the next decade needs to adapt to these new threats 
however we need to understand those we want to influence by engaging with and enabling 
positive influencers in these communities. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 called for the 
integration of gender perspectives into peace and security initiatives however rarely are women 
called upon during the most critical phases of military operations working with military planners 
to give that added perspective of the “other 50%” of the population. With the context of cyber 
violence and online recruiting it is only recently that focus has been placed on the tactics used by 
terrorist’s groups to recruit women either for passive roles or for combatants. There is no doubt 
that the most recent attacks we have seen in around the world have continued to raise the 
consciousness of the role of women to influence and recruit online through social media 
platforms. Our enemy has used gender as a weapon and most terrorist groups like Boko Haram 
and ISIS have used females in the local community to recruit and provide martyrs. Reports 
indicated that women were instrumental in converting female family members and in some 
cases, offered up their daughters to serve as martyrs. In Nigeria, three women were arrested in 
Abuja for attempting to recruit females to serve as members in what the military described then 
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as the “female wing” of the group. The use of social media for influence campaigns and 
marketing tactics only broadens the pool of potential recruits.  
Over the next decade, the WPS agenda needs to be inclusive of providing solutions that can be 
more preemptive and inclusive of all gender roles, in addition to the post conflict solutions. 
Cyber violence and recruitment will only become more apparent and more effective as a tool for 
recruitment. Formulating a strategy on how to combat an ideology that sees itself as a quasi-state 
without borders or traditional rules of sovereignty will need to invoke a new thought process. An 
effective counter strategy involves understanding the enemy, not only their tactics but their mind 
set and perspective. Also, identifying what resources, they can implement to gain significant 
advantage. The problem however, is most problem sets are approached with a male perspective.  
In doing so, an effective strategy for the role of women in maintaining peace and stability within 
their communities, not only in the physical sense but within the realm of cyberspace and within 
the social networks created online will need to be created and encouraged and implemented not 
from just one side of the equation but a more inclusive approach. Understanding how women 
receive messaging and what narratives appeal and influence. This will require more women at 




ADVANCING WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY BY 
TARGETING NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES
Chelsea B. Payne, Maj, USAF, MC; Andrew T. Allen, Lt Col, USAF, MC, SFS 
FORWARD 
“I am a business woman,” states a smiling Kagiso who wades in fresh water, where 
schistosomiasis is endemic, collecting reeds on the banks of the Chobe River in Kasane, 
Botswana. Like many women living near Chobe National Park, Kagiso weaves the reeds into 
baskets and sells them to tourists. In Botswana approximately 12% of the population
1 
requires 
periodic medication to prevent schistosomiasis, a water-borne infection that can lead to 
genital infections, infertility, and cancer. 
INTRODUCTION 
As of May 2017, 66 nations have created national action plans on women, peace and security 
(WPS) under the framework of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325. The 
United States (US) updated its national action plan in June 2016.
2 
Through these strategic
initiatives, gender inclusion has been advocated as a pathway for countries to enhance peace 
and promote political stability. Health is a major determinant of social and economic stability, 
and within the paradigm of WPS, advocacy and promotion of women’s health is crucial to 
ensure success of most gender inclusion programs. This paper asserts that optimizing 
women’s health is a core component of their ability to assume and maintain leadership roles 
in community development and security cooperation. 
Furthermore, a subset of infectious diseases, known as neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), 
significantly impact women’s ability to reach milestones in education, employment, and 
ultimately to have an active voice in sustaining a peaceful society. 
NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 
NTDs encompass 17 unique diseases which predominately impact people living in poverty and 
without adequate sanitation, in tropical and subtropical regions.
3 
Annually, an estimated 1
billion people are infected while another 1 billion are at risk of infection
4
, with the largest
burden found in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
5 
These infections are caused by a variety 
of organisms including bacteria, viruses, single-celled protozoa and parasitic worms 
(helminths). They can lead to long-term physical and mental disabilities such as blindness, 
cognitive impairment and death.
6
Figure 1 lists the 17 NTDs as identified by the World Health Organization and summarized in 
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010.
7 
Rabies, African trypanosomiasis and dengue hold
the greatest burden in terms of mortality or years of life lost (YLL), whereas parasitic worm 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of 
the US Air Force, the US Department of Defense or the US government 
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diseases have a much greater impact on years of disability in a population (YLD) and result in 
less mortality. Another important measure of the burden of a disease is disability-adjusted life 
year (DALY). The DALY is calculated by adding YLL and YLD which yields a measure for 
both morbidity and mortality in a population. The five most common NTDs have a high rate 
of morbidity and include lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, trachoma, schistosomiasis 




Figure 1. The seventeen NTDs and fractions of YLD and YLL (as components of DALY’s)7 
 
 
Historically NTDs have been underfunded and lacked prioritization in research and global 
health programs. However, the Global Burden of Disease Study in 2010 estimated that all 
NTDs combined result in over 18 million years of life with disability (YLD), 8 million years 
of life lost (YLL) and 152,000 deaths.
7 
In 2012 the World Health Organization (WHO) 
outlined a “Roadmap for implementation” of a strategy to combat NTDs, which was endorsed 
by the World Assembly Resolution of 2013.
8 
This plan calls for equitable access to care for 
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patients with NTDs, integration into existing programs and ensuring that essential services 
reach those who need them.
8
 
THE IMPACT OF NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES ON WOMEN 
Globally, females as compared to males are more disadvantaged in terms of poverty, lack of 
opportunity for education, land ownership and political voice.
8 
These factors can impede 




In sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that over one-third of pregnant women are infected with 
one or more NTDs.
9 
Soil-transmitted helminths, particularly hookworms, make the greatest 
contribution to years of life with disability.
7 
Hookworms can lead to moderate to severe 
anemia. In pregnancy, anemia can worsen the effects of excessive blood loss during childbirth 
and contributes to a higher risk for maternal death.
9 
According to the WHO, obstetric 
hemorrhage is the leading direct cause of material death worldwide and accounts for 27% of 
maternal deaths
10 




Anemia during pregnancy can also contribute to low birth weight in infants which is 
associated with cognitive impairment and stunted growth.
9 
In one study of a helmith endemic 
area women treated during the second or third trimester with antihelminthic medication 
demonstrated infant birthweight rise by 59 grams (95% CI 19-98) and infant mortality at 6 
months decreased by 41% (RR 0.59; 95% CI 0.43-0.82).
11
 
Helmith infections in children can also negatively impact growth, cognitive development and 
lead to recurrent school absenteeism.
12 
School-based deworming programs in Kenya have 
shown a statistically significant reduction in school absenteeism by 25% and a year was 
added to the average duration of childhood education.
12 
Another long-term study in Kenya 
demonstrated that after 10 years, females who were dewormed during primary education were 
25% more likely to pass the secondary school entrance exam (9.6 percentage point increase, 
P<0.5) and over one third more likely to enroll in secondary education than females who were 
not, thereby decreasing the gender-education gap.
13
 
There is increasing recognition that certain NTDs are more likely to impact girls and women. 
For instance, in communities where females predominately perform household task, such as 
clothes washing and water collection, they are more likely to be exposed to water-borne 
illnesses including Schistosomiasis.
8 
Urogenital schistosomiasis is a common NTD in sub- 
Saharan Africa and causes urinary and renal tract infections.
14 
Chronic infection can lead to 
an increased risk of infertility, pregnancy complications and bladder cancer.
8,14 
Urogenital 
schistosomiasis is also associated with an increased risk of HIV. In rural areas of Zimbabwe 
female genital schistosomiasis was associated with a three-fold increased risk of vertical 
(mother-to-child) transmission of HIV/AIDS.
15
 
Lymphatic filariasis (LF) lymphedema, which causes pain and swelling in the arms and legs, 
occurs more often in women compared to men and swelling can also occur in the breasts and 
genital area.
16 
Cultural restrictions on examining women can lead to these complications 
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being underdiagnosed and going untreated. A qualitative study in Sri Lanka demonstrated that 




Trachoma and onchocerciasis both affect vision and are the first and second most common 
causes of preventable blindness.
17 
Low vision and blindness significantly impact a woman’s 
mental and physical wellness, ability to maintain employment, care for her family and 
contribute to her community at large. Trachoma is associated with insufficient access to clean 
water, poor sanitation and overcrowding.
17 
Children are also reservoirs of this infection.
17 
In 
sub- Saharan Africa women as compared to men are two to four times more likely to become 
infected with trachoma due to their close contact with young children.
17 
A longitudinal study 
in Sierra 
Leone showed that women in rural areas who spend considerable time pregnant or lactating 
were also at risk for being continually excluded from treatment programs.
18 
The true burden 
of disease from trachoma has been estimated in DALY’s and falls between 2.2-3.6 million 
annual DALY’s with 72% of these DALY’s taking place in sub-Saharan Africa and 80% 
lifetime DALY’s occurring in women.19 
Many other NTDs affect women and their ability to engage as key leaders. For instance, 
Chaga’s disease is associated with severe organ damage and congenital infections.
9 
Another 
important NTD is cutaneous leishmaniasis (CL) which causes disfiguring facial scars 
associated with depression, anxiety and decreased quality of life.
20 
Incidences of NTDs often 
rise during conflicts which compounds the cycle of disease and poverty. As civil war broke 
out in Syria, the incidence of CL rose to over 55,000 known cases in 2011 from an estimated 
17,000 in 1995.
20 
Women are at increased risk of becoming internally displaced or refugees 
during conflicts, and populations which become displaced are often excluded from the host 
nation’s NTD control programs.
21 
This facilitates pockets of disease propagation and 




The five most prevalent NTDs, lymphatic filariasis, trachoma, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis 
and soil-transmitted helminths, can all be controlled or eliminated through programs of mass 
drug administration (MDA).
5 
The World Health Organization has set disease control targets 
for 2020 which were reaffirmed by the 2012 London Declaration.
5,22 
Safe and cost- effective 
interventions are projected to lead to significant economic and productivity gains. For every 
US dollar invested in MDA between 2011-2020 the net benefit is expected to be $27 and then 
rise to $42 between 2021-2030.
5
 
Addressing NTDs is also an integral part of meeting the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The SDGs are seventeen goals and 169 targets outlined by the United Nations on 
September 15
th
, 2015 which seek to “end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for 
all”.
23 
NTDs are relevant to all the SDGs but most consistent with goal three (SD3) and SDG 
five (SD5). SD3 is to ensure health lives and promote well-being for all. SD5 focuses on 
achieving gender equality and empowering all woman and girls. 
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There is evidence that women can play an integral role in surpassing socio-behavioral and 
structural barriers to treatment within communitites.
8 
A study of community health workers in 
Uganda demonstrated that when Community Directed Distribution (CDD) was started women 
became actively involved as community implementers.
24 
Another systematic review in sub- 
Saharan Africa showed that women were more patient, persuasive and committed in  
distributing NTD medications as compared to male CDD workers.
8,25
 
Leadership in CDD programs can be a pathway to empowerment for women. However, 
caution should be taken against asking for volunteers to care for the distribution of NTD 
medications. Women should be paid for their work or participation may reinforce traditional 
gender roles and add to the time poverty which can result from unpaid labor.
26,27 
Internationally, women spend two to ten times more time participating in unpaid work than 
men.
27 
Gender inequality in unpaid work, such as cooking, cleaning and childcare, contributes 
to gender gaps in labor outcomes like labor force participation, quality of jobs and wages.
27
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
The inclusion of women in security and peace operations starts with addressing the factors 
which impede meaningful participation. If women like Kagiso, living in northern Botswana, 
are to escape cycles of poverty and disease they must have better access to preventive and 
curative medicine. A woman’s health, at all stages of life, is at the core of her ability to 
contribute to the betterment of her own welfare and society at large. NTDs have a significant 
negative impact on the lives of girls and women by impairing reproductive health, 
increasing the risk of acquiring sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and contributing to 




 When mapping NTDs and implementing programs, particular attention 
should be given to special populations including pregnant and lactating 
women. 
 Women are part of the solution to NTDs and their work should be recognized 
and rewarded by just compensation. 
 Further research, factoring in age and gender considerations, is needed to 





A “gender-transformative” approach, seeking to modify gender norms and 
work toward equality, should be pursued as we continue to support women, 
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PRESENCE AND ACCESS: WHAT WOMEN BRING TO 
THE CVE FIGHT 
LT Michaela Bilotta 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit One 
Platoon Commander 1-1-1  
INTRODUCTION: 
The face of warfare continues to shift every day. No longer are battles fought only in warzones. 
No longer are soldiers confined to a nation-state. Terrorist organizations have no concrete 
borders to hold them; instead they shift constantly to evade eradication by global powers that 
hold significant advantages in manpower, money, and materials. The fight to counter violent 
extremism (CVE) must now operate across the political, military, and social spectrums. In short, 
we are waging war against a ghost-like enemy, one that is becoming ever more present but ever 
harder to confine.  
The news of the day illustrates this perfectly. As I write, police in London rifle through the 
apartment of Salman Abedi, a 22 year old born in the United Kingdom, from Libyan parents who 
fled persecution in the 1990s. On May 21, 2017 Abedi conducted a suicide bombing in a concert 
hall in Manchester, ending his life along with the lives of 22 innocent civilians.1 Intelligence 
analysts and investigators are working to trace the source of his radicalization and the terrorist 
network behind it. If attributed to ISIS, as the group claims, this would mark the group’s first 
suicide bomb attack within the United Kingdom, a significant escalation in their lethality and 
reach.2 Now more than ever, the line between who is and is not at war has never been more 
blurred. If the global community seeks to defeat terrorist organizations operating at this pace, 
every weapon and tool must be employed to maximum efficiency. Every asset at our disposal 
must be exploited in reaching at-risk populations before violent extremism takes hold.  
While this may seem like a daunting task, a key weapon remains untapped that could open 
additional possibilities for countering violent extremism. Expanding this asset would widen our 
presence on the battlefield, provide access to the networks violent extremist organizations 
(VEOs) create, and allow us to touch at-risk populations and prevent them from going dark, or 
succumbing to extremism. Systematically employing women within Special Operations Forces 
would enable greater presence and access than all-male SOF units could ever hope to reach 
alone, strengthening efforts to target VEO key players.  
1 Katrin Bennhold, Stephen Castle, and Suliman Ali Zway, "Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices 
Extends to Libya," The New York Times (New York, NY), May 24, 2017, Europe, accessed June 11, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-bomber-salman-abedi.html. 
2 Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, "Manchester Bomber met with ISIS Unit in Libya, Officials Say," The 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) has made previous efforts to employ women, most recently 
through the Female Engagement Teams (FET) and Cultural Support Teams (CST) initiated 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. However, these programs 
have not reached their true potential due to a lack of investment. If we seek to reap the benefits 
of these programs, we need to invest the time, resources, and most importantly, risk, required to 
build a sustainable enabler package capable of shifting events on the ground. By standardizing 
the FET and CST training and deployment pipelines, we can build them into true enablers of 
Special Operations Forces, with the experience, authority, and trust they need to expand their 
current mission set. This will provide the DOD with a presence on the battlefield it currently 
lacks, offering increased access to at-risk populations, enabling disruption of terrorist networks, 
and countering violent extremism from the ground up.  
WOMEN IN CONFLICT 
Women have long been caught in the aftermath of atrocity and global conflict. Especially in 
patriarchal societies, women are often exploited first and considered last in the hierarchy of 
needs. According to the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, while “the desire of 
women affected by conflict situations to bring about peace and an end to violence may be 
universal…women have been largely excluded from peace processes, from negotiations, from 
efforts by warring parties to work out a settlement.”3 If we can overcome this stigma of silence, 
increasing the stability and quality of life among women can be an impetus for positive change 
and lasting peace. A study from the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security 
(WPS) found that “women in civil society tend to seek transformative change in a way that 
conceptualizes peace beyond the cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of warring 
troops.”4 The challenge for global powers, those seeking to help rebuild these fragile states, is 
how to connect to the women that make up over half of the population. While it has been over 
twenty years since the United Nations recognized that “without the active participation and the 
incorporation of women at all levels of decision making, the goals for equality, development, and 
peace cannot be achieved” the challenge to incorporate them into stabilization operations and 
conflict resolution processes continues to this day.5  
In October of 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) 
which recognized a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, made women a priority in the 
peace process, and sought to investigate the effect of armed conflict on women and girls.6 This 
marked the first time the Security Council expressly mentioned the particular effects of armed 
conflict on women and signaled a shift in global foreign policy to finally include women’s voices 
in the peacemaking process. According to the Resolution, “an understanding of the impact of 
armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their 
3 Ferris, Elizabeth. "Making the Difference: The Role of Women in Conflict Situations." Contribution to the 
"Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement" symposium conducted at The Brookings Institute, Washington, 
DC, May 2, 2012.  
4 Chang, Patty, Ph.D., Mayesha Alam, Roslyn Warren, Rukmani Bhatia, and Rebecca Turkington. "Women 
Leading Peace: A Close Examination of Women’s Political Participation in Peace Processes in Northern Ireland, 
Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines." Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, 2015 
5 UNDOC/A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 
6 “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000) 
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protection, and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the 
maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.”7 To that end, individual nations 
were tasked to implement UNSCR 1325, and outline the methods through which their security, 
defense, and diplomatic strategies will incorporate gender perspectives. While the 2016 policy 
update of United States’ National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security continues to 
promote key features of UNSCR 1325, specifically that “countries are more peaceful and 
prosperous when women are afforded full and equal rights and opportunity,” many argue that our 
progress has not moved quickly enough.8 Since its inception, nations have implemented UNSCR 
1325 in various ways, however its relevance on the global stage has only grown with time.  
A key provision of the resolution stressed the need to increase the role of women in conflict 
prevention and resolution, and expand the contribution of women in field-based operations, 
especially among military, civilian police, human rights, and humanitarian personnel.9 This 
measure was written explicitly to affect security doctrine in the training of civilian and military 
personnel working in conflict zones.  The Obama Administration sought to integrate WPS 
initiatives into the National Security Strategy and Joint Service Capabilities Plans.10  In addition, 
Geographic Combatant Commanders introduced WPS objectives into their Theater Campaign 
Plans, illustrating the relevance of these issues across the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels of command. Several DOD programs initiated during the recent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, including the FET and CST programs, would not have come about without 
UNSCR1325 and the subsequent National Action Plan. 
USING FEMALES AS AN ASSET TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted towards long-term nation building, the Department 
of Defense recognized the need to build relationships with the local population. 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine advised leaders to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan 
public in the hopes of creating mutual trust, fostering information sharing, and thwarting the 
insurgency rhetoric from within each household.11 This included females, as leaders recognized 
they could not achieve mission success if they were shut off from half of the population. 
According to the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “when women support COIN efforts, 
families support COIN efforts.”12 Female Engagement Teams were implemented by the U.S. 
Marine Corps to allow ground combat units to interact with women in Iraq and Afghanistan 
without violating cultural sensitivities and straining the very relationships upon which COIN was 
dependent.  
7 “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000) 
8 "The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security," in United States National Action 
Plan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2016), [5] 
9 “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000) 
10 "The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security," in United States National Action 
Plan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2016), [5]. 
11 David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," Joint 
Information Operations Center, Summer 2006, [5], PDF. 
12 Department of the Army Headquarters, "Field Manual 3-24," in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2006), PDF. 
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Designed to create lasting relationships with Afghan women, FETs deployed female Marines 
with ground troops in groups of two or three for patrols, engagements with village leaders, or 
shuras (councils) with local women. At times they were supplemented by female corpsmen to 
offer medical support to women and children in the area. They sought to act as battlefield 
enablers or force multipliers, influencing and interacting with the local population, men, women, 
and children, to achieve their COIN objectives and build enduring trust and confidence between 
local Afghans and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.13 While the United 
States established the program, other nations joined the effort and by 2014, fourteen NATO 
nations were providing female engagement team support (McNierney 2015).14  
Cultural Support Teams also stemmed from a battlefield necessity. In 2011, Army Special 
Operations Forces conducting missions in Afghanistan recognized that they were missing key 
intelligence collection and interrogation opportunities by not engaging the host nation female and 
adolescent populations. Cultural sensitivities made it impossible for male commandoes to search 
or question women and children during their raids. Oftentimes, to avoid offending the local 
population, Afghan women and children were secluded in rooms and left unattended while SOF 
units conducted field level exploitation and interrogation. Insurgents quickly noticed this security 
gap and began to exploit the lack of female oversight; hiding evidence, weapons, and even 
personnel among the women and children. 15 USASOC, U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command, knew that immediate action had to be taken to rectify this security and intelligence 
breach. They issued a force-wide call for female volunteers to break from their current 
occupational specialties for one year in order to screen, train, and serve alongside Army Special 
Operations Forces as cultural support specialists.  
Cultural Support Teams were described as “female Soldiers who serve as enablers supporting 
Army special-operations combat forces in and around secured objective areas.”16 The language 
outlining their role was significant, as the combat exclusion principle had not been revoked at the 
time of their inception and women remained barred from combat oriented positions like Infantry, 
Rangers, or Special Forces. CSTs were divided into two distinct mission sets, direct action and 
village stability. Village Stability CSTs joined Green Berets on long-term stability missions in 
austere environments to build rapport with local nationals.17 Direct Action units accompanied 
Army Rangers and conducted searches and tactical questioning of any women and children. 
These missions usually occurred at night, with troops fast roping or conducting clandestine 
infiltrations onto targets under night vision before conducting surprise raids on key insurgents 
suspected of enemy activity. While their program had some similarities to the Marine Corps FET 
13 Sheila Medeiros and Traci Swanson, "DoD’s Combat Exclusion Policies Limit Commanders and Strain Our 
Current Forces," Small Wars Journal, November 20, 2011, digital file. 
14 Dr. Brooke A. McNierney, "Female Engagement Teams: An Evaluation of the Female Engagement Team 
Program in Afghanistan," Constructive Pathways: Stimulating and Safeguarding Components of WPS, April 16, 
2017, 85, PDF 
15 Kristen Moores, telephone interview by the author, San Diego, CA, May 19, 2017 
16 Department of the Army, "About the Cultural Support Program," US Army Special Operations Command, 
accessed June 10, 2017, http://www.soc.mil/CST/about.html. 





program, it was unique in that its arduous selection process sought to put potential candidates 
through the rigorous core skills required for ARSOF missions.18  
GAUGING EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH FIRST HAND ACCOUNTS 
Two officers who participated in FET and CST at the peak of their operating years, 2010-2013, 
sat down to provide interviews on their experience in each program. Several scholars have 
collected and analyzed data from FET and CST employment in Iraq and Afghanistan, most 
recently LTC Keravouri and Dr. Brooke McNierney’s research for the 2015 NWC conference on 
WPS.1920 While these studies provide relevant data and analysis, the information and insight 
provided by leaders at the tactical level is unique, and provides lessons on what could be 
improved upon from those who have worked to accomplish the mission. Seemingly small 
changes at the tactical level can have a large strategic impact when amplified across a force.  
U.S. Marine Corps Captain Marissa Loya served as the First Marine Division FET Liaison 
Officer and Executive Officer for a Female Engagement Team that deployed to Afghanistan’s 
Helmand Province from 2010 to 2011. She cited numerous instances where FET personnel 
enabled mission completion and saved the lives of U.S. Marines through intelligence offered 
only to them. U.S. Army Captain Kristen Moores served on a Cultural Support Team in 
Afghanistan from October 2012 to June 2013. She summarized the capabilities CSTs brought to 
the fight that Army Special Forces could not in just two words, placement and access. Both 
women serve as models for the ways the Female Engagement Team and Cultural Support Teams 
“are providing new avenues for female Marines and soldiers to support ongoing operations and 
engage women in local populations.”21  
Despite the success of these programs, each woman revealed points that stalled overall mission 
accomplishment. While their programs and experiences were different and very successful, each 
woman cited common reasons for slowed or degraded operational success, ways they could have 
been employed more efficiently to achieve maximum impact. The lack of a standardized training 
pipeline and a military occupational specialty (MOS) dedicated to FET/CST personnel inhibited 
the ability for women to grow in the community, share lessons learned, and train the next 
iteration. Lack of education on the part of the supported command on how to employ females 
wasted program resources. Finally, the combat exclusion principle forced supported units to 
modify their employment of FET/CST personnel in certain environments. Today, each of these 
problems has the capacity to be solved. Doing so will have an exponential impact on the 
battlefield in Operation Inherent Resolve.  
“We made it work because the mission required us to make it work,” Captain Loya’s words 
summarized the spirit of the 48 Marines she helped lead in Afghanistan, the first FET created 
stateside.22 Prior to the establishment of the 1st Marine Division FET, Loya’s unit, teams were 
                                                      
18 Department of the Army, "About the Cultural," US Army Special Operations Command. 
19 Dr. McNierney, "Female Engagement Teams," 82, PDF.  
20 LTC Rose Lopez Keravouri, "The Instrumentalization of Femininity in U.S. Military Conflict Resolution in 
Afghanistan," Constructive Pathways: Stimulating and Safeguarding Components of WPS, April 17, 2015, 61, PDF. 
21 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, 2016  
22  Loya, e-mail interview by the author. 
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banded together in country, pulled from other missions and given on the job training.23 Captain 
Loya’s team was one of the first to receive pre-deployment training. This consisted of four 
months of infantry tactics, language and cultural courses, patrolling, land navigation, tactical 
casualty combat care, and shooting. Captain Loya and her Marines were also able to conduct 
simulated missions at 29 Palms with the infantry units they would deploy with in Afghanistan. It 
is key to note that these integrated simulated missions, possibly the most important part of 
training, lasted two weeks and only exposed them to some of the units they would meet on 
deployment. Despite obstacles in training and in country, Captain Loya and her Marines made 
significant strides in Afghanistan, garnering support for coalition forces specifically attributed to 
their employment. 
Once in country, Captain Loya oversaw the tactical employment of her teams and flew to various 
positions to brief 1st Marine Division leadership on the progress of Female Engagement Teams 
when not conducting missions herself.24 Captain Loya proved the effectiveness of her team 
through specific measures of performance that were recorded after each mission. FET personnel 
maintained daily logs of the number of missions conducted, amount of enemy information 
passed through FET personnel, the number of engagements with Afghan locals, and the number 
of female only shuras (councils) they coordinated. These metrics were established and enforced 
by the unit, another testament to the creativity and determination of FET personnel to achieve, 
and prove, mission success. Captain Loya cited an example of the value of FET personnel 
describing a day in Marjeh province, when a village elder specifically sought out the female 
Marine in the patrol to pass information. After getting the Sergeant’s attention, he proceeded to 
draw a terrain map in the sand, outlining the location of several improvised explosive devices, or 
IEDs, in the village. His information proved true, saving the lives of several Marines and 
enabling the collection of valuable intelligence and evidence.  
Unfortunately, despite their proven success, Captain Loya felt that she experienced repeated 
pushback from Infantry Company and battalion commanders who did not know how or when to 
effectively employ FETs. Due to a lack of education and pre-deployment training between FET 
and Infantry units, commanders remained unsure of what the female Marines could handle, how 
worthwhile their presence could be, and lacked trust in their ability to perform in a potential 
combat situation.  Captain Loya spent valuable time training not Afghan leaders but fellow 
Marines on FET employment. It was up to Captain Loya and her Marines to prove their 
counterparts’ doubts about their assimilation to be “just flat out false.” 25 Captain Loya stated 
there were no issues with her Marines’ ability to conduct the mission with infantry Marines, no 
matter the austerity of the environment. Had there been more training stateside on the role and 
value of FET on missions, or more lasting integration exercises between the two units prior to 
deployment, this inefficiency could have been avoided.  
Captain Kristen Moores deployed with a Cultural Support Team in October 2012 and operated 
throughout Eastern Afghanistan in Logar Province, supporting Ranger operations until June 
                                                      
23 McNierney, "Female Engagement," [82]. 
24 Loya, e-mail interview by the author. 





2013.26 She cited numerous examples where searches and tactical questioning of Afghan women 
by CSTs led to evidence collection directly related to highly sought after targets. Her experiences 
highlighted one of the principal capabilities of the CST program when she said, “while women 
there are not even treated as second class citizens, they are not given nearly enough credit for 
how much they know and understand the society around them.” While many of these women 
lack a basic education, Captain Moores noted that “these women know everything that is going 
on, who is doing it, and why.” A UN study researching women in conflict found that while 
Captain Moores assertions were true, “because women are usually seen as victims of conflict 
who are unaware of combat operations and other violent acts, they generally have nowhere to 
turn with their information.”27 While some were more guarded than others with the information 
they shared, all of the women had information that could only be gleaned through the presence 
and access offered by female CSTs on the ground. 
While Captain Moores’ service as a cultural support specialist highlights the success CSTs 
brought to the Ranger mission, her introduction to the program also underlines a problem with 
the Army’s current management of the capability. After graduating from the University of 
Virginia, Captain Moores was attending Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) with every 
intention of reporting to the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Fort Bliss, TX 
when she heard about the screening course to become a cultural support specialist. She quickly 
completed the required physical tests and requested permission to attend selection instead of 
reporting to her designated command. Upon being selected, Captain Moores essentially deviated 
from her military occupational specialty for one year in order to report to CST follow-on 
training, deployment, and turnover out of Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.28 After Captain Moores 
returned she left the CST community, reported to her original unit and began working in her 
originally designated specialty, as an intelligence officer.  
Captain Moores felt her time in the CST program was valuable in shaping her Army career and 
outlook as an intelligence officer, however it is atypical. This deviation from the intended path 
could be seen by some as a step back in an officer’s career progression, and would prevent some 
viable candidates from applying. Furthermore, without a career designation for cultural support 
specialists, there was no community for Captain Moores to return to in order to share lessons 
learned, keep knowledge within the CST field, and move the mission capability forward. 
Additionally, while former Army Rangers taught Captain Moores’ pre-deployment training, she 
did not meet the units she would operate with until deployment.  
In both branches, if the FET and CST programs could be pursued as military occupational 
specialties, it would attract even more competitive candidates and retain their knowledge and 
expertise after deployments. Their corresponding Infantry and Special Forces units would learn 
to trust and value the capabilities of their programs over time, as they do with other enablers, 
including Pararescue, Communications, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal assets. In the cases of 
Captain Loya and Captain Moores, both women returned to their primary MOS after their FET 
                                                      
26 Moores, telephone interview by the author.  
27 Brenda J. Opperman, "Hawks, Doves, and Canaries: Women in Conflict," Small Wars Journal, August 13, 
2014, [12], PDF. 
28 Moores, telephone interview by the author. 
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and CST tours, the members of their units returned to their previous commands, and their 
supported command deployed with another female asset on the next rotation.29 If FET and CST 
units remained with ground combat or Special Forces for multiple rotations, as other enablers 
typically do, this would fulfill a vital principle of Special Operations, repetition.30  Furthermore, 
it would allow for more integrated planning and preparation with all assets prior to mission 
execution, phases vital to an operation designed to achieve relative superiority. 31 As it currently 
stands, this lack of continuity degrades the overall mission capability of both the female assets 
and the units they support.  
The reversal of the DOD’s combat exclusion policy allows for new openings and methods 
through which women can be employed to fight the global war on violent extremism. On January 
24, 2013 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Martin Dempsey, signed a memo reversing the 1994 policy excluding women from combat. 
Prior to this, the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment rule stated that “service 
members are eligible to be assigned for all positions for which they are qualified, except that 
women shall be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade level whose primary 
mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.” 32 As women continue to break barriers on 
previously defined limits on their ability to serve-five women have passed the Army’s rigorous 
Ranger School since 2015-the DOD should look to the FET and CST programs as the foundation 
upon which to build female presence on the battlefield. 33 Until enough females are present in 
Infantry and Special Operations Forces units to fulfill the unique role of FETs and CSTs, these 
programs can expand their current footprint in the combat environment.  
MOVING FORWARD 
As the war on terror continues, the global community has shifted focus, considering not only the 
aftermath of conflict on women but also how women can be instrumental in preventing violent 
extremism from taking hold of their community in the first place. 34 In 2015, Sisters Against 
Violent Extremism (SAVE), published “Mothers Against Terror” recognizing that “mothers are 
strategically placed to serve as a buffer between radical influences and those targeted next.” 
Their three-stage study conducted 200 in-depth interviews with women whose children had been 
radicalized by violent extremist organizations. They identified what mothers noticed, what 
                                                      
29 Loya, e-mail interview by the author. 
30 Admiral McRaven served as commander of both United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and defined Special Operations as those “conducted by forces 
specifically trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue, is a 
political or military imperative.” He defined six principles of special operations: simplicity, security, repetition, 
surprise, speed, and purpose.  
31 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New 
York: Ballantine Books, Random House Publishing Group, 1996), 8. 
32 David Vergun, "Secretary of Defense rescinds 'Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,'" US 
Army, last modified January 24, 2013, accessed June 11, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/94932. 
33 Meghann Myers, "Two women, the First Since October 2015, Graduate from Army Ranger School," Army 
Times, April 3, 2017, accessed June 11, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/articles/two-women-the-first-since-
october-2015-graduate-from-army-ranger-school. 
34 Women without Borders, an international, research based NGO, has established “Sisters Against Violent 
Extremism,” the first research-based female counterterrorism platform to empower women with the tools to 
recognize violent extremism in their homes and take steps to prevent its escalation. 
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escaped them, who they felt comfortable sharing their concerns with, and whom they did not. 
They created the Mothers School model to “seek out mothers as an embedded security ally and 
arm them with the skills to be an effective foundation of community resilience.”35 While the pilot 
project has been successful in Indonesia, Kashmir, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Zanzibar, it 
currently lacks the security infrastructure to be implemented in active warzones like Syria and 
Iraq.  
The presence and access achieved by FET and CST programs would be instrumental in “co-
opting neutral or friendly women” and building “networks of enlightened self-interest” that 
eventually undermine insurgents and terrorists alike. David Kilcullen, a chief architect of the 
current U.S. Counterinsurgency strategy, argues that eventually “you need your own female 
counterinsurgents…win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take 
a big step forward in mobilizing the population.”36  Unencumbered by the combat exclusion 
policy of 1994 and empowered with the standardized training of a Special Forces enabler 
package, FETs and CSTs could deploy in support of these strategic objectives.  
As mentioned previously, the line between who is and is not at war has blurred, the borders of 
battlegrounds have become almost invisible, and the casualties and combatants have become 
ever harder to distinguish. Despite this global ambiguity, one thing remains clear, the presence of 
a very real enemy. General McChrystal’s words from 2006 hold true to this day, “This is a war. 
And this war will have a winner, and it will have a loser. We are not here to fight the war on 
terror. We are here to win it”37 We can only hope to win it if we employ every asset at our 
disposal to maximum efficiency.  
35 Edit Shlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, "Mother's Against Terror: Families are Best Placed to Address 
Radicalization Before it Escalates into Violence," Women Without Borders, last modified December 2015, accessed 
June 9, 2017, http://www.women-without-
borders.org/files/downloads/Mothers_Against_Terror_Per_Concordiam_Dec_15.pdf  
36 David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," Joint 
Information Operations Center, Summer 2006, [5]. PDF. 
37 Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir; [updated with a New Preface] (New York, NY 
[u.a.]: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014), 135. 
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MENTAL HEALTH AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 
By: Kate Hendricks Thomas, Ph.D. 
www.drkatethomas.com 
INTRODUCTION 
In any conversation about complete integration of women into all components of the military, the 
topic of mental health outcomes arises. As a whole, suicide is a major health problem in the 
military community with risk rates almost four times higher in the veteran population than in 
non-veterans (Bossarte, 2013). Conservative estimates indicate that numbers of suicide attempts 
and completions have increased since 1995, and are currently hovering at 22 veterans taking 
their own lives each day, along with one active duty service member per day (Department of 
Defense, 2015). Military deployment to a war zone elevates the risk of long-term physical, 
psychological, and social problems and reduces overall health status (Spelman, Hunt, Seal, & 
Burgo-Black, 2012) and reintegration after active service is a risky time for such outcomes 
(Friedman, 2015).   
While in the general population, women are at less risk for suicidality than men, women in the 
military face the same risk rates as military male peers. Military male suicide rates are typically 
25% higher than civilian male peers, and research has shown that female veterans are six times 
more likely to commit suicide than civilian women (Prupis, 2015). For both men and women in 
the military, stress injuries and depression are correlated with suicidality, and those conditions 
are exacerbated by low levels of self-reported social support (Brenner & Barnes, 2012; Thomas 
& Plummer Taylor, 2015). 
Issues of social support are uniquely problematic for military women due to sexual trauma 
prevalence, lower levels of perceived unit cohesion, and institutional barriers to accessing health 
care. As this forum’s second essay notes, a culture of misogyny and exclusion impact the 
experience of women in military service. Such entrenched gender bias, present at every level of 
the military woman’s experience from entry-level to separated veteran, is a major contributor to 
the social factors that increase military women’s risk of suicide. This bias can be seen in both the 
structures (or lack thereof) in place for helping service members through difficult periods, and as 
discussed in the Women, Peace, and Security forum, the informal language used to discuss 
women in the field of security studies. Both formal and informal biases have excluded women 
from conversations about how their changing role in the military has impacted mental health 
concerns. Increasing awareness of the behavioral health ramifications of lower levels of social 
support for military women can improve the resourcing and framing of population-specific 
programming that considers trauma history, unit cohesion issues, and institutional barriers in a 
more informed manner. In addition, as the following forum essay will argue, attention to the 
experiences of women who are sexual minorities is important to lower the rates of suicide seen in 
female veterans. 
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MILITARY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES – CAUSAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SUICIDE 
Statistics on PTS in military-connected communities are uncertain, with estimates out of the 
Veteran’s Administration sitting at 15-50% (Coughlin, 2012).  A RAND corporation study 
reported numbers hovering at about 20% (Acosta, Adamson, Farmer, Farris, & Feeney, 2014). 
Suicide is positively correlated with depression, of which stress and anxiety are symptoms (Hoge 
& Castro, 2012). Depressive conditions are closely related to trauma and stress-related disorders 
like PTS; the two often co-occur (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
V, 2013; Hoge, 2010)). Depression in veterans can be categorized as both diagnosed and 
undiagnosed, and specific sub-populations of veterans are more likely to struggle with symptoms 
without diagnosis and the medical care that presumably would follow (Thomas, et al., 2015).  
The nature of warfare today has added to mental health issues. High operational tempos and 
short garrison time between deployments means that service members frequently do not have the 
time to get the help they need.  Additionally, a smaller percentage of the American public 
volunteers for service and deployment, leading to minority stress for military personnel as they 
reintegrate into a civilian society that may struggle to understand their experiences (Hendricks 
Thomas, 2015).These factors have led to much higher levels of undiagnosed PTS than in prior 
generations, and the problems are particularly significant for women. As women are more 
frequently involved in combat operations, they are more likely to experience events that can 
trigger PTS. However, since women have not been legally recognized as part of combat arms 
units, the frequently lack the structural support mechanisms to ensure they receive evaluation and 
care. This has made not only treatment of women extremely difficult, but obtaining reliable data 
particularly challenging.    
Women constitute approximately 15% of the armed services (Murdoch et al., 2006), and 
represent a growing segment of the veteran population. Female service members and veterans 
have healthcare needs often unmet and misunderstood by Department of Defense and Veterans 
Administration providers (Carlson, Stromwall, & Lietz, 2013). Duhart (2012) indicated that 
female veterans returning from deployment were more likely than their male counterparts to 
report mental health concerns such as posttraumatic stress (PTS), depression, and suicidal 
thoughts. Research has also shown that women are more likely to screen positively for 
depression both before and after deployments (Koo & Maguen, 2014). These higher incidence 
rates have often been used to buttress arguments opposing the integration of women into combat 
arms specialties. Such simplistic reliance on the statistics misses the predictor correlates, 
misunderstands causes in context, and erroneously points to solutions of exclusion. 
Understanding mental health conditions in military women in a complex process, but knowing 
that low social support levels and poor unit cohesion are major predictors of both depression and 
stress injury, behavioral health researchers can place the issue in context and recommend 
solutions. Set standards and formal inclusion erase structural barriers that contribute to 
stereotype threats and lower levels of acceptance experienced by military women. In addition, 
because military women face issues of trauma prevalence and institutional barriers to health care 
that contribute to poorer mental health outcomes, health programming in targeted fashion to 





Depression is a diagnosis that covers a host of symptoms, which are categorized in The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) by duration of symptom 
presence. Mild depression involves symptoms manifesting for more than four days, moderate 
depression for slightly longer periods, and major depression involves symptoms present almost 
every day for one month. As with most psychological illnesses, symptoms manifest differently in 
every individual. Depression red flags include feelings of sadness, grief, worry, and tension, and 
possible interference with daily activities as a result of these feelings. Some people experience 
loss of appetite or sex drive, while others go the opposite route and overeat or engage in 
promiscuous or risky sexual behavior (Hendricks Thomas, 2015).  
Highly variant, depression is often ignored or even misdiagnosed, particularly in milder forms 
where treatment is most effective but diagnosis hardest to pin down. Depression in some people 
looks a lot like stress injury, which is a normal and adaptive response to excess threats, whether 
those threats are present in the moment or are being re-experienced mentally in a flashback. In 
fact, stress and anxiety are symptoms of depression and in some patients both conditions occur at 
the same time. The diagnoses are different, however (Tanielan & Jaycox, 2008). 
STRESS INJURY 
Understanding stress injury requires understanding the absolutely normal way that human bodies 
respond to stressors. In response to stimuli, the brain triggers a bodily reaction, setting in motion 
a chain of physical reactions. The human endocrine system is artfully wired to fire off a series of 
hormones whenever the brain registers something as threatening. Threats can vary in terms of 
seriousness, but all trigger this exact same hormonal reaction in varying degrees of intensity. 
The strongest reaction is the survival response known commonly as “fight or flight.” This 
reaction gets the body ready for physical exertion, sending energy and resources to systems that 
are needed in a fight or a footrace. Heart rate increases, respiratory rate increases, and major 
muscles tense. Intense alertness may save a life in an immediate threat situation, but in the long 
term, an excessively firing fight-or-flight stress response causes problems. When stressed to this 
degree, the body shuts down nonessential systems to give energy and attention to major muscle 
groups, heart function, and breathing. The body responding to stress hormones considers 
complicated thinking, muscle repair, reproductive functions, blood flow to fingers and toes, and 
digestion nonessential. Over time, problems arise as the body struggles to balance competing 
messages and maintain homeostatic balance (Thomas & Plummer Taylor, 2015).  
If a given threat is overly traumatic or simply goes on for too great a time, the stress response 
keeps firing, sending the entire system into dysregulation. The elevated levels of cortisol and 
adrenaline present in the bloodstream of chronically stressed individuals directly impair the 
body’s ability to shut down into restorative states. The sympathetic nervous system aggressively 
stays on, resulting in hypervigilance, insomnia, and a host of emotional regulation problems 
(Hoge, 2010).  
In addition to mental, stress injury symptoms can be physical, including among others: numbness 
in hands and feet, stomach problems, and high blood pressure. Though clinicians label it an 
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injury, the body is only responding naturally to the messages cortisol and adrenaline are sending. 
The overactive stress response becomes ingrained in a patient with PTS symptoms, and a 
constant state of reactivity and hyperarousal can begin to feel normal.  
Both depression and stress injury cause mental and physical problems for military men and 
women struggling with symptoms, creating a challenge for the services to prevent and treat both 
in order to improve productivity, health indicators, and to prevent suicide (Bossarte, 2013; 
Hendricks Thomas, 2105; Hoge, 2010). 
MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL SUPPORT 
Not everyone exposed to trauma or combat suffers from reactivity issues afterward, and many 
mental health issues are not causally linked to trauma. Misconceptions and stigma are a problem 
for military personnel who view depression and stress injury as weakness, or believe that only 
very specific combat experiences create diagnosable emotional struggles (Malmin, 2013). In fact, 
combat exposure doesn’t predict the likelihood that a veteran will commit suicide. Among 
younger veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, the greatest predictor of suicide is not deployment but 
rather a recent separation from service (Friedman, 2015).  
Service separation stress points to the importance of social support as a predictor of mental 
health, because of the way human endocrine and nervous systems positively respond to socially-
supportive relationships (Thomas, 2016; Egolf, Lasker, Wolf, & Potvin, 1992)). Humans are 
built to connect and commune with one another (Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb, 2000). When 
people cooperate and bond in close-knit groups, they increase levels of oxytocin and dopamine 
in their bloodstream. These hormones act in direct opposition to the stress hormones cortisol and 
adrenaline, and have the opposite effect on the body and mental state. This relaxation response is 
triggered whenever a close connection occurs, and loneliness and social rejection immediately 
set off the body’s threat receptors (Friedman, 2015).  
Social support is vital to mental wellness because it lowers stress levels. It is natural and adaptive 
for humans to seek connection with one another, and interruptions to those close connections are 
uniquely traumatizing. Loneliness and rejection feel like threats to life and future stability to 
human nervous systems, and the result is measurable impact on physical health. Strained social 
relationships only increase reactivity in a person already struggling with stress injury (Hendricks 
Thomas, 2015). 
Scientists have studied social support from a variety of angles, looking at the size of networks, 
whether or not someone has a confidante, partnership status, and the perceived quality of support 
received (Cutrona, 1996; DiMatteo, 2004). Research examples validating the need for a trusted 
tribe abound; social support is a known contributor to health and longevity, with recent studies 
indicating that high levels add 7.5 years to the average American lifespan (Rankin, 2013).    
Social support improves mental health in general, but studies have shown that specifically in 
military settings, high levels of perceived social support also independently predict coping self-
efficacy post-deployment (Koo & Maguen, 2014; Hoge, 2010). Unfortunately, both male and 
female military-connected personnel are a numerical minority. Minority status creates 
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deleterious health effects. During the last twenty years, the American veteran population (both 
male and female) has steadily declined. What this means for today’s veterans is that only about 
12 percent of their male peers and 3 percent of their female peers served during the last decade of 
war. Women comprise 14.5 percent of the active component, with fewer in the Marine Corps and 
more in the Air Force (Department of Defense, 2015).  
Historically, higher proportions of the American citizenry served at least one tour in the military. 
The significant majority of American men aged seventy-five and older are veterans, compared 
with no more than 12 percent of those younger than age thirty-five. The opposite is true for 
women, who are less represented in older eras of military service. Younger women are slightly 
more likely than older women to be veterans, but veteran status does not rise much above 3 
percent in any female age group. Minority stress for female service members is even higher than 
that of male colleagues (Junger, 2015).  
A qualitative study published in the American Journal of Public Health shared interviews with 
recently-discharged troops diagnosed with depression and conducted general surveys of 
separating service members who did not have a diagnosis. The study demonstrated that major 
issues for veterans were reintegration into new roles and the loss of community felt when leaving 
the military. Veterans described a sense of burdensomeness and extreme disconnect from 
civilians. These feelings linked to a failed sense of belonging and desire for death. Later studies 
focused specifically on female veterans and found that descriptions of symptoms and feelings of 
disconnect were markedly similar, though more pronounced and likely to be of greater severity, 
both practically and statistically (Seal, et al., 2009). 
ISSUES IMPACTING UNIT COHESION IN MILITARY WOMEN – TRAUMA 
PREVALENCE & MINORITY STRESS 
Targeting programs towards women must take into consideration several facets of the female 
military experience that differ from that of their male counterparts. As discussed in this forum, 
women are more likely to face issues of discrimination and belonging. They are at a 
disproportionately high risk for Military Sexual Trauma (MST), defined as sexual violence, 
sexual coercion, sexually threatening behavior, and/or sexual assault experienced during military 
service. MST is under-studied and under-reported, but between 20-40% of female veterans report 
experiencing MST during their time in service (Kelly, Skelton, Patel, & Bradley, 2011). During 
mental health screenings, one in five women report MST (Burns, Grindlay, Holt, Manski, & 
Grossman, 2014). Additionally, the majority of female veterans report having endured ongoing 
sexual harassment (Street, Vogt, & Dutra, 2009; Rogers & Kelly, 2011).  
Historical discrimination against women in the service branches combined with cultural issues 
that linger in the present day can make issues of social support and unit cohesion uniquely salient 
for military women (Kline et al., 2013; Mitchell, 1989).  Many servicewomen report feelings of 
alienation and decreased feelings of unit cohesion while serving (Meredith, et al., 2011). These 
women are at increased risk for mental health problems, including depression and stress injury 
(Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2013).  
81
2017 Women, Peace, and Security Conference Working Papers 
Institutionally, efforts to reduce barriers to unit cohesion for military women must be explored, 
researched, and critically analyzed. This forum argues that full inclusion and specialty-specific 
standards are a necessary step towards decreasing misogynistic and unhealthy culture faced by 
military women. Additionally, research on military women and mental health should seek 
condition correlates. If we know who is struggling, we can create specific programs led by 
stakeholder members of a specific subset of the population. Behavioral health research is useful 
in providing road maps for providers hoping to target military women by identifying variables, 
and in expanding our scope of understanding concerning how to reach servicewomen in 
culturally competent ways.  
BARRIERS TO HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR MILITARY WOMEN   
Female servicewomen face unique health issues related to rampant Military Sexual Trauma rates 
and a host of issues related to access to health care through the Veteran’s Administration, both 
stigma-related and structural (Bielawski, et al., 2014). Easing access burdens for Department of 
Veteran Affairs (VA) benefits and health care must be a top priority; female veterans do not need 
additional barriers. Some of the available services that are offered through the VA are 
psychological assessment and evaluations, psychotherapy, inpatient and outpatient care, and 
psychosocial rehabilitation (Elnitsky, et al., 2013). There are several VA facilities that have 
established women-only programs and specialized women’s treatment teams to serve those 
female veterans that are not comfortable in a mixed-gender environment (Department of Veteran 
Affairs, 2015a). 
Enabling care access for younger female veterans is important. Older female veterans are more 
likely to access VA health care than their younger peers from Afghanistan and Iraq (Bielawski, 
et al. 2014). The largest sub-population of women that use VA services are between the ages of 
45 and 64; women veterans that are 65 and older make up 14% of those that use VA services 
(Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015b). With that said, more research is needed on mental 
health challenges, including depression, experienced by women across the life span (Bean-
Mayberry et al., 2011).   
THE WAY FORWARD – ASSETS-BASED APPROACHES 
The challenge for health professionals looking to stem the tide of service suicides and improve 
quality of life for military women lies in shifting from a focus on problems toward a focus on 
capacity building. In this space, there is massive opportunity to make a positive impact. Focusing 
beyond post-incident therapy and relying on theories of resiliency are key. Military subculture is 
unique and requires culturally-palatable programming, and understanding the uniquely liminal 
space occupied by female veterans is necessary (Held & Owens, 2013; Thomas, 2016). Issues of 
social support are uniquely problematic for military women due to sexual trauma prevalence, 
lower levels of perceived unit cohesion, and institutional barriers to accessing health care 
(Naybeck-Beebe, 2010). These issues complicate the challenge for health professionals looking 
to stem the tide of service suicides and improve quality of life for military women (Malmin, 
2013).   
Resilience is the ability to become strong, healthy, or successful again after something stressful 
happens (Richardson, 2002). Case studies of existing programs that have worked to build 
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resilience in different populations provide the foundation upon which savvy programmers must 
build; and health promotion professionals working to prevent and treat mental health problems 
like depression and stress illness must understand the confluence of sex, social support, and 
mental health issues in the community (Kline, et al., 2013).   
Resilience-training methods have been demonstrated to reduce stress and emotional reactivity 
and promote mental health and emotional well-being; framing this as promotion of combat 
fitness, resilience, and mental endurance may render it culturally-palatable to the military 
population (Greden, et al., 2010; Kobau, et al., 2011). Receiving training to cultivate resilience in 
the pre-deployment interval may help protect against the deleterious effects of the high-stress 
military context on physical and psychological health (Lee, et al., 2013; Sipe & Eisendrath, 
2012).   
This review suggests that targeted programming is needed for female veterans in treating and 
preventing depression and in select sub-populations of female veterans. A need exists for further 
research that explores the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of veterans toward programming that is 
focused on resilience-building, particularly in veteran populations in postsecondary educational 
settings given the high numbers of younger veterans attending postsecondary institutions and 
potential to introduce targeted interventions early in their life trajectories. The advancement of 
military mental health from a health promotion and education perspective could benefit 
tremendously from qualitative research, specifically case studies of successful resilience 
programming (Coughlin, 2012). This should involve rigorous program evaluation of culturally-
sensitive content that focuses on predictor variables of interest, designing and validating program 
exemplars that provide the best opportunity to make a difference in the mental health of veterans.  
Using information about social support as a significant predictor of depression in veterans to 
target programming is a needed first step. Tailoring programs for relevance in order to resonate 
with military women and rigorously evaluating them is the next (Thomas, Plummer Taylor, 
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MAKING CHANGE OUT OF SCANDAL 
By Colonel Sheila M.Q. Scanlon USMC Retired 
JUNE 1, 2017 
Testifying before of Congress, Marine Commandant General Robert Neller stated “This issue of 
denigration of women, objectification of women, misogyny — however you want to articulate it 
— or just bad behavior, is tied to the way that some group of male Marines look at women in the 
Marine Corps. I think we can fix that....”1 I thought to myself, I hope they aren’t reading this in 
Afghanistan, because, if so, gender integration may take a step backwards. I spent three years in 
Afghanistan working as a Senior Gender Advisor with both the Afghan National Army and 
Afghan National Police. As part of our duties, we were encouraging both organizations to 
increase and integrate more women. The Afghan General Officers were always checking the 
internet looking at what is going on in the U.S. and questioning their U.S. advisors as to why 
we’re trying to change their culture on how they treat women when we have issues such as this 
in the United States. 
A private Facebook group called Marines United, made up of about 30,000 active and former 
Marines, posted nude photos of women. This scandal not only included nude pictures of women 
on active duty in the Marine Corps, but also contained many lewd comments. This is reminiscent 
of 1991 and Tailhook. Tailhook was a Naval Aviators (Marines and Navy) Convention, held 
yearly in Las Vegas. In 1991, the 35th Annual Tailhook Convention was rocked by dishonor 
when 83 women and seven men were assaulted in degrading ways at what became a frat party 
gone badly.2 Leadership had known for years that the Convention was out of hand with 
drunkenness and vulgar behavior and did nothing to stop it. This is no different than the Marine 
Corps knowing for years that the internet was being used to harass and denigrate women and 
doing very little to stop it.3 
In response to the nude-photo scandal and the need to make change, the Commandant created a 
Task Force “to address cultural change and gender diversity Corps-wide.”4 Cultural change 
means addressing the cultural issue of military masculinity. Military masculinity does not have a 
clear definition but is described as “a combination of traits and attitudes that are 
hyper-masculine, hegemonic, and are associated primarily with the military.”5 Military 
1 Marine Corps Times Top Marine: Nude Photo-Sharing Scandal Shows ‘We have to change’ by Jeff Schogol 
March 14, 2017. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/neller-testifies-on-photo-scandal 
2 Newsweek “Tailhook: Scandal Time” by Newsweek Staff on 7/5/92. www.newsweek.com/tailhook-scandal-
tine-200362. 
3 Marine Corps Times Top Marine: Nude Photo-Sharing Scandal Shows ‘We have to change’ by Jeff Schogol 
March 14, 2017. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/neller-testifies-on-photo-scandal 
4 USMC Update: Marines United Response http://www.moaa.org/Content/Take-Action/Top-
Issues/Currently-Serving/USMC-Update--Marines-United 
5 Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004). 
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masculinity does not accept women as equal partners, making gender integration difficult. This 
means the ethos of the Corps needs to be changed to one of inclusiveness. 
So how do you encourage a partner government, as directed by the US National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace, and Security (NAP-WPS), such as Afghanistan, to improve their recruitment and 
retention of women in their armed forces, if males in our armed forces treat women in this 
manner? If you can’t treat women in your own armed forces with respect, how will you treat 
women in partner countries with respect? This paper will explore the implementation of the 
NAP-WPS by the Department of Defense (DoD) and give recommendations on how the DoD 
implementation of the NAP-WPS can go a long way to change the culture of the military when it 
comes to women. 
The U.S. has one of the largest military force on earth and is considered the world’s 911 force. It 
is also one of the world’s most democratic and free nations. Our President is seen as the leader of 
the free world. As such, the rest of the world looks to the United States to set the example. As 
strong supporters behind the signing of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, 
empowering women in all aspects of conflict, peace, and security, when a scandal such as the 
USMC photo scandal occurred, the United States gets the proverbial black eye. 
Signed in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 specifically discussed how women are disproportionately 
affected by conflict and need to be included in all the phases from conflict prevention to the 
peace process to post-conflict reconstruction, including stability operations, peace building and 
peacekeeping.6 In December 2011, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13595 - 
Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. EO 13595 directs that not 
only will the U.S. have a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security but that the DoD 
would implement it. The goal of the NAP-WPS is to “empower half the world’s population as 
equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by 
war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.”7 
The DoD signed their Implementation Guide to the NAP-WPS in September 2013. In June 2016, 
the White House issued a revised NAP-WPS and the DoD is currently working on the 
implementation plan. 
The 2016 NAP-WPS holds DoD “accountable for the implementation of the policies and 
initiatives endorsed” in the plan.8 The NAP-WPS specifies tasks for the DoD to accomplish 
some of which can only be taken by operational forces. How the DoD implements the NAP-WPS 
says a lot on how the military sees the role of women in conflict and how they recognize the 
need to include women’s participation in conflict affected environments, especially when over 
half the world population is made up of women. There are many ways that DoD can comply with 
the NAP-WPS that could help change the culture of how women are seen by male service 
members. Below are recommendations on some specific objectives the DoD is responsible to 
implement with recommended Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in Appendix A. 
                       
6 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ 






Outcome 1.1: Incorporating NAP-WPS objectives into appropriate DoD strategic guidance and 
planning documents. 
Leadership starts at the top. One of the ways to change the culture of the military on how women 
are viewed is to implement the NAP-WPS through strategic direction. Strategic direction is “the 
processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and 
combat support agencies.”9 Strategic direction starts with the National Military Strategy (NMS) 
to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The NMS gives the military objectives to the 
force. The JSCP is the “most specific tasking document affecting planning by the combatant 
commander”.10 From the JSCP, the Combatant Commanders (CCMDS) issue their Theater 
Campaign Plans (TCPs). The TCPs are plans that “focus on the command’s steady-state 
activities, which include operations, security cooperation, and other activities designed to 
achieve theater strategic end states.”11 
Strategic direction or guidance is also given through DoD Instructions. After the first NAP-WPS 
was issued, the DoD issued its guidance through the “DoD Implementation Guide for the U.S. 
National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security”. With the reissuance of a revised NAP-
WPS in June 2016, the DoD should forego the Implementation Plan and instead issue a DoD 
Instruction (DoDI). A DoDI is a broad policy document used to instruct the forces on 
information required by the President, Legislature, and the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The 
Instruction regulates actions or conduct to be taken by Components of the DoD.12 A DoDI on the 
Implementation of WPS would assign tasks and actions from the NAP. A DoDI would be much 
stronger and have more impact than an Implementation Plan. 
Outcome 1.2: Ensure all relevant U.S. personnel receive appropriate training on Women, Peace, 
and Security issues, including instruction on the value of inclusive participation in conflict 
prevention, peace processes, and security initiative.... 
Training and education are the keys to changing the culture of the Services to be more inclusive 
of women in the military and women in conflict zones. Training starts at enlisted recruit training 
and Officer Candidate School (OCS). The USMC has the only gender segregated basic training 
among the Services, yet it is the Service at the core of the nude-photo scandal. Time needs to be 
carved out to teach inclusiveness to both enlisted and officers and respect for women as part of 
WPS. At Parris Island, SC the East Coast basic training for new recruits, and Quantico, VA for 
officers, there is no reason that men and women cannot be trained together to teach acceptance 
and inclusiveness. 
Training and education is something that occurs throughout a military person’s entire career. 
WPS needs to be taught at all levels of one’s career, up to and including General Officer level. 
Most pushback comes from those military educators who say there are not enough hours in the 
                       
9 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ 
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day to conduct mandatory training. The fact that WPS is “critical to our national and global 
security” as stated by General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff conveys 
that it is an important subject to be presented at all levels of training.13 It does not need to be an 
elaborate course and can be presented in less than an hours’ time. It also needs to be covered at 
senior service schools since leadership starts at the top. 
Outcome 1.3: Designate one or more officers, including senior-level officials as appropriate to 
be responsible for coordination of implementation of the NAP.... 
As discussed above, DoD is responsible for coordinating and implementing the NAP-WPS. 
There are two directorates at DoD responsible for WPS. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Policy has had been a billet within the office of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs 
called Rule of Law and Detainee Policy. However, the position is a temporary billet that has 
been vacant since January 2017. The J-5, within the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy, 
Partnership Strategy Division, is responsible for WPS. The billet responsible has WPS as an 
additional duty. Both DoD positions, responsible for WPS need to be full-time billets which 
would go a long way to show the seriousness with which DoD views the inclusiveness of 
women. 
To maintain a ready and capable force, postured globally, ready to handle all types of crises, 
contingencies, conflicts and war, including threats from terrorists, the Commander, especially 
CCMDS, must have the best advice possible on WPS and this can only be done by having a 
gender advisor on staff. The resistance so far has been that a billet would have to be given up or 
a new one created which costs money. One billet in Gender is fiscally insignificant when it 
comes to the CCMDS’s overall budget. The work-around has been to assign someone with the 
additional duty as the gender advisor. If DoD is serious about changing the culture of the U.S. 
military to be inclusive and respectful of women then they need to be proactive and assign full-
time gender advisors. The DoDI should mandate that there be gender advisors at the Military 
Service level, CCMDs and at all Major Commands. Southern Command is an example of best 
practices with a full-time gender advisor in attendance at all meetings with the Combatant 
Commander. 
Outcome 2.1: Assist partner governments in improving and recruitment and retention of 
women..., into government ministries and the incorporation of women’s perspectives into peace 
and security policy. 
A good example of a partner government would be Afghanistan, where U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) has both military and civilians deployed. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military is 
providing advisors to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces - the military and police.14 
There have been full-time gender advisors working at both the Ministries of Defense and 
Interior, since 2010. So far, there has been no guidance from CENTCOM on recruitment of 
women for the Afghan National Army and Police or other ministries. In addition, the 
                       
13 September 2013, Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on 






International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) has not emphasized recruitment of 
women. However, ISAF Gender Advisors do keep track of the numbers of women in both 
groups by ethnicity. 
The argument for not paying attention to this task has been that it was more important to fight the 
war than worry about how many women have been recruited by the Afghan Army and Police, 
since women do not fight. What women in the Army and Police do, besides being role models, 
are searchers of other women and gatherers of intelligence. In this Muslim country, men cannot 
talk to or search women for weapons, explosives, or contraband. It is well known that insurgents 
have used burkas to hide behind. In addition, with only women culturally permitted to talk, army 
and police women provide human intelligence needed to help fight the insurgency. 
“Evidence shows that security efforts are more successful and sustainable when women 
contribute to prevention and early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict 
resolution and rebuilding.”15 This “Outcome” is a very important task not only to helping our 
partner-nation and supporting WPS issues in the country, but also to our national security and 
national interests. In addition, women are “significantly more likely to agree to talks and 
subsequently reach an agreement” when they are included in the peacekeeping processes.16 
Outcome 2.1 (Continued): Leverage the participation of female U.S. military personnel to 
encourage and model gender integration and reach out to female and male populations in partner 
nations. 
This objective is very challenging to accomplish because the Services requirements for 
deployment are based upon rank and military occupational specialty, not gender. The Joint Staff 
and CCMDS should specifically task Military Services and the CCMDS with the requirement to 
assign women as part of deployed forces or as Individual Augments to ensure the participation of 
female military personnel “to encourage and model gender integration”17. 
A second way to accomplish this objective is to send more women to operations/missions to 
work with partner nations as members of Mixed (male, female) Engagement Teams (METS). 
This is a modification to the Female Engagement Teams (FETs). FETs are teams of women only 
used to interact with partner nation female populations in conservative societies where male 
service members cannot interact with them due to cultural norms. Cultural Support Teams, in 
Afghanistan, are a good example of integrated teams working together reaching out to both 
female and male populations. 
A third way to accomplish this objective is to increase the number of women accessions in the 
military. Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated, women make up “50 percent of the 
American population. To succeed in our mission of national defense, we cannot afford to cut 
                       
15 How Women’s Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests by Jamille Bigio 
and Rachel Vogelstein Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security June 2016. 
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ourselves off from half the country’s talents and skills. We have to take full advantage of every 
individual who can meet our standards.”18 
19 
Objective 2.1 (Continued): Mobilize men as allies in support of women’s leadership and 
participation in security-related processes and decision-making. 
When US Congresswomen visited the Afghanistan Ministries of Interior and Defense, and 
brought up the subject of women, the Afghans were expecting these issues to be discussed and 
took no action because they did not take the message delivered by women seriously. However, 
when a male leader brought up the subject, the Afghan males listened. This objective of 
mobilizing men as “allies” is not difficult to implement or accomplish if you have the support of 
men. For example, include women’s issues as part of Talking Points when senior leaders visit 
their counterparts. When visiting partner countries insist that female leadership of the country be 
included in the discussions and have an active part in the visit. This is as simple as training our 
military and civilians on the importance of WPS. 
In conclusion, the USMC nude-photo scandal brought out a glaring problem with the U.S. 
military today. It may very well be a cultural problem among male service members as noted by 
General Neller. One way to fix this “cultural” issue of military masculinity is by changing the 
way women are viewed through education and training. Education and training starts at recruit 
training and OCS by not only teaching respect for women but about WPS and how the inclusion 
                       
18 “Secretary of Defense Speech, Remarks on the Women-in Service Review” (Arlington, VA: DoD 2015) 







of women in countries threatened by war is critical to our national and global security interests. 
Without a change in how male military members perceive women serving alongside them, the 
services will continue to struggle to include women in combat arms. 
The DoD, leading from the top, needs to put their weight behind WPS and should start by issuing 
a DoDI on the implementation of the NAP-WPS rather than a Guide or Plan. The DoD and Joint 
Staff can ensure education and training does not end at basic training but continues through PME 
and mandatory classes, as part of pre-deployment training, and career level schools. As 
America’s 911 force, our military stands for U.S. norms and values which demands 
inclusiveness. Those norms and values include understanding the importance of the NAP-WPS, 
respect for women, and empowering “half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing 
conflict and building peace in countries threatened by war.”20 By not fully implementing the 
NAP-WPS, the DoD will likely continue to experience scandals such as Tailhook and the 
nude-photo scandal and denigration of women will continue.
                       
20 September 2013, Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and 
Security. 
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Appendix A: Measures of Effectives 
Outcome Implementing Office Measures of Effectiveness 
1.1. Incorporating NAP 
objectives into appropriate 
DoD strategic guidance and 
planning documents. 
OSD, Joint Staff, Military 
Departments and CCMDS 
- OSD, Joint Staff - Women, 
Peace, and Security (WPS) is 
included, in instructions, 
directives, plans, etc. 
- Military Departments and 
CCMDs have WPS included in 
directives, instructions, orders, 
operation orders or plans. 
1.2. Ensure all relevant U.S. 
personnel receive appropriate 
training on Women, Peace, and 
Security issues, including 
instruction on the value of 
inclusive participation in 
conflict prevention, peace 
processes, and security 
initiative.... 
OSD, Joint Staff, Military 
Departments, CCMDs, 
Service School 
- Courses or classes are taught on 
WPS. 
- Deployed civilian and military 
personnel receive pre-deployment 
and in-theater training on WPS. 
1.3. Designate one or more 
officer, including senior-level 
officials as appropriate as 
responsible for coordination of 
implementation of the NAP, as 
well as other gender-related 
policies and strategies. 
OSD, Joint Staff, Military 
Services, CCMDS, Service 
Schools 
- Designation has been made for 
coordination and implementation 
of WPS policies and strategies. 
- Designation has been made for a 
full-time or part-time gender 
advisor. 
2.1. Assist partner governments 
in improving and recruitment 
and retention of women..., into 
government ministries and the 
incorporation of women’s 
perspectives into peace and 
security policy. 
CCMDS - Partner countries are recruiting 
women for their security 
ministries. 
- Financial support was given to 
the partner governments for 
recruitment of women in security 
ministries. 
- Women are being retained in the 
security ministries. 
2.1. Leverage the participation 
of female U.S. military 
personnel to encourage and 
model gender integration and 
reach out to female and male 
populations in partner nations. 
Joint Staff, Military 
Departments, CCMDS 
and Service Schools 
- Women are attending combat 
arms training. 
- Women are being deployed as 
part of a force or as Individual 
Augments. 
- Command has a strategy to 
deploy more women service 
members and civilians. 
- Women are being deployed as 






2.1. Mobilize men as allies in 
support of women’s leadership 
and participation in security-
related processes and decision-
making. 
OSD, Joint Staff, 
Military Services, 
CCMDS 
- Formal and informal meeting held 
with dignitaries within the 
Ministries of Interior and Defense 
of partner countries include Talking 
Points on WPS. 
- Women leaders from partner 
countries are invited to attend 






UNSCR 1325 ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 
AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION OF 
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING 
CONFLICT  
Carolyn J. Washington 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2016, after a four-year struggle, U.S. Special Forces Sergeant First Class (SFC) Charles 
Martland would finally win his fight to remain in the Army following an incident in Afghanistan, 
in which he and Captain Dan Quinn, also U.S Special Forces, assaulted an American-backed 
militia commander for chaining a boy to his bed as a sex slave.  According to the New York 
Times “the Army contends that Martland and others should have looked the other way (a 
contention that I believe is nonsense),” stated Representative Duncan Hunter, California, 
Republican who worked to save SFC Martland’s career.1   
The New York Times further reported that the spokesman for the American command in 
Afghanistan, Colonel Brian Tribus, wrote in an email: “Generally, allegations of child sexual 
abuse by Afghan military or police personnel would be a matter of domestic Afghan criminal 
law.” He added that “there would be no express requirement that U.S. military personnel in 
Afghanistan report it.” “An exception,” he said, “is when rape is being used as a weapon of 
war.”2  While the conduct of soldiers who engage in such behavior as Martland and Quinn 
should not be excused, soldiers should be provided with a coherent policy, a set of rules for 
rational decision making on the handling of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) as part of the military’s overall strategy for providing security.   
Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) refers to “any act that is perpetrated against a 
person’s will and is based on gender norms and unequal power relationships.”3  SGBV can 
include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
mutilation and trafficking.  While women and girls suffer disproportionately from SGBV, it can 
also be inflicted on men and boys.  Although SGBV frequently occurs during conflict, it is not 
inevitable and can be prevented.   
Since military personnel are charged with the responsibility to protect and may be the first to 
encounter victims, it is important to provide them with the tools to appropriately handle incidents 
1 Joseph Goldstein (September 20, 2015), U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies, 
New York Times. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Sexual and gender based violence defined.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
accessed on June 1, 2017 at www.unhcr.org/en-us/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html. 
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of SGBV.  It is impossible to maintain a secure environment if SGBV is a widespread problem.  
In this paper, I focus on military strategies for the prevention of SGBV.  I argue that the armed 
forces already have several mechanisms, that when coupled with a gender perspective can be 
effective in developing the appropriate strategies to prevent SGBV.     
BACKGROUND 
In October 2000, the landmark adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security which 
marked the recognition of the roles that both men and women play in conflict and sustainable 
peace, identified as one of its four pillars, the prevention of sexual violence against women and 
girls during conflict.4  UNSCR 1325 calls for improving intervention strategies for the 
prevention of violence against women, which includes prosecuting perpetrators of violators of 
international law; enhancing women’s rights under national law; and supporting local women’s 
peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes. 
Later, subsequent resolutions which comprise the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, would 
further emphasize the problem of sexual violence.  UNSCR 1820 (2008), recognized sexual 
violence as a “weapon and tactic of war,” advocating for the training of troops in the prevention 
of calling of sexual violence.5  And UNSCR 1888 (2009) acknowledges that “sexual violence 
exacerbates armed conflicts and impedes international peace and security” and calls for 
leadership to address sexual violence.6  
NATO militaries play an important role in peace and security as they deploy to crisis situations 
around the world in the fulfillment of its three core tasks to safeguard its alliance members-
collective defense, crisis-management and cooperative security.7 To this end, NATO has adopted 
a policy of the integration of a gender perspective as a tool to increase operational effectiveness 
through its Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, “Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender 
Perspective into the NATO Command Structure.”8 
A GENDER PERSPECTIVE AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR THE PREVENTION 
OF SGBV 
I argue that the key to implementing a viable strategy to prevent SGBV is the integration of a 
gender perspective, “a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in 
their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources.”9  A 
                                                      
4 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) accessed 
on May 30, 2017 at www.un.og/womenwatch/osagi/wps.  
5 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (2008) accessed 
on May 30, 2017 at www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2008/6/un-security-council-resolution-1820. 
6 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1888 on Women, Peace and Security (2009) accessed 
on May 30, 2017 at www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2009/9/un-security-council-resolution-1888. 
7NATO Strategic Concept, (November 2010), 6, Core Tasks and Principles, accessed at 
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. 
8 Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 REV 1 (2012) Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender 
Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, NATO, accessed on May 12, 2017 at 
www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2012/20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf. 




gender perspective can be a force enabler and inform SGBV planning on the ground by 
encouraging military forces to take into consideration the security needs of all members of a 
community in which it deploys to protect.  The implementation of a gender perspective is 
accomplished through a gender analysis, “a systematic gathering and examination of information 
on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand iniquities based on 
gender.”10 
The appointment of the Gender Advisor within the military organization (GENAD) is key to the 
successful integration of a gender perspective.  The GENAD is primary staff and required to 
provide constant guidance and oversight as well as provide feedback to the commander on 
gender issues.   The role of the GENAD is to ensure a common understanding of UNSCR 1325 
within the command and the integration of a gender perspective.  The GENAD can also provide 
subject matter expertise on procedures to prevent SGBV.11    
In framing military prevention strategies, I examine three levels of sexual prevention efforts 
according to when they occur during the violence.  These levels are primary prevention, 
secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention.12    
PRIMARY PREVENTION 
Primary prevention activities normally take place before sexual violence has occurred in order to 
prevent such acts.  The best way for military forces to prepare to prevent SGBV at this level is 
through pre-deployment training and later SGBV targeted operations during deployment.  
Pre-deployment 
A good place for the commander to establish his or her priorities concerning a gender 
perspective in SGBV prevention is in the command’s Annual and Quarterly Training Guidance.  
Training Guidance allows the commander to determine his/her unit’s training requirements and 
priorities in the development of a training strategy which emphasize the importance of 
eliminating SGBV and its significance to the mission.  Training should be tailored to local and 
cultural circumstances and address both the standards of conduct expected of soldiers and how to 
respond to SGBV incidents that occur, such as medical treatment for victims, and detention of 
perpetrators.  Soldiers can benefit from scenario training.   
Scenario-driven training exposes soldiers to situations they might encounter on the ground 
during deployments as well as possible solutions for handling them.  It allows soldiers to the 
think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually present themselves.  
A sample of scenario-driven training is as follows:  
                                                      
10 Ibid, paragraph 1-4d, 5. 
11 Ibid, paragraph 3-4a-c, 12. 
12 Sexual violence prevention: Beginning the Dialogue (2004) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Atlanta, GA, 3, accessed at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/svpresentation-a.pdf on May 30, 2017. 
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SAMPLE SCENARIO  
Your unit is operating in a country which has experienced numerous incidents of sexual 
and gender-based violence (SGBV).  The area has been plagued by violence between 
rival armed factions jockeying for control.  The situation is further complicated by a 
breakdown of government control, undisciplined security forces and criminal elements. 
The mission of your unit is to provide security through both mounted and dismounted 
patrols to maintain an effective presence and help improve security. The commander has 
directed the staff to prepare a SGBV checklist to help patrols identify and report on 
SGBV. In addition, the commander wants the staff to identify local actors, programs, and 
stakeholders that can help mitigate SGBV.13 
 
During deployments   
Military operations can be specifically tailored to prevent SGBV.  Women and girls who are 
disproportionately targeted, are vulnerable as they perform domestic activities such as gathering 
firewood, drawing water, shopping at the market or taking children to and from school.  They 
should be prepared to intervene and stop acts of SGBV when they encounter them and, 
depending upon policy, detain perpetrators.14  During routine patrols and checkpoints, units 
should be alert for indicators of SGBV such as the absence of women and children on the streets, 
evidence of sex in exchange for food and domestic violence.15  It is also important to pay 
attention to the activities of men.  Are they still going to work or just hanging out?   Men and 
boys may also be victims of SGBV. 
An important aspect of prevention is the establishment of rapport with the local population, who 
may be valuable sources of information useful in identifying possible threats.  Since women and 
children are the main victims of SGBV, it can prove difficult for male soldiers to cross cultural 
boundaries to engage with them.  Female soldiers may be useful in fostering trust and gathering 
valuable information for prevention of SGBV.  In Afghanistan, Female Engagement Teams 
(FET) consisting of female ISAF soldiers were assigned to patrols to engage with Afghan 
females.16  However, it should not be assumed that female soldiers possess innate characteristics 
to connect with populations. They too must be trained.   
                                                      
13 Modified from Training Scenarios: Preparing to Prevent (November 26, 2014) edited by Dwight Raymond, 
Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Army War College, accessed on June 1, 2017 at 
pksoi.armywarcollege.edu. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Megan Bastick, Karen Grimm, Rahel Kunz (2007) Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict-Global Overview and 
Implications for the Security Sector, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF), 
Geneva, Switzerland, accessed on May 30, 2017 at https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/sexual 
violence_conflict_fall%5B1%5D.pdf. 





Checklists provide the unit with another tool to systematically incorporate a gender perspective 
into operations focused on the prevention of SGBV.   A sample checklist is shown below: 
SAMPLE CHECKLIST  
• How does the security situation affect women, men, girls and boys differently? 
• How do the different movement patterns of men, women, boys and girls serve as 
indicators of the current security situation?  
• What are the activities of women and girls?  Are they conducting daily activities such 
as gathering firewood, drawing water, shopping at the market or taking children to 
school? Or are they are staying at home or hiding? 
• What are the activities of men and boys?  Are they going to work?  Congregating on 
street corners? 
• What are indicators of SGBV for both males and females?  Is their evidence of sex in 
exchange for food?  Domestic violence?  
• What critical elements of information should be gathered to identify high risk areas? 
• What deterrent measures can be taken according to rules of engagement (ROE)? 
• What actions should be taken in encountering victims of SGBV? Perpetrators? 
• What NGOs and women’s groups are operating in the area? 
     
SECONDARY PREVENTION 
Secondary prevention involves immediate responses after SGBV has occurred to deal with the 
short term consequences of violence in order to reduce the harm to the victims and detain 
perpetrators.  In the aftermath of an SGBV incident, secondary prevention may require 
immediate action to include medical treatment for victims, investigation of the incident and the 
apprehension of perpetrators.   
ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 362:  Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel (2006), 
represents the type of action that could also be useful immediately following an SGBV incident. 
17 A NATO Holding Facility/NATO Detention Facility was used, designed or adapted for the 
detention of individuals.  The period of detention was not to exceed 96 hours, beginning with the 
time of arrest up until the point a detainee was handed over to the Afghanistan National Security 
Forces (ANSF)18 or government of Afghanistan (GOA) officials or released by ISAF.   
                                                      
17ISAF Afghanistan Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures, SOP 362:  Detention of Non-ISAF 
Personnel (August 31, 2006) Headquarters International Security Kabul, Afghanistan (NATO/ISAF Unclassified 
REL GCTF, accessed on June 1, 2017 at https://publicintelligence.net/ISAF-DetaineeSOP.pdf. 
18 The abbreviation ANSF stands for Afghan National Security Forces and includes the Afghan National Army 
(ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police, Afghan Highway Police, Afghan Counter-Narcotics 
Police and any authorized Afghan national or regional government agency involved with security or detention 
facilities. 
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Detentions were both planned, during a specific operation and unplanned, during the course of 
normal duties, e.g. patrolling.  Detainees faced questioning by specially trained individuals, with 
issues of admissibility and procedure for possible future prosecution raised with the 
Headquarters ISAF Legal Advisor (LEGAD).  ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowed for 
the detention of an individual under the following circumstances: ISAF force protection; self-
defense of ISAF or its personnel; and accomplishment of the ISAF mission.  The ROE appears to 
be broad enough to extend to the detention of SGBV perpetrators.  
Another initiative which can benefit victims of during secondary prevention is Afghanistan’s 
Family Response Unit (FRU).  Here mostly female police officers support victims of domestic 
violence, sexual abuse, child marriage and other issues.  Resolute Support has constructed 41 
FRUs and 93 Women’s Participation Program facilities across Afghanistan.  During incidents of 
SGBV, FRUs can provide essential services where victims can receive necessary treatment.19 
TERTIARY PREVENTION 
 
Tertiary prevention involves long term responses after SGBV has occurred to deal with the 
lasting consequences of violence such as prevention or treatment programs.20  While it may seem 
that the military has no role in tertiary prevention because of the social nature of these programs, 
the U.S. Department of Defense does have several programs which can be supportive during this 
level of prevention.  Two programs that I would like to highlight are the Defense Institute of 
International Legal Studies (DIILS) and the State Partnership Program (SPP). 
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS).  The goal of DIILS as the lead defense 
security cooperation organization for “professional legal education and international engagement 
focused on human rights, international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict training” 
is to strengthen a nation’s legal capacity.21  DIILS can offers training, often via mobile training 
teams (MTT) which travel directly to the country and provide important legal training which for 
the prevention of SGBV. 
In December 2016, during a Military Justice Course, a three-week course which provides a 
“comprehensive overview of the U.S. military justice system and comparative analysis of other 
military justice systems,”22 an investigation specialist from the UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Service visited DIILS in Newport, Rhode Island, to lecture on how peacekeeping troop 
contributing countries can effectively gather evidence in cases of sexual misconduct during 
                                                      
19 E.L. Craig (June 24, 2017) Afghan police provide shelter for domestic crime victims, Resolute Support News 
Stories, accessed on June 30, 2017 at rs.nato.int. 
20 Sexual violence prevention: Beginning the Dialogue (2004) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Atlanta, GA, p.3, accessed at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/svpresentation-a.pdf on May 30, 2017. 
21 Home, U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) accessed on May 15, 2017 at 
globalnetplatform.org. 
22 Nancy Parvin (December 9, 2016) DIILS participants investigate and prosecute sexual misconduct in military 





remote missions.  During a mock trial on the prosecution of sexual assault, the 24 course 
participants from 21 countries prepared charges, questioned witnesses and made arguments.23 
State Partnership Program (SPP).  The SPP is a joint U.S. Department of Defense program 
managed by the National Guard that links U.S. states with other countries to support the security 
cooperation objectives of geographic combatant commands.  Through these partnerships, SPP 
can improve the capabilities of partner nations to prevent SGBV and also enhance the cultural 
awareness and skills of U.S. military personnel.  The unique civil-military nature of the National 
Guard provides opportunities for a wide range of security cooperation activities which may 
support the prevention of SGBV such as: emergency management and disaster response; border 
and port security; leadership and NCO development; medical capabilities in responding to 
victims; economic security; peacekeeping operations; and counter trafficking.  Since 1993, some 
73 unique partnerships in 79 countries have been established such as the Indiana National Guard 
with Slovakia under European Command (EUCOM); South Africa with New York (Africa 
Command-AFRICOM); Thailand with Washington (Pacific Command-PACOM); Jordan with 
Colorado (Central Command-CENTCOM); Chile with Texas (Southern Command-
SOUTHCOM) and the Bahamas with Rhode Island (Northern Command-NORTHCOM).24   
In spite of the best training and cooperation among security forces, there are still some major 
obstacles to the prevention of SGBV, both internal and external.  These challenges include the 
problem of sexual exploitation (SEA) within the armed forces itself and host country cultural 
norms.  SEA refers to “the abuse of service members by other service members as well as the 
abuse of sexual abuse of civilians.”25 Training and education of military personnel can help to 
reduce SEA.  Commanders must establish clear policies, reporting channels, swift and thorough 
investigations of reported allegations and strict punishment for offenders.     
Host country cultural norms may discriminate against women resulting in the condoning of 
SGBV.  As a result, victims may be discouraged from reporting SGBV. To mitigate the negative 
impact of these norms, military forces should actively engage with local security forces both in 
peacetime through security cooperation activities as previously mentioned and during 
deployments conflict situations in joint military operations. 
In conclusion, the prevention of SGBV as outlined in UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda is an important aspect in conflict.  Since military forces are often the first to 
encounter victims, especially in an environment where the host government’s security forces 
may be unavailable or incapable of providing protection, it is important that soldiers be equipped 
with the tools necessary to prevent and protect vulnerable populations from SGBV.   
 
                                                      
23 Ibid.   
24 U.S. Department of Defense State Partnership Program, accessed on June 1, 2017 at nationalguard.mil. 
25 Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 REV 1 (2012) Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender 





SO, YOU WANT TO FIGHT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST? FIRST, FIGHT GENDER 
INEQUALITY. 
Sarah Abdella-El Kallassy 
U.S. Naval War College 
July 30, 2017 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, there has been a concerning rise of active 
violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and a marked increase in women’s support and 
participation in these VEOs.1 Consequently, the MENA region also boasts the widest collective 
gender gap in the world, at a distance of 39% from gender parity in the 2016 World Economic 
Forum’s annual Global Gender Gap Report.2 While the United Nations’ Resolutions on Women, 
Peace, and Security strive to involve women in the MENA region in efforts to counter violent 
extremism, a direct attack on regional gender inequality issues must be made a priority. Gender 
inequality is inextricably linked to violent extremism in the MENA region, therefore, countering 
violent extremism (CVE) efforts must have a preceding or concurrent, comprehensive gender 
equality plan based on successful regional models and best practices to address this major cause 
of societal instability. 
GENDER INEQUALITY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Numbers Don’t Lie 
Even the most cursory analysis of the Global Gender Gap Report and Global Terrorism Index 
shows the correlation between a nation’s level of gender inequality and the occurrence of violent 
extremist activity. In fact, of the nations ranked as the 10 most affected by terrorism in the 2016 
Global Terrorism Index (GTI),3 all but one (India) were ranked in the bottom 20 for gender 
inequality, while three nations were unable to have data collected due to current conflict 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia).4 Unfortunately, current international programs aimed at 
eradicating violent extremism do not usually consider the elimination of gender inequality as a 
primary or interrelated step in reducing occurrences of violent extremism. 
CAUSES OF DISCONNECT 
According to A Man’s World, jointly published in 2016 by the UAE’s Hedayah Center and The 
Global Center on Cooperative Security, four main issues exist that create challenges in the 
1 USAID. 2015. People Not Pawns: Women's Participation in Violent Extremism Across MENA. USAID, 1. 
2 World Economic Forum. 2016. The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. World  
Economic Forum, 16. 
3 Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016. Global Terrorism Index 2016. Institute for Economics & Peace, 10. 
4 World Economic Forum, 11. 
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discussion surrounding countering violent extremism and gender. Not surprisingly, these issues 
are connected in one way or another to the challenge of gender equality. The main issues 
identified in the report are:  
The debates about the roles of women and violent extremism are not connected to broader 
analyses about the relationship between gender and security. 
Many policy discussions and programs on the role of women and their roles in countering 
violent extremism do not listen to the voices of women on the ground and are based on 
misguided notions of the power of women in many societies. 
The larger Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda—that is the agenda of gender equality 
and women’s empowerment as embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 
(2000) and its follow-on resolutions—must not become subordinate to the counter-terrorism 
agenda. In other words, gender equality and women’s empowerment should not be reduced to a 
counter-terrorism policy, but should be pursued in its own right and according to national and 
international commitments. 
International actors are not putting money where their mouth is. The amount of money spent on 
programming furthering the WPS agenda is very limited and is far outshined by the amount of 
money spent on counter terrorism efforts.5 
Particularly significant is the implication that UNSCR 1325’s Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda is becoming subordinate to a counter-terrorism agenda. An understanding and assessment 
of the gender equality challenges of the broader MENA region and the drivers causing women to 
support and participate in VEOs are essential to both reducing gender inequality and violent 
extremism. 
WHY WOMEN SUPPORT AND JOIN VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS 
To understand why a focus on increasing gender equality is essential to reducing and eradicating 
violent extremism, women’s roles and connections to VEOs must be explored and understood. 
According to the Global Gender Gap Index, gender subordination and exclusion have been cited 
as the main causes for women joining and supporting VEOs, while women who desire social and 
political agency are deemed vulnerable to recruitment.6 These vulnerabilities are directly tied to 
institutionalized gender inequality that is omnipresent in many MENA region nations. The 
MENA region family structures women are intrinsically tied to, can prove to be yet another 
vulnerability. Protecting family members from law enforcement, especially one’s children, 
spouse, father, and brother, keeps women silent regarding extremist activity. In some instances, 
women will even end up supporting a VEO that their family member has joined. Promises that 
participation in extremist activity will improve the financial situation of the family frequently 
                                                      
5 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, Rafia Bhulai. 2016. A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in 
Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, 19-21.  




play into women’s decisions to support and eventually join VEOs, moving from a passive to 
active role. 
The transition of women from passive to active roles in violent extremist organizations is 
influenced by several driving factors, the majority fueled by institutionalized gender inequality. 
USAID reports these driving factors are composed of, “push, pull, and context specific 
elements”,7 some of which are shared between the two genders, and some that are gender 
specific to women.  Push factors, that are often situational and predispose individuals to support 
a VEO, often include gender subordination, exclusion from mainstream politics, dissatisfaction 
with regime or the political process, seeking security amidst instability, experiences of abuse or 
humiliation by state security forces, and death or abuse of family members.8 It is important to 
consider that lack of stability exacerbates these factors, and armed conflict often brings with it 
instances of gender based violence. Pull factors, that draw individuals to VEOs are frequently 
group-specific (identity-based) and include romanticism of ‘state-building’ projects (such as in 
the case of Daesh); selective incentives related to security; services or financial gain; group 
rejection of ‘Western’ political and economic experiments; and support of VEO ideology, such 
as nationalist goals or religious goals.9  
While push and pull factors for VEO participation in the MENA region are more generalized, 
context specific factors change frequently according to the nation or area. These context specific 
factors may include: access to public space, freedom of movement, access to information, and 
previous political engagement and awareness. Context specific factors, along with gender 
specific factors (both push and pull), can be affected directly by a positive change in the gender 
equality of a nation. Conversely, they are also the most difficult factors for outside organizations, 
like the United Nations, to address. By increasing gender equality, factors such as gender 
subordination, exclusion from mainstream politics, restricted access to public space, limited 
freedom of movement, and lack of access to information disappear rapidly, removing drivers that 
encourage female (and male) participation in MENA VEOs. 
MENA VEOs which recruit women consistently take advantage of push, pull, and context 
specific factors, as well as individual motivations. The reasons for female recruitment are often 
pragmatic on the part of VEOs. A lack of male recruits and the strategic advantages of using 
female recruits (they are less likely to be searched by authorities) are frequently cited as benefits 
of including women in VEO activity. Utilization of women’s social networks, such as family or 
friends, in person recruiting, and targeted messaging are common methods used to recruit 
women. In many MENA nations, the VEOs’ access to female recruits is their greatest challenge. 
Women lacking access to public space and freedom of movement, as well as limited access to 
technology (internet, mobile phones, and social media), while driving factors that may encourage 
women to join and support VEOs are also barriers to their recruitment.10 
                                                      
7 Ibid, 2. 
8 USAID, 2. 
9 Ibid, 2. 
10 USAID, 3. 
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SUCCESS STORIES: BANGLADESH, MOROCCO, AND THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
Bangladesh 
While not in the MENA region, as home to 9.2% of the world’s Muslim population, Bangladesh 
is a majority Muslim state. After 1975 assassinations of political figures in disputes over a 
secular state, madrassas began to emerge that radicalized impoverished and unemployed 
students, resulting in widespread influence of militant Islamist organizations by the 1990s.11 A 
2005 terrorist attack that wounded the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, and killed 22 people was 
the tipping point for the nation to address the growing problem of violent extremism by 
developing a CVE strategy that worked within their societal context. Identifying the root causes 
allowing violent extremism to take root, the Bangladeshi Government focused on efforts to 
counter rampant poverty; specifically, through women’s economic, educational, and social 
empowerment efforts. The determination that women’s empowerment and gender equality in 
Bangladesh would have a positive long term impact did not miss the mark. The nation has not 
had a significant violent extremist attack since 2005.12 
To empower women and close the reduce gender inequality in Bangladesh, required several 
initiatives; micro-lending programs were opened for women; women were employed in the 
ready-made garment (RMG) industry; education was increased for girls, particularly at the 
primary school level; and micro scholarships and free English classes were made accessible.13 
These efforts dramatically reduced the level of poverty in Bangladesh, as they enabled women to 
participate in the economy. Education, specifically of women, is a cornerstone of CVE in 
Bangladesh, as the nation believes, “poverty is one of the root causes of terrorism because 
impoverished individuals lack safe and viable means to improve themselves…education… 
creates alternatives.”14 In an effort to improve women’s access to education in rural areas, 
Bangladesh used a quota system (much like the U.A.E. uses in regard to government positions) 
to ensure that 60% of primary school teachers would be women.15 First (Political) Secretary 
Shahanara captured this achievement, stating, “if you send your children to school, they will 
have distance from radical ideas and the allure will fade.”16  
Morocco 
Over the past decade, Morocco has successfully combated violent extremism through modern 
means, with a ‘political and social renewal’ that allowed the nation to escape the chaos of the 
Arab Spring. Like Bangladesh, Morocco has integrated women into CVE efforts to ensure long-
term stability, utilizing their critical role in family and community structures.17 Increasing gender 
equality through reforms of the Moudawana (family code), women were given access to similar 
                                                      
11 Couture, Krista London. 2014. A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism Lessons Learned 
from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco. Foreign 
Policy at Brookings, 20. 
12 Ibid, 22. 
13 Couture, 25. 
14 Ibid, 24. 
15 Ibid, 25. 
16 Ibid, 25. 




rights as those which women have under the U.A.E.’s personal status laws, women’s economic 
agency was also increased. The passing of Moudawana reforms were inconsequential to some, 
however, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network lauded the effort as a, “landmark 
reform of the status of Moroccan women as it put them on equal footing with men regarding 
marriage and children.”18 As seen previously, any efforts that reduce gender inequality are 
shown to increase the stability of nations and increase the likelihood of successful CVE 
initiatives.  
Morocco took their integration of gender equality measures in CVE strategy further in 2005. The 
Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs began to certify mourchidates, female imams.19 Utilizing 
the role of women in the family and community structure, the mourchidates were assigned the 
duty of curbing radicalization, by encouraging religious moderation and tolerance.20 This effort 
again increased the equality of women in Morocco and contributed to stability. In response to the 
reforms that appointed the mourchidates and reformed the Moudawana, American Foreign 
Policy Council Vice President Ilan Berman said:   
“In the Muslim world, few issues are as accurate a barometer of societal dynamism as the status 
of women. As recent scholarship convincingly shows, women have consistently been at the 
forefront of societal change in the region. Whatever their political orientation, countries that 
reward (or at least permit) this behavior, such as Tunisia and post-Saddam Iraq, tend to be 
vibrant and hopeful places. Those that do not, like Saudi Arabia, are stagnant and 
sclerotic...Morocco unequivocally falls into the former camp. Under the Moudawana...women 
have been endowed with rights not present—or even conceivable— in other parts of the Muslim 
world.”21   
Eventually, the role of the mourchidates grew to encompass social issues, culture, and health. 
The mourchidates expanded role continued to increase gender equality in Morocco, resulting in 
rising women’s political and religious empowerment.  
The United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) does not suffer domestically from rampant violent extremist 
activity, rather, the nation is frequently regarded as a bastion of stability and economic prosperity 
in the MENA region. Ranking 124th of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report22, the U.A.E. is 
also ranked 103rd in the Global Terrorism Index, grouped with nations that experience the, 
“lowest impact of terrorism,”23 While the nation doesn’t have much first-hand experience 
conducting domestic CVE, they do have experience writing and implanting legislation meant to 
increase gender equality. In recent years, the U.A.E. has focused on increasing political 
participation, the number of women in the workforce (public and private sector), and passing 
laws to increase the rights of women both in the public sphere and the family. MENA nations 
                                                      
18 Couture, 28. 
19 Ibid, 28. 
20 Ibid, 28. 
21 Ibid, 30. 
22 World Economic Forum, 11. 
23 Institute for Economics & Peace, 10 
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eager to adopt gender equality policies would greatly benefit from the model the U.A.E. has 
developed.  
Sheikh Zayed once stated, “women have the right to work everywhere. Like men, women 
deserve the right to occupy high positions according to their capabilities and qualifications.”24 
The Constitution of the U.A.E. protects this right to work as does the UAE Federal Labor Law of 
1980, while the U.A.E.’s Civil Service Law, Constitutional Article 35, outlines women’s right to 
political participation. These are just some examples of recent efforts to reduce gender inequality 
and increase women’s participation in the workforce and society. In recent years, minimum 
quotas for women’s participation have been instituted to develop further gender diversity. In the 
civil service sector, the quota is 30%, whereas, in the government sector, the minimum is 66%.25 
In 2008, Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi, then the Minister of Foreign Trade and now the Minister of 
Tolerance, even launched a research project under her direction entitled, “The Emergence of 
UAE Women as an Economic Force.”26 The research project focused on profiling leading 
women in a workforce that has grown over 59%. Support for working Emirati women comes in 
the form of organizations such as the Abu Dhabi Businesswomen Council (ADBWC) and the 
General Women’s Union (GWU). The U.A.E.is optimally positioned to provide mentoring to 
other MENA nations and has shown their capability to pass context specific legislation 
determined to increase gender equality that is sustainable in the long term. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Middle East North Africa region is clearly in a dire situation regarding operating violent 
extremist organizations and seemingly insurmountable gender inequality challenges in many 
nations. Assistance is required in a timely manner to counter the already negative effects groups 
like Daesh, Al Qaeda, and their franchise organizations have had on the region. For regional 
reduction of violent extremism and gender inequality to become a realistic possibility, 
participation is required by both the international community and the most capable MENA 
region states. Nations such as the U.A.E. should take a mentoring role in passing new context 
specific legislation to increase gender equality, while nations like Morocco and Bangladesh 
should share their experience in the practical application of successful gender equality measures 
and CVE initiatives. Additionally, effectively leveraging the diversity of roles that women play 
in violent extremist activities is critical to success27 and requires the input of nations that have 
experience in such practical application of strategies.  
The Hedayah Center and the new UN Women Liaison office in Abu Dhabi are incredible assets 
for the MENA region, especially if used cooperatively, with the input of other nations and 
experienced practitioners (such as Morocco and Bangladesh). Increased research will be 
necessary to decipher exactly how and why gender inequality is inextricably linked to higher 
levels of violent extremist activity. Additionally, the international community must be willing to 
earmark funding for efforts that address gender inequality issues equally to and separately from 
                                                      
24Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs. n.d. Women in the United Arab Emirates: A Portrait of 
Progress. Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs, 9. 
25 Ibid, 4. 
26 Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs,10. 




the counter terrorism agenda. The increased research conducted on these connected issues will 
go a long way in leveraging the necessary funding to support widespread gender equality 
programs in the MENA region.  Through cooperation of the international community and stable 
MENA region nations on gender equality and context specific planning, there is a greater 
likelihood of success in efforts to reduce the occurrence of violent extremism in the MENA 
region.  
CONCLUSION 
While the status quo response of the international community in response to the interconnectivity 
of gender inequality and violent extremism seems to still be missing the mark, there is a way 
forward. As the Hedayah Center identified in A Man’s World?, the domination of the Women, 
Peace, and Security agenda by the counter terrorism agenda is not and will not be successful. 
Rather, the international community must change tact on their CVE efforts and include preceding 
or concurrent comprehensive gender equality plans and legislation to address each nation’s 
context specific factors that contribute to gender inequality and ultimately, increased violent 
extremist activity. Fighting violent extremism is not impossible, as proven in the cases of 
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NOT THE USUAL SUSPECTS:  
ENGAGING MALE CHAMPIONS OF  
WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 
Jolynn Shoemaker & Sahana Dharmapuri 
 
This paper includes excerpted sections of a report that will be published by Our Secure Future: 
Women Make the Difference, a program of the One Earth Future Foundation in September 
2017. 
INTRODUCTION  
In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously passed the landmark Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 
1325) on Women, Peace, and Security. UNSCR 1325 is the first formal recognition of the critical 
role women play in effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  It mandates attention to 
gender in all aspects of international peace and security decision-making.  UNSCR 1325 and its 
subsequent related family of resolutions are now known as the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda.   
While men still dominate leadership roles within national and international security structures, 
they have remained on the sidelines of the Women, Peace, and Security movement. With the 
increasing awareness of the Women, Peace, and Security mandates in countries around the 
world, men who are personally moved by this agenda are stepping forward as supporters and 
contributors. However, there are obstructions (both institutional and perceptional) that have 
limited the engagement of men and the powerful impact they could have in vocally supporting 
this mandate.  Recently, there has been more attention on engaging men, but the efforts have 
been ad hoc and lessons have not been documented sufficiently.      
In 2017, Our Secure Future: Women Make the Difference, a program of the One Earth Future 
Foundation, launched a new project to begin to address this significant gap. Through interviews 
and surveys of leaders from across the US Government, US military, other governments and 
militaries, civil society, and international organization sectors, this project is collecting 
reflections of men who are promoting gender equality in peace and security policy and practice. 
Between December 2016 and July 2017, more than 50 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted by skype and phone for this project and more than 20 survey responses were collected 
and analyzed. This study is meant to provide important foundational knowledge that can inform 
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DO MEN MATTER TO WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY? 
Women, Peace, and Security presents an opportunity to make formal peacemaking and 
peacebuilding processes and structures more inclusive, effective, and sensitive to the needs and 
capacities of the entire population.  Men are critical partners in this endeavor. Men have the 
power to move forward – or obstruct – this agenda because of their dominant roles in peace and 
security structures and decision-making. There are also deep interconnections between gendered 
norms – including concepts of masculinity and violence – and armed conflict. From the family 
unit to the highest levels of policy, men’s attitudes and behaviors directly affect women’s 
personal security and life opportunities with wider ramifications for stability and peace.  Gender 
equality, and the transformative change that Women, Peace, and Security envisions, will only be 
achieved with men’s involvement.  
Since the passage of UNSCR 1325, women have been visibly on the forefront of the Women, 
Peace, and Security movement.  Women peacebuilders were the founders of this movement and 
they have persistently carried it forward. Men, who occupy positions of power within the peace 
and security institutions, are usually the advocacy targets for the agenda, but have rarely been the 
advocates themselves, with a few notable exceptions. However, as peace and security institutions 
begin to formally integrate Women, Peace, and Security, more men have started to participate 
directly. The National Action Plans (NAPs) and related policy mandates in many countries have 
also opened more space for men’s engagement. According to one interviewee who specifically 
works on developing NAPs, “We are seeing more men in the workshops. Men and women are 
working together.” 
Men who were interviewed for this study point out that as men, they can convey a persuasive 
message about the relevance and importance of gender equality principles. When men deliver the 
message, it is given more weight precisely because Women, Peace, and Security is so often 
perceived as a “women’s issue.”  Men with traditional national security backgrounds can also 
become credible bridge-builders between Women, Peace, and Security and other peace and 
security policy areas.  They understand the perspectives, the language, and the prism of the 
security sector, as well as its biases, and can identify strategic opportunities for advocacy.  Men 
also express the view that as men, they can open needed dialogue about prevalent gender norms 
and expectations for men, and their consequences. They can begin to shift perceptions on gender 
equality and security in positive ways.  
A REDEFINITION OF SECURITY: WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AS A 
TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA 
The bold idea behind Women, Peace, and Security was to change the way that security is 
conceptualized (the “what”) and pursued (the “how”) by national, regional, and international 
actors. Women, Peace, and Security recognizes that gender inequalities, power, social status, and 
violence are intimately linked together, and as a result, violent conflict can only be prevented, 
managed, or solved by fully including women and incorporating gender perspectives. 
Male advocates and experts who participated in this study highlighted the transformational 
potential of Women, Peace, and Security to redefine security. They observed that recent 
experiences with terrorism, counterinsurgency and stability operations may have created much 
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more openness to change within security-focused institutions – out of necessity. Interviewees 
pointed out that no government or individual can address today’s urgent peace and security 
issues without collaborative efforts that integrate equality and inclusiveness.  
Interviewees, including those from the security sector, expressed the common view that military 
force cannot solve underlying issues that drive conflict and instability. They emphasized that the 
entire population needs to be engaged in finding solutions to these deeper challenges. One 
former military interviewee observed that the military is very good at “cutting the weeds” – i.e. 
fighting aggression with aggression – but this approach does not change the conditions that give 
rise movements such as Boko Haram. He observed that “Changing conditions starts with 
families, communities, and tribes” and that women play a central role in this process.   
There was a common perspective that the current dominant approaches are failing to provide 
peace or security for much of the world’s population, and that Women, Peace, and Security,  and 
gender equality more broadly, offers a chance for deep structural and social change. One 
interviewee commented that “we need to change the parameters of the system.” He noted that 
gender equality needs to be considered in all aspects of foreign policy. “Women, Peace, and 
Security has tremendous strategic potential that is not being tapped,” according to another 
participant. For many male interviewees, this agenda goes far beyond institutional mandates: 
“We are not so much talking about policies as much as human values…. We do have the 
capability to change how we see the world.”  
Interviewees pointed out that mandates are necessary but insufficient to bring needed change to 
peace and security institutions and processes. Much of the attention on Women, Peace and 
Security has remained symbolic, general, and high-level, but does not always filter down to 
changing practices in life and work. According to one former high-level official from a Western 
country: “The elements of government are based on standards and norms on one hand and laws 
and rules on the other. Much of the Women, Peace, and Security narrative has been focused on 
rules and laws, but what’s really important is norms.”   
Men who work in the Women, Peace, and Security arena made clear that this agenda should not 
be reduced to adding women to peace and security structures: “The point of 1325 is not to have 
more women doing what we were doing before. It’s about including women to transform 
security. Parity is important but it is not 1325…It is very valid but does not supplant the need for 
gendered institutions.”  As one senior-level military interviewee noted: “Parity is not irrelevant 
but it doesn’t achieve the goals. To provide comprehensive security solutions you must have 
representatives from all of society.  A diverse security sector means that all of society is invested 
in the solutions.”  
Men highlighted the need to move from general sensitization about gender to the transformation 
of institutions and people as the next stage for the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. 
Interviewees said this is a juncture to reflect on the body of research and experiences that have 
been collected on Women, Peace, and Security and gender equality and learn from best practices. 
They spoke about expanding beyond micro-interventions to focus on larger social and structural 
issues that are prerequisites for peaceful societies.  
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OVERCOMING GENDER BLINDNESS AND BIAS 
Men indicated that changing organizational cultures and leaders are the greatest impediment to 
implementation of Women, Peace, and Security and related gender equality goals in peace and 
security. They point to pervasive gender blindness and gender bias in the peace and security field 
that must be overcome to achieve the vision of Women, Peace, and Security. Among those 
surveyed for this study, half report that they have experienced or observed instances of gender 
bias against the agenda.   
Male advocates described personal and professional experiences, including family dynamics, 
academic studies, and early experiences in conflict settings, that were influential in their 
understanding of gender. Some men who had served in the military were deeply affected by the 
realities of war and its disproportionate effects on women.  Others saw the negative 
consequences when security forces excluded or exploited women. Those who served in recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan observed the ability of female colleagues in the military to 
build relationships with women and increase awareness of what was happening in the 
communities.  It was sometimes eye-opening to realize that they had not been hearing from half 
of the population.  
Exposure to gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda altered their 
perspectives on security significantly. One interviewee who was in the military said he dismissed 
“women’s issues” for a long time because he considered them “something extra.” But he began 
to see the critical role of gender, and has been actively trying to learn since. “The challenge is 
waking men up to the issue,” he said.  One interviewee with a traditional military background 
described his own learning process about Women, Peace, and Security: “It had a profound 
impact on me...How could I not be an activist? I began promoting it quite fiercely.” A former 
senior-level diplomat said that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda shaped his current 
outlook and his priorities in foreign policy. With a gender perspective, “once you put on the lens 
you can’t take it off. The world never looks the same.”  
 
Case Study: US NAP—An Insider View 
 
In December 2011, the U.S. Government released its first National Action Plan (US NAP). 
The US NAP was the culmination of more than 12 months of work inside the sprawling US 
foreign policy and national security apparatus. Individuals who were closely involved in the 
process were interviewed for this study. 
 
The US NAP process demonstrated the vital importance of senior-level champions. The 
unique constellation of leadership across government agencies who were personally 
committed to Women, Peace, and Security was unprecedented. In many ways, the US NAP 
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process was more important than the product, according to interviewees. It brought 
representatives from across the US Government together, including diplomatic, military, 
development, health, and other officials. The process of formulating a US NAP was strongly 
supported and prioritized by the President and those in senior leadership positions. Various 
components of the US Government needed to come up with a credible plan. 
 
The process introduced many government policymakers to Women, Peace, and Security for 
the first time. Advocates within the government found that different arguments resonated with 
different people as they were trying to build support. Many policymakers were influenced by 
the concept of improving effectiveness, others were moved by a belief in equality, human 
rights and women’s rights, and some were interested in unpacking issues around masculinities 
and security. It necessitated a factual and nuanced approach. Those who were leading the 
process framed it as a mission-driven strategy. Women, Peace, and Security was presented as a 
new lens on complex peace and security issues. 
 
One interviewee observed that those who responded to the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda positively often tapped into a personal experience (e.g. had a daughter; worked with 
very competent women, etc.) to recognize the importance of gender equality.  The process was 
female-dominated (women made up the majority of government staff involved), which 
complicated efforts to clarify gender equality concepts or to overcome the perception that 
Women, Peace, and Security is a women’s issue. According to one interviewee, there were 11 
senior staff from various agencies who participated in the working meetings, and only two of 
them were men (he was one of them).  In comparison, the MAPRO (Mass Atrocity 
Prevention) teams were almost entirely comprised of male staffers. 
 
There was more support from Department of Defense (DoD) than anticipated. Some former 
officials attribute that to larger shifts within DoD that created openness to this agenda. There 
was a significant increase in the number of senior-level women in DoD and clear support from 
the Secretary of Defense. There was a recognition from recent experience in Afghanistan and 
Iraq that a failure to engage with women in the communities was a strategic disadvantage for 
the military. Counterinsurgency strategies emphasized engagement of local populations, so the 
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Women, Peace, and Security agenda was understood as legitimate. Some of the men from the 
military were unenthusiastic, although not outright resistant, in the beginning.  After some 
involvement in the working group discussions, many became very supportive and began to see 
that this wasn’t “just a women’s issue.”   
 
Some participants reported that the momentum during the process of drafting the NAP has 
faded with implementation.  According to those who were involved in the US NAP process, 
the biggest challenge is that policies cannot be prioritized without adequate resources. It is 
very difficult to add more to portfolios to over-extended government staff. Senior-level 
officials, even if they are personally supportive, are time-pressed.  The responsibilities are 
given to the most junior staff who lack influence or authority, often also young women. 
Interviewees were uncertain about the fate of the US NAP under the new Administration. 
Many pointed out that the implementation was moving forward. However, they emphasized 
that the attitudes of senior-level leaders send a very clear message about priorities that 
reverberates throughout the ranks of government. 
 
 
1. THE “HOW” OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION 
The participants in this study, reflecting on their experiences and lessons learned, offered 
recommended approaches to move Women, Peace, and Security forward in practice.  
1. Cultivate Champions – Women and Men -- on the Inside 
• Consider Women, Peace, and Security and gender equality both an internal and external 
policy issue. Peace and security institutions need to improve gender equality internally to 
make a case for gender equality externally in bilateral and international relations.  
• Cultivate support from senior-level men to overcome skepticism, resistance, and inertia 
in peace and security bureaucracies. Support gender equality champions among the mid-
level ranks in these institutions who will move into senior ranks.  
• Increase opportunities for men and women in peace and security institutions to build 
competencies on gender equality and Women, Peace, and Security. Facilitate more 
opportunities for learning from gender experts on best practices.  
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• Bridge civil society and security sector communities working on Women, Peace, and 
Security. 
• Integrate gender advisors and focal points –both male and female – in peace and security 
bureaucracies to ensure policy documents or programs do not move forward without 
adequate consideration of gender implications.  
2. Address Gender Norms as a Foundation for Peace 
• Focus on listening and open dialogue as first steps to starting conversations about gender 
norms and equality principles in local contexts.  
• Conduct participatory research to examine gender relations and behaviors, and how these 
relate to peace and security in specific contexts.  
• Address the role of masculinities in peace and security – including the connections 
between masculine norms and violence, and the development of healthy masculinities 
and caregiving/fatherhood attitudes.  Focusing on people as fathers, brothers, sons, helps 
them to think differently about themselves and how violence affects others. 
• Utilize mixed gender teams on the ground to facilitate contact with both women and men 
on peace and security issues, and to send a visible message that gender equality is 
relevant to everyone. When designing research and programming, communicate with 
women’s civil society groups to determine if women-only or mixed workshops are most 
appropriate for context. 
• Partner with civil society and women’s organizations on the ground to identify genuine 
champions, and to formulate approaches to Women, Peace, and Security and gender 
equality that will resonate with the population.   
3. Tailor the Women, Peace, and Security Message 
• Tailor the gender equality message very carefully for specific audiences, based on an 
understanding of the institution and individual.  Engage people from “where they are.” 
Consider strategic opportunities to draw attention to the gendered aspects of high-profile 
peace and security issues to gain the attention of policymakers and build increased 
support.  
• Emphasize that gender equality is smart policy because it makes communities and 
countries safer. Offer country-specific examples to illustrate the importance of gender in 
a direct and powerful way. Counter the perception that this is a zero-sum game – 
women’s gains are men’s losses – to mitigate overt and subtle pushback. 
• Push peace and security institutions to utilize data about local needs and solutions to 
inform policy and programs in specific, gender-sensitive ways. 
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• Broaden the framing for discussions to include different audiences and encourage new
approaches. Develop coalitions and alliances among advocates on gender equality who
approach the issue from different fields and/or disciplines to influence specific policies
and programs.
• Find ways to engage young people, and other sectors, including business and media, to





A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION, 
NEPALI WOMEN AS A RESOURCE FOR REGIONAL 
STABILITY 
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A former kingdom that is now a federal democratic republic, post-civil war Nepal has seemingly 
limitless potential to elevate over half its population1 – its women and girls – from centuries of 
severe historical and cultural oppression. But like the great Mount Everest that resides within its 
borders, are Nepal’s deep-rooted patriarchal values insurmountable for even the newly elected 
woman president to influence change? And as the U.S. continues to foster its “rebalance to the 
Pacific” global strategy, should the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) have any interest in 
helping Nepal gain ground toward gender equality and empowerment in an effort to increase 
regional stability? 
Strategically, Nepal may have greater value to the U.S. than what previously has been realized, 
providing more than just regional stabilization. As a nation, Nepal has close, separate ties to both 
its bordering neighbors – India and China. With an eye toward avoiding the current India-Nepal 
unrest over Nepal’s new constitution,2 a strengthened U.S.-Nepal partnership could make for 
greater U.S. influence within the region. And with the recent election of Communist leader 
Bidya Devi Bhandari as Nepal’s first woman head of state, promoting women’s rights fits neatly 
into her long-supported political agenda.3  
Women, as a gender that comprises 52 per cent of the national populace, are by-and-large an 
untapped human resource with great stabilizing potential in Nepal, making them a specific target 
audience in which USPACOM can and should invest. And by utilizing the Daniel K. Inouye 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) as a vehicle for building partnerships and 
collaborations that work to promote and protect women, the U.S. can emerge as a champion of 
international women’s rights while reinforcing the international rules-based order as a counter-
balance to rising China. 
GLOBAL GENDER INEQUALITY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY GUIDANCE 
Gender inequality is rampant worldwide, whether examining traditional women’s roles in Nepali 
society, or the gender wage gap in the most advanced Western cultures, to include the United 
States. Drawing on societal effects, the United Nations Development Program states that gender 
inequality remains a major barrier to human development. According to the UN, girls and 
women have made major strides since 1990, but they have not yet gained gender equity. This has 
hampered the development of societies as a whole, which in turn has had an adverse effect on 
global security. 
The World Economic Forum’s 2015 Global Gender Gap Report revealed that, after a decade of 
data collection, the gap in health, education, economic opportunity and politics around the world 
has closed by only 4 per cent, while the economic gap has narrowed by just 3 per cent, 
                                                           
1 Population 52.2% female nation-wide, according to Nepal’s National Population and Housing Census 2011. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_phc/Nepal/Nepal-Census-2011-Vol1.pdf 
2 Foreign Policy, India Pushes Nepal into China’s Arms, October 23, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/23/india-pushes-nepal-into-chinas-arms/ 





suggesting it will take another 118 years to achieve equality.4 Furthermore, current gender 
inequalities risk being exacerbated by the coming Fourth Industrial Revolution, as industries are 
undergoing profound shifts in their business models while technology is disrupting methods of 
production, distribution and consumption. Tragically, gender gaps are set to increase in some 
industries where jobs traditionally held by women will become obsolete. 
According to the report, the magnitude of national gender gaps is the combined result of various 
socioeconomic, policy and cultural variables. Governments have a leading role to play as the 
closure or continuation of these gaps is intrinsically connected to the framework of national 
policies in place.5  
Even the United States, which fell eight places compared to last year, ranking 28th out of 145 
countries in the study, recognizes the issue of gender inequality as a matter of global security. In 
December 2011, the Obama Administration released the first-ever U.S. National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace, and Security. The plan’s goal is to empower half the world’s population as equal 
partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, 
violence and insecurity. Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best 
forged and sustained, when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and 
conflict prevention, according to the plan.6 
This notion is reinforced in the February 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), which states 
that the focus of U.S. efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive 
politics, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, 
and promoting economic opportunity, particularly among youth and women. “We will press for 
transformative investments in areas like women’s equality and empowerment, education, 
sustainable energy, and governance,” says the strategy.7 
From a security perspective, countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are 
accorded full and equal rights and opportunity as men. This concept is reinforced in the NSS, 
which says, “Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all 
its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and girls – who 
are too often denied their inalienable rights and face substantial barriers to opportunity in too 
many places.”  
 
                                                           
4 Financial Times, Gender gap progress stalling, warns World Economic Forum, November 18, 2015. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b4adbfa-8de7-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz41EPZpmay 
5 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2015, November 12, 2015.  
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2015 
6 United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, December 2011. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-
files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf 
7 The White House, National Security Strategy 2015, February 1, 2015. 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf 
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GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN NEPAL 
Founded as a Hindu caste-based society, Nepal has developed over centuries as a nation of social 
hierarchies and divisions of deep-rooted and systemic discrimination and exclusion. After the 
abolition of caste-based discrimination in 1963, social hierarchies remained with the patriarchal 
system assigning women a subordinate role in society, which was reflected in state-based 
discrimination. In a series of five-year national plans, 2002-2006 focused on Nepal’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. As part of the plan, the government identified social exclusion as a 
fundamental development challenge and acknowledged that exclusion and the lack of political 
representation were major reasons for women’s deprivation.8 
A result of deep-rooted social exclusion, Nepali women suffer on various societal levels. 
Relegated to second-class citizenry, they face gender specific challenges due to having 
subordinate status in a male dominated society which sees them as home makers and child 
bearers.  Says President Bhandari, "People still think women should only do household work. 
They are still mistreated, discriminated against and insulted."9 
Even worse, crimes such as human trafficking, domestic violence and rape are common but 
rarely reported because victims are afraid of being blamed and ostracized by their family or 
community. Women also face discrimination in accessing healthcare, education and employment 
and in establishing their rights to property and land. All of these issues contribute to instability in 
Nepal and across the greater South Central Asia region. 
WHERE USPACOM STRATEGY AND NEPALI WOMEN’S ISSUES INTERSECT 
On January 22, 2013, former USPACOM Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III outlined 
three major components to the USPACOM Strategy: strengthening alliances and partnerships, 
maintaining an assured presence in the region, and effectively communicating our intent and 
resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests.10 Of these three components, partnerships have 
proven critical to establishing regional security, especially in keeping rising China in check, over 
recent years.  
In his February 23, 2016 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Locklear’s 
relief and the current USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr. told committee 
members, “USPACOM’s forward presence, posture, and readiness reassure allies and partners of 
U.S. commitment to security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Strengthening these relationships is 
critical to meeting the challenges and seizing opportunities.” Harris explained that through bi-
lateral and multi-lateral relationships and activities, USPACOM is building a community of like-
minded nations that are committed to maintaining the international rules-based order, as opposed 
                                                           
8 Asian Development Bank, Overview of Gender Equality and Social Inclusion in Nepal, 2010. 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32237/cga-nep-2010.pdf 
9 Reuters, In patriarchal Nepal, first female president works for equality, November 10, 2015. 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/11/10/nepal-woman-president-idINKCN0SZ1IR20151110 




to China’s non-conformity. “Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top 
USPACOM priority,” said Harris.11 
With the recent development of internationally renowned criminal and terrorist organizations, 
most notably the Islamic State, transnational crime is becoming more of a regional concern 
throughout the world. In his statement before the SASC Harris specifically addressed 
transnational crime as a USPACOM security challenge, with nearly 36 million victims of human 
trafficking estimated worldwide, nearly two-thirds come from Asia. Furthermore, he singled-out 
human trafficking as a women and children’s issue, as they – especially those from the lowest 
socioeconomic sectors – comprise the most vulnerable demographic.  
Nepal, unfortunately, is especially vulnerable to the exploits of human trafficking due to its 
poverty rate, dominant patriarchal cultural heritage, and proximity to human trafficking 
destination countries. The U.S. State Department’s July 2015 Trafficking In Persons Report 
categorizes Nepal as a Tier 2 country according to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA) of 2000. Tier 2 countries are those whose governments do not fully comply with 
TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into 
compliance with those standards. According to the report, Nepal is a source, transit and 
destination country for men, women and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.12 
A recent opinion piece that ran in The Kathmandu Post reports, every year it is estimated that 
between 5,000 to 10,000 Nepali women and girls are trafficked to India for the purpose of 
commercial sexual exploitation.13 Additionally, UNICEF reports as many as 7,000 women and 
girls are trafficked out of Nepal to India every year, and around 200,000 are now working in 
Indian brothels.14 The Post attributes that most girls trafficked are from very poor families and 
villages where they or their families are lured by false marriages or promises of employment or 
education. Yet, the U.S. State Department says that although the government of Nepal does not 
fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, it is making 
significant efforts to do so. This quality makes Nepal an especially attractive partner for 
championing women’s issues because it demonstrates great potential for improvement plus the 
willingness to improve. 
In his statement to the SASC Harris recognized that, of human trafficking victims worldwide, 
roughly half of the 36 million are women and children who end up in the commercial sex trade. 
The rest end up as laborers in factories and farms or as domestic servants, or as child soldiers. 
Tying back to the overall USPACOM strategy, Harris said, “While much remains to be done, 
11 U.S. Defense Department, Statement: Commander U.S. Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, February 23, 2016. http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_02-23-16.pdf 
12 U.S. State Department, Trafficking In Persons Report, July 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf 
13 The Kathmandu Post, Taken from Nepal, January 31, 2016. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-
01-31/taken-from-nepal.html
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USPACOM forces … are building partner capacity and sharing intelligence in order to combat 
these transnational threats.” 
A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION, A TV STAR BRINGS GENDER 
TRAINING TO NEPAL 
One partner program that is already making headway toward addressing gender issues in the 
USPACOM AOR is the DKI APCSS Fellows Project. In his statement to the SASC, Harris 
declared the center serves as a truly unique venue to empower regional security practitioners to 
more effectively and collaboratively contribute to regional security and stability. He also 
affirmed that the DKI APCSS provides added support to the USPACOM mission in several 
uniquely focused areas, to include as USPACOM’s lead in implementing the U.S. National 
Action Plan mandate to increase inclusion of women in the security sector under the Women, 
Peace, and Security program. “This center is one of our asymmetric capabilities. No other 
country has anything quite like it,” said Harris.  
Established in 1995 and based out of Honolulu, the DKI APCSS’s mission is, “Building 
capacities and communities of interest by educating, connecting and empowering security 
practitioners to advance Asia-Pacific security.” All students, known as Fellows, who attend a 
course that lasts four to five weeks also work on a Fellow’s Project during their studies. The 
greater aim of the Fellow’s Project is to improve security sector governance, cooperation and the 
capacity of countries in dealing with security matters. At the same time, the overarching theme 
of the Fellow’s Project is Comprehensive Engagement, a concept that focuses on creating 
linkages between American security practitioners and their counterparts in the region while 
providing a basis for mutual understanding.  
This past spring, Nepali television journalist Aarti Chataut graduated from the Fellow’s Project 
program after developing her Project entitled, Breaking the Silence: Bringing Real Peace to 
Nepal Through Reconciling the Issues of Wartime Violence Against Women. Upon graduation, 
Chataut returned to her native country to advance women’s issues, for which she has received 
national recognition and an award from former president Ram Baran Yadav.  
Through her work as a television journalist, Chataut has produced news programs in cooperation 
with her employer news agency, National Television of Nepal (NTV), to highlight sexual and 
gender-based violence as it relates to Nepali Truth and Reconciliation Law. In addition, she has 
accomplished work as a gender analyst and advisor, working for women’s rights by giving UN 
lectures to Nepali government and state officials on behalf of the Nepal Department of Home 
Ministry. Specifically, she provided three program lectures on UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security in the cities of Kathmandu, Chitwan and 
Dhulikhel, to chief district officers, police chiefs and other security agencies from 25 out of 75 
total districts. As recently as December of last year, she worked with former Communication 
Minister and Nepali Congress leader Minendra Rijal at a workshop and training program on 
increasing gender sensitivity. Within Nepal’s patriarchal society, this body of work is no small 




In her role as a woman journalist Chataut embodies the message that she delivers to her 
audiences, that empowering women by involving them in the peace-making process is the only 
way to ensure real and lasting peace. In her Fellow’s Project, Breaking the Silence, Chataut 
asserts that the absence of clear statistical data on sex and gender -based violence during the 
Maoist insurgency (of the Nepali Civil War), and failure to address it as a problem in the 
subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has left Nepal in a state of social conflict. Not 
only were female victims left physically harmed, but debilitated as a result. Worse still, she 
suggests that if the issue of sexual and gender-based violence continues to be unaddressed, it 
could lead to the resurgence of yet another violent conflict. 
Chataut lobbied hard to deliver on the promise she made upon graduating the DKI APCSS 
Fellow’s Project, which was to develop television programming hi-lighting women’s struggle in 
post-civil war Nepal. After much convincing and demonstration of resourcefulness, she managed 
to develop a recurring television program focusing on women’s issues, a program she directs, 
produces and presents. The first episode, airing April 14, 2015, was a 25-minute show that 
featured the Nepali Honorable Minister of Women, Children and Welfare Ministry. On that 
show, the minister publicly accepted the problem of the blight of Nepali women and expressed 
her commitment to create an enabling environment for them in the future. The second episode 
aired the following week, where Chataut expanded on ideas presented in the previous episode 
and related them to government authority. Although the signal for Chataut’s station, NTV, 
blankets 50 percent of Nepal’s total land mass, it reaches up to 72 per cent of the country's 
population: she has quite an impressive megaphone from which to deliver her gender-promoting 
message throughout Nepal’s mountainous terrain.  
BRINGING REAL SECURITY TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
When considering the value of spending time and energy toward promoting and championing 
women as a gender rather than addressing broader women’s issues such as poverty and human 
trafficking, some may argue that the resulting impact is so minimal that it is not worth the 
resource investment. One could say that it is more prudent to invest time and energy toward 
addressing the issues themselves. To these objectors, I say we should embrace a holistic 
approach to building relationships, an approach that aims to lift-up targeted interest groups – 
especially women – to ensure that we are reaching and influencing all layers of the larger global 
society. The DKI APCSS is already an established vehicle recognized by the USPACOM 
commander. We should work to develop courses that specifically address women’s issues in the 
region to influence security cooperation at the highest levels and, ultimately, promote a more 
secure regional environment. 
On the surface, breaking down Nepal’s ingrained patriarchal society and culture to promote 
gender equality in the post-civil war era can appear as treacherous and daunting as the towering 
topography upon which the country resides. However, with the assistance of USPACOM 
partnership capacity building initiatives, such as the NKI APCSS, we have seen how the 
empowerment of just one woman is reaching up to 72 per cent of the entire Nepali population. 
That kind of return on investment is staggering on the macro level, but the same principles can 
and do apply on the micro level, too.  
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Women are by-and-large an untapped human resource with great stabilizing potential in Nepal, 
making them a specific target audience in which USPACOM can and should invest. By focusing 
on regional partner education and training at the DKI APCSS, and specifically developing 
collaborations that work to promote and protect women, not only can the U.S. emerge as a 
champion of international women’s rights, but it can also shape and influence the region at a 
higher level, reinforcing a rules-based order for regional security cooperation. 
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It goes without saying that men and women are absolutely equal before the law. A sincere desire to give 
effect to this equality is evident in all spheres. We are enlisting women to work in the economy, the 
administration, legislation, and government. All courses and education institutions are open to them so 
they can improve their professional and social training. 
              V.I. Lenin, 19201 
Similar to women in many other nations, Russian women participate in decision-making for regional, 
national, and international institutions, engage in the labor force, education, healthcare, and social 
services. However, women in Russia are grossly underrepresented in traditional positions of power and 
face many challenges and discrimination. Understanding the ‘women question’ – ‘zhenskiy vopros,’ the 
Russian term for a broad range of issues and policies concerning women, would benefit Russian women 
as well as improve cooperation between the nations, ensuring national and world peace, security, and 
stability.  In order to explain the complexity of the ‘women question,’ it is necessary to begin with a 
historical reference. 
The first part of the paper is a historical background of women’s role in the society and established 
trends in Russia’s experience with Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Secondly, I provide analysis of 
the women's status and participation in “Putin’s Russia” and their engagement with the international 
community since 2000.2 Lastly, I discuss the possibilities and opportunities for cooperation between the 
international community and Russian women in the government, military, and non-governmental 
organizations focused on peace, security, and humanitarian relief. The framework for this paper analyzes 
the ‘women question’ through the DIME  (Diplomacy /Intelligence/ Military/Economy) elements of the 
governmental spectrum of influence and the Four Pillars that support UN Resolution 1325 
                                                           
1 V.I. Lenin in the interview on the Woman Question with Clara Zetkin in the Fall 1920.  
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, The Emancipation of Women. From the Writings of V.I. Lenin, 4th ed. (New York: International 
Publishers Co., Inc, 1966), 115 
2 In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325, and President Vladimir Putin began 
his rule of Russia. The first President of Russia Boris Yeltsyn chose then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as his successor in 
1999. During the traditional televised address to the nation on 31 December 1999, President Yeltsyn officially transferred his 
authority to Prime Minister Putin. Vladimir Putin became the acting President of Russia until he won Presidential elections in 
March 2000 to govern Russia for the next seventeen years.  
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(Participation, Protection, Prevention, Relief and Recovery).3 The DIME and Four Pillars define the 
spheres where women are active and  describe women’s initiatives and decisions that bring changes into 
the Russian politics, education, healthcare, economy, military, and society as a whole.  
The history of Russia is rich with life stories of women who ruled over the land, expanded territories, 
built alliances, secured borders, advanced education, and cared for the less fortunate. Throughout 
history, Russian women demanded equal rights, opportunities, respect, and dignity; women fought for 
ideas and the nation, and defied traditions and the cultural norms of a patriarchal society. As a result, 
many women became leaders and brought changes in Russian society and the world, opening more 
opportunities for women’s participation in the decision-making, conflict resolution, and peace 
negotiations. When leaders recognized national peace and security were closely connected to the 
empowerment of women to seek education and their voice in the society, stability and prosperity of the 
state and its allies followed. 
While Russia remained a serfdom until 1861, peasant women in the villages and servants in the palaces 
and noble household did not have many opportunities to advance in the society and suffered even more 
from The Domostroi rules, which described the ideal family and its management where everyone knew 
his or her place. A wife had to be obedient to her husband at all times, follow his instructions, and could 
be disciplined if not compliant. Thus, women obediently endured domestic violence and abuse, while 
the Russian Orthodox Church, the authority for many, preached about the suffering that Christ endured 
and commanded His people to do the same.4 When there was no support or protection from the leaders, 
women found support from each other: neighbors helped each other, and networks of women built 
stronger communities, creating a foundation for the society. During the industrialization and 
urbanization of Russia, many emancipated peasant women moved from villages to cities. Women’s 
labor contributed to manufacturing, expanding commerce, and social services. A greater number of 
women became professionals, such as doctors, teachers, and factory workers; many were dedicated to 
helping poor, widows, and orphans. Women became active participants in protests, political meetings, 
igniting and supporting the revolution that changed the world.5 The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 
empowered women to push for legal and political equality; women were able to vote and had greater 
access to education and employment. The Soviet government prided itself in the liberation and 
empowerment of women. Nevertheless, the Communist Party’s policies addressing women issues 
throughout the Soviet Union lacked consistency, which became the trend in Russia for the next century. 
The policies reflected the needs of the Party rather than ‘women question’ issues. Currently, women are 
involved in all spheres of the society, but remain underrepresented in the decision-making process at the 
executive levels of the government, businesses, and education institutions.6   
Although women have a better representation in the Russian society, the numbers are still low. The 
Eurasian Women’s Forum indicates that as of 1 January 2017, the Federation Council of the Federal 
                                                           
3 United States Institute of Peace. What is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 and Why is it so Critical Today? 
http://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 (accessed May 20, 2017) 
4 Barbara Alpern Engel, Women in Russia, 1700-2000. Advance Praise for Women in Russia (1700-2000) (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
5 Elizabeth A. Wood, The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1997) 







Assembly of the Russian Federation consists of 170 members, of which 30 are women (17.6 percent). 
There are 450 representatives in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly, of which 72 are women (16 
percent).7 According to the World Economic Forum 2016 report, Russia ranked 129 out of 145 countries 
in political empowerment of women, even as it scored fairly well on economic participation, education 
and health (ranks 41, 45 and 40 respectively – See Table 1).8 This gap is an indicator of the challenges 
faced by Russian women while establishing their presence in the political life of the country. 
 























































Table 1. The Global Gender Gap Report, World Economic Forum, 2015/2016 
 
PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT 
Female members of the government strive to be “ultimate loyalist” - once elected they fully support the 
government’s agenda, not their constituents needs, simply to maintain their position.9 While the Russian 
government attempts to empower women, promote dignity and respect for women, it also adopts laws 
decriminalizing domestic violence, which diminishes women dignity and violates women rights. Instead 
of concrete steps promoting grassroots mobilization of women into politics, the regime nominates 
                                                           
7 Eurasian Women’s Forum, http://eawf.ru/en/ (accessed: 20 June 2017) 
8 The Global Gender Gap Report 2015 / World Economic Forum, 2015. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR2015 
/cover.pdf (accessed 25 May 2017)  
9 Janet Elise Johnson, “Putin’s Russia Promotes Both Women and Misogyny in Politics. Wait, What?: Using Women as 
“Showgirls” or “Political Cleaners” to attract Voters Doesn’t Exactly Promote Gender Equality,” The Washington Post, 
November 6, 2016 
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Russian elite, such as celebrities, singers, and athletes to attract voters and promote the government’s 
agenda and policies. In February 2017, President Putin signed the law reducing punishment for the 
domestic violence with more than 85 percent of legislators in Russia's Duma approving the bill.10 To 
voice opposition to such abuse and discrimination, women in Russia start grassroots movements to 
spread awareness, prevent the abuse, and educate the population about domestic violence. Women 
establish relief and recovery shelters and centers for the victims of domestic violence abuse.11 If there is 
no support from the government, women make it their own business, providing peace, security, safety, 
and support to every girl and woman in need. 
DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE 
The common perception in Russia is that “diplomacy is no women’s business.”  The numbers in the 
latest report from the Russian government to the UN on the implementation of the UN convention  
focused on the elimination of all forms of women discrimination confirm the situation. Women 
represent approximately 13 percent of all diplomatic service officers in the upper ranks within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Throughout the history of Russia, only 5 women served as 
Ambassadors leading diplomatic missions. While male diplomats acknowledge the benefit of having 
women in the diplomatic corps because women often think “outside the box and deliver wise and 
creative solutions” in a different situation, women are underrepresented in the field of foreign affairs, 
except in a strictly administrative support roles or as good-will ambassadors.12 
A similar situation exists in Russia’s intelligence community, although it is difficult to locate the 
statistics about the numbers and role of women in this sphere. The general public usually learns about 
women working for the intelligence community, when the information is revealed after the fact.13 In 
Russia, similar to many other countries, women contribute to peace and security serving in the law 
enforcement agencies, and, recently, in the military as the contractors in the Russia’s Army, Special 
Forces, Marines, Navy, and Air-Space Defense.  The conscript military service in Russia is still 
mandatory only for men of age 18 – 28. 
MILITARY  
With the President of the Russian Federation’s approval of order №1237 on 16 September 1999, women 
became eligible to serve in the military as contractors. After this ruling, the number of women entering 
military service increases every year. Women are admitted to every branch of service, if there are 
                                                           
10 Janet Elise Johnson, “Putin’s Russia”, The Washington Post.  
See also: State-run news agency RIA Novosti has reported that 40% of serious crimes in Russia are committed in the family, 
36,000 women are beaten by their husbands daily, and 12,000 women die yearly as a result of domestic violence, one woman 
dies every 44 minutes. http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/13/europe/russia-domestic-violence/index.html (accessed: July 1, 2017) 
11 Change.org. https://www.change.org/p/state-duma-adopt-the-domestic-violence-law-in-russia (accessed: July 1, 2017) 
12 “Many Think that Diplomacy is No Women’s Business.” How Women-Diplomats Fight for the Place under the Sun.” 
Gazeta.ru, 7 March 2016, trans. A. Davis. http://m.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/03/07_a_8112761.shtml (accessed: March 25, 
2017) 
13 “Spies Swapped by US and Russia at Vienna Airport,: BBC News, 9 July 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10564994 
(accessed: June 10, 2017).  The recent example, is the story of Anna Chaplan, at that time 28 years old cosmopolitan woman, 
who pleaded guilty in New York court for the act of espionage on the territory of the United State with ten other Russian 
spies in the summer of 2010. It was the public revelation of a spy ring, their trial, and the first high-profile spies exchange 






vacancies, and at the discretion and needs of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).14 Preparation of women 
for military service in Russia starts at a young age and is becoming an increasing trend in Russia’s 
experience with WPS. The MoD and Russian government make a priority to invest in patriotic education 
and military training of the Russian youth, including girls. In April 2008, President of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed an executive order permitting young girls to study at the historically 
boys’ military boarding schools, such as Nakhimov’s Navy Boarding School, Suvorov’s Military school, 
military band schools, as well as the cadets’ academies.15 In July 2008, the MoD and Ministry of 
Education established the first and only military boarding school for girls – Moscow Cadet’s School 
“Boarding School of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (MCS).”16 MCS is an elite school 
that provides the best education available and is devoted to raising women who will become leaders and 
decision-makers in the government, military, foreign affairs, and economics.17 
 In addition to new policies enabling girls to receive the best education and increased opportunities, the 
Russian government resurrected the idea of youth upbringing and education through indoctrination – the 
youth patriotic movement Yunarmia (Young Army), which is similar to the Soviet Union period Young 
Pioneers and Komsomol members (Young Communist). Currently, more than 100 thousand Russian 
teenagers, 11 - 18 years old, are part of Yunarmia, learning about national interests, security, and the 
military.18 The main goal of this movement is to inspire the young generation to become devoted, 
patriotic, physically fit citizens of Russia who are ready and willing to defend their nation.19 Similar 
enthusiasm is present among young women who pursue their careers in the different branches of the 
Russia’s military. 
According to Russia’s MoD, there are 45 thousand women contractors, equaling approximately 10 
percent of 425 thousand military contract personnel. The majority of women, in all branches of the 
military, traditionally serve in support roles such as nurses and doctors, logistics, communication, and 
Information Technology.20 Similar to other nations’ militaries, Russia, does not permit women to serve 
on submarines. However, the reasons for the absence of the female submariners in the Russian Navy is 
                                                           
14 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation order №30, 16 January 2001., trans. Anna Davis, 
http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/conditions/women.htm (accessed: June 18, 2017)  
15 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation order №30, 16 January 2001., trans. Anna Davis, 
http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/conditions/women.htm (accessed: June 18, 2017). 
16 Moscow Cadet’s School “Boarding School of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” trans. A. Davis 
(accessed June 19, 2017)  http://pansion-mil.ru/ 
17 Ibid. 
18 Krasnaya Zvezda, (Red Star), May 29, 2017, N56, trans. A. Davis. On 29 October 2015, the Ministry of Defense, 
DOSAAF (Dobrovolnoye Obschestvo Sodeystvia Armii, Aviatsii i Flotu/Volunteer Society to Support Army, Airforce, 
Navy), and the Central Army Athletic Club established youth patriotic movement Yunarmia (Young Army).   
19 Ibid. 
20 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation News, 8 March 2016, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country 
/more.htm?id=12080101@egNews (accessed: June 1, 2017) See also: Ministry of Defense News, 14 June 2015 
http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12041310@egNews (accessed: June 1, 2017) According to 
Commanding Officer of the VDV (Airborne), Colonel-General Andrey Serdyukov, reported that currently there are more 
than 1,500 women serve in Russia’s Airborne command as contractors, of which 60 women are officers, more than 1,300 in 
the ranks of lieutenants, sergeants, private soldiers. In Russia’s Special Forces (Spetsnaz – Special Designation Force) 
women serve in mixed units, many in support positions. 
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different: Russia does not need women serving on subs because “there are enough highly educated and 
trained men who are capable of serving and performing their duties.”21 This comment reflects a common 
perspective about women’s participation and service in the military: women can assist when there are 
not enough men to do the job instead of extending equal opportunities to serve and contribute. Many 
male leaders do not understand nor see the benefits of having women serving in their units. Although the 
‘women question’ has reemerged on the government agenda, and some new policies have a “woman’s 
face,” the process of empowering women and fully engaging them in every aspect of life in the society 
is a very slow process. Women generated their own trend in the military: the incentives to join the 
military, moreover to engage in combat are often attributed to private reason. It could be economic 
considerations, desire to continue the legacy of their family members in defending the Motherland, 
defiance of a traditional view and role of women in society, personal aspirations, or taking revenge for 
their loved ones. 22  If a war has a woman’s face, women are engaged in combat and insurgency; then 
they absolutely can participate in peacekeeping missions, a peace negotiation process, or reconstruction 
of a post-war zone in different parts of the world.  
The UN reports there are approximately 14 thousand policemen, 10 percent of them are women, from 90 
countries participating in UN peacekeeping and other special missions throughout the world. In Russia, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) employs approximately 180 thousand women in the police 
force, equaling one-fourth of the total number of employees. Many women are in leadership positions in 
the law enforcement agencies and actively participate in the decision-making regarding law and order, 
protection of women and children against any form of violence, drug abuse, crime, peace, and security.23 
According to the MoIA, Russia is planning to increase training of women for participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations.24 In March 2016, three women of the Russian police force joined the UN 
peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. It was the first deployment of the female police officers on the 
peacekeeping mission in a foreign country.25 Although the level of participation of women in the 
Russia’s military and the police force is slowly increasing, the reasons for the change is mainly out of 
necessity to fill the vacancies due to the lack of manpower.  
ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT 
A January 2016 statistics services of Russia indicate there are approximately 35.2 million women 
contributing to the Russian economy; that is 48.7 percent of the 72.3 million people employed in Russia. 
More than half of the educators in schools, colleges, universities, are women, and the medical field 
consists of more than 80 percent women.26 Women in Russia are breaking many stereotypes regarding 
the role of women in society by choosing the trades and industries that have been traditionally male-
dominated career fields. There are female astronauts, women who serve as first responders and deep-
water divers for search and rescue teams, many work as firefighters, cab-drivers, and some as 
                                                           
21 Rear Admiral Viktor Kochemazov, Director of the Military Training of Russia’s Navy. Interview . Gazeta.ru. 18 
March 2017, trans. A.Davis. https://m.gazeta.ru/army/news/9812987.shtml; (accessed: March 18, 2017) 
22 Amandine Regamey and Brandon M. Schechter, “Women in Arms: From the Russian Empire to Post-Soviet State”, 
The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 17, 2016. www.pipss.revues.org (accessed: June 20, 2017) 
23 TASS. http://tass.ru/info/4076669 (accessed: June1, 2017) 
24 https://russian.rt.com/article/306054-glava-mvd-rf-rossiiskie-zhenschiny-gotovy-sluzhit 
25 “Three Female Police Officers Help UN to Maintain Peace in Cyprus,” Russia Today, 12 March 2016, trans. A. Davis. 
https://russian.rt.com/article/153192 (accessed: June 1, 2017) 
26 “Women Employment Situation,” Tass, 8 March 2017, trans. A.Davis. http://tass.ru/info/4076669 






blacksmiths.27 These women become heroes and role models in Russian society. Overall, women in 
Russia are more educated than men: 37 percent of women have a university education, which is 8 
percent higher than among men. However, women still face discrimination in the workforce: women’s 
salary is typically 73 percent of the men’s earnings, depending on the career field.28 Staying true to the 
historical trend, when facing challenges and injustice, Russian women mobilize the masses to form 
national movements and forums that bring changes in the society, draw the attention of the international 
community, opening venues for cooperation. 
There are 2000 women’s organizations in Russia.29 Until recently, they operated in an “informational 
vacuum,” according to the Eurasian Women’s Forum, which became a platform and mechanism for 
network support of the women organizations. The Forum discusses issues of sustainable development of 
women initiatives, humanitarian relief, “empowerment of women in evolving economic context, 
politics, and social integration.”30 The Eurasian Women’s Forum works in cooperation with the ASIAN, 
Eurasian Economic Forum, The Commonwealth of Independent States and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization to address “both domestic and global challenges within the Eurasian space.”31 The Forum 
and its working groups became the driving force in articulating policies of the National Strategy of 
Actions in the Interests of Women, 2017-2022, signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 
Dmitriy Medvedev, on 8 March 2017.32 The adoption of the strategy will give a new impulse for the 
further participation of women in all areas of public life and increase women engagement in national and 
world peace and security processes. Russia has yet to join 63 nation-states, which have already adopted 
and successfully implement the National Action Plan to fulfill the provisions of  United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 WPS.33  The delay creates a perfect opportunity for nations leaders in WPS to 
assist Russia in the process, ensuring a successful integration of women in the decision-making and 
policy implementation process.  
Lastly, it is necessary to discuss a few venues and opportunities for cooperation with Russia through 
engaging women and entities where women are in leadership. Such collaboration is in our national 
interest and can contribute to the world peace and security. Education, science, arts, and technology do 
not have borders, and women have a presence and voice in all these spheres. Education in the spirit of 
patriotism, such as national youth movements, Yunarmia, founding military boarding schools for girls, 
and admitting girls and young women to military academies, cultivates pride in the national identity of a 
                                                           
27 “Free from Stereotypes. Women are Choosing Men’s Trades,” TASS, Special Project. trans. A.Davis.  
http://tass.ru/spec/woman-job (accessed: June 1, 2017) 
28 “Golodets: Women in Russia Are More Educated but Face Salary Discrimination,” TASS, 27 February 2017. trans. 
A.Davis. http://tass.ru/ekonomika/4053831 (accessed: June 15, 2017); Olga Golodets is the Deputy Speaker of the Federal 
Council of the Russian Federation.  
29 Eurasian Women’s Forum, http://eawf.ru/en/ (accessed: June 20, 2017) 
30 Ibid. 
31 Eurasian Women’s Forum, http://eawf.ru/en/ (accessed: June 20, 2017) 
32 The National Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Women 2017-2022 initiated by the Chair and a Spokesperson of 
the Federal Council of the Russian Federation  Lyudmila Matvienko. She oversees the work of the Forum and its working 
group. trans. A. Davis.http://eawfpress.ru/en/new-strategy-as-a-present-for-russian-women/ (accessed: June 20, 2017)   
33 InclusiveSecurity. Inclusive Security National Action Plan Resource Center . n.d. 
https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org/ (accessed: May 15, 2017). 
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country: its history, values, achievements, and traditions. Raising responsible and respectful citizens is 
beneficial to children and the society. However, when education is administered by propaganda, 
indoctrination on the borderline with nationalism, there is a direct threat to national and international 
peace and security. Professional exchanges of educators and students, international forums, such as the 
Eurasian Women’s Forum, and the sharing of innovative methodologies in education and leadership 
reflecting ideas regarding gender theories and their implementation in various spheres of influence are 
proven to promote good will and cooperation between nations.34   
Many UN agencies have representatives in the Russian Federation, who participate in the work of 
Theme Groups. There are seven working Theme Groups in Russia, which are established within the 
framework that supports the UN Resolution 1325. One of the groups is a Special North Caucasus Theme 
Group covering the full spectrum of humanitarian needs, recovery, and justice for victims of recent 
armed conflicts. The group is also focused on providing protection, relief, and recovery from traditional 
customs and practices (such as female genital mutilation practices in remote rural areas of Dagestan) 
that violate the dignity and endanger the lives of girls and women.35 Therefore, joint multinational 
efforts, certainly, are more effective in the implementation of WPS through DIME and the Four Pillars 
that support Resolution 1325.  
In conclusion, women’s leadership and influence in Russia affects both national and international peace 
and security. Although the role and participation of girls and women in all spheres of the society have 
evolved, empowerment of the female population and gender equality leaves much to be desired. The 
reasons for such a slow process of women integration and participation are societal genders bias, 
inconsistency in government’s policies, the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, advocating strict 
preservation of cultural traditions and norms, and economic challenges. When there is a lack of support 
from the government, historically, Russian women initiate the changes in the workforce and society, 
drawing attention to the needs and capabilities of women. Facing challenges, women remain resourceful, 
creative, resilient, and rely on the power of various women’s networks and organizations.  Russian 
women assume leadership of many entities, in government and non-government sectors, opening a 
variety of venues for cooperation with the international community, which in turn contributes to national 






                                                           
34 Eurasian Women’s Forum, 2015, http://eawf.ru/en/press/1849/ 
35 UN Russia, Theme Groups, http://www.unrussia.ru/en/groups; (accessed: 20 June 2017).  
Aso see Eto Kavkaz (This is Caucasus), 18 August 2016 https://etokavkaz.ru/news/13435 (accessed: 20 June2017).  
Site and report of Stitching Russian Justice Initiative (SRJI). http://www.srji.org/en/ (accessed 10 May 2017). SRJI and its 
partner organizations utilize domestic and international legal mechanisms to seek justice for grave human rights violations in 
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A LEGACY OF PARTICIPATION: HOW SERBIAN 
WOMEN CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THEIR INCLUSION 
AND CREATE LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY 
Nikoleta Sremac 
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1990, Yugoslavia was on the brink of a decade-long civil war that would tear the 
country apart, leaving thousands dead and millions displaced. Unnoticed by most, this was also 
the month that the country’s rate of female political participation dropped dramatically to only 
1.6%, one of the lowest in the world. For scholars and practitioners of “women, peace, and 
security,” however, Serbia is a remarkable case study through which to examine the relationships 
between gender inclusion, political ideology, government structure and cultural change. Rooted 
in a history of female participation and an emphasis on equality and inclusion during the 
communist era, the collapse of the dictatorship of Josip Broz Tito and his socialist ideology left a 
political vacuum that was filled by nationalist propaganda and aggression. The rise of macho 
political mentality also meant a reappearance of hegemonic masculinity in Serbian society and 
culture, coinciding with the low rate of female political participation during the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic.  
Following his ouster in 2000, Serbia has opened itself to the West, established democracy and a 
free market, and sought to reconnect to other European states. Rebuilding from a strong 
historical legacy of female participation in the Communist era, Serbian women have established 
themselves again as a cornerstone of the country’s new democracy, with rates of participation 
climbing to 34% in 2017. Thanks also in part to external actors like the UN, EU, and 
international NGOs, additional structural changes have been achieved, including increased 
female participation in security forces, gender quotas for parliamentary parties, and two National 
Action Plans for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and 
security. 
However, structural reform must also be supported by cultural beliefs, and in Serbia’s case, 
culture has been slow to change. “Macho” values persist throughout society and manifest 
themselves in conditions such as a persistent pay gap, traditional gender roles at home, and the 
“tokenization” of female politicians. These attitudes can be challenged through education, 
national dialogue about these issues, and changed media portrayals. In Serbia, a combination of 
cultural and structural reforms is needed to promote a robust democracy, an inclusive 
environment for all and bolstered prospects for peace and stability throughout the region. 
This working paper presents the findings of a series of personal interviews with Serbs both in- 
and out-of-country from various relevant sectors who shared their unique perspectives on the 
role of women in Serbia’s peace and security processes moving forward. Their views are a mix 
of optimism and pessimism, and shed light on both the successes of structural change and the 
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challenges of cultural shifts. The case of Serbia’s combined efforts in this field deserves close 
attention because it has broad implications for the region, for women in post-conflict societies, 
and because it can define how others tackle these challenges in the 21st century. 
II. A HISTORY OF FEMALE PARTICIPATION: SERBIAN WOMEN IN COMMUNISM
AND NATIONALISM
While it is true that Serbia has always had a “traditional” culture in terms of gender roles and 
“macho” values that persists today, it has also had a strong history of women’s participation in 
politics and society that should not be discounted. Every single respondent, at the beginnings of 
our interviews, framed Serbia’s current situation of gender inclusion as being firmly rooted in the 
post-World War II, communist era lasting until the late 1980s. They pointed out that after World 
War II, women were actually “rewarded” for their participation in the fight against fascism and 
the rebuilding of the country with equal rights.1 One of the “missions on paper” during the 
communist times was equality for everyone, and especially to include women equally in society 
and in education.2 In such senses as voting rights, inheritance laws, and pay, women were equal 
during the Tito regime. They were roughly equally represented within the work force and 
“women comrades were equal to male comrades.”3 Even in the Communist government, women 
were prominently ranked within the party and occupied important positions. Respondents 
pointed out that this “legacy of communism” with its emphasis on equality and participation is 
often not recognized in external narratives about Serbian history.4  
This legacy of equality and participation has paved the way for women’s inclusion today, even 
though it took a sharp dive during the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s—at least on 
paper. When asked about Milosevic’s rise to power, interviewees recall that his aggressively 
nationalist and violent policies also coincided with their memories of male-dominated 
suppression overtaking political and cultural life. It was in the elections of 1990 under that 
regime that female parliamentary participation fell to the lowest rate in Europe at 1.6%.5  
However, as former Member of Parliament Milica Delevic pointed out, there is a difference 
between a “formal way of wielding power and informal way of wielding power.”6 She describes 
how the wife of Slobodan Milosevic, Mirjana Marković, was a prominent political figure in her 
own right and was even the leader of Milosevic’s rival party, the “Yugoslav Left.” Delevic 
herself, the former wife of Belgrade mayor and opposition leader Dragan Đilas, was a leader of 
the protest movements against the Milosevic regime together with her former husband. Vice 
Chair of Inclusive Security Miroslav “Miki” Jacevic, told a similar story about a high degree of 
women’s participation during the 1990s, and explained how this represented a direct and 
paradoxical contrast to the “macho” nationalism of Milosevic, which emphasized women’s 
1 Dragana Milojevic, email interview with author, May 3, 2017.   
2 Gabor Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA, April 25, 2017.  
3 Dragana Milojevic.  
4 Milica Delevic, phone interview with author, May 18, 2017. 
5 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, “Women’s Parliamentary Network of Serbia,” October 10, 
2014, http://www.womeninparliaments.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Serbia-WPN-Wasington.pdf. 
6 Milica Delevic. 
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passive roles as “carriers of the nation.”7 He spoke about organizations like Women in Black and 
others that led women in resistance to not only Milosevic’s regime, including its suppression of 
women’s rights, but also to the nationalism and militarism overtaking the country.8 This legacy 
of female participation is therefore key to understanding the current situation and how 
representation has “risen” so high—it has actually historically been quite high, though in 
different ways. 
III. SERBIAN POLITICS TODAY: EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION, EXTERNAL
RELATIONS AND GENDER REFORM
In 2000, major democratic changes in Serbia are also the starting point for security sector 
reforms (SSR), including gender integration of police, security and military forces.9 After the 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was signed in 2006, the process began to create Serbia’s 
first National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace and Security.10 Throughout the process of National Action Plan adoption and 
implementation, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were crucial in pushing for reform and 
publicizing their efforts, along with a government working group comprised of representatives 
from various ministries. The first Serbian National Action Plan 1325 was adopted in December 
of 2010 for the period of 2010-2015, and is unique among NAPs in that it is sponsored by the 
Ministry of Defense rather than other ministries that commonly administer National Action Plans 
such as gender ministries or ministries of the interior.11  
Other major “gender and security” laws were adopted in 2009 during the first generation of 
gender reforms, including the Law on Gender Equality and the Anti-Discrimination Law, which 
contain broad-based and urgent reforms prohibiting gender-based discrimination and mandating 
equal access to opportunities across all sectors.12 It also requires all public and official statistics 
to be gender-disaggregated and calls on mass media to actively work to change gendered cultural 
norms and stereotypes.13 In May of 2017, Serbia’s second National Action Plan 1325 was 
approved by the Cabinet to build upon the work already being accomplished.  
Another political process occurring in Serbia today that overlaps in many ways with gender 
integration is its goal of joining the European Union. The EU has bolstered progress by including 
related provisions in its accession criteria, encouraging Serbia to take on more inclusive policies 
in order to meet them. It has also contributed funding, investing €3 billion in Serbia since 2001—
7 Mirsad “Miki” Jacevic, phone interview with author, May 4, 2017. 
8 Žene u Crnom Beograd, http://zeneucrnom.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory 
&id=2&Itemid=4.   
9 Maja Bjeloš, “Monitoring and Measuring Progress in Implementation UNSCR 1325 in Serbia,” Belgrade 
Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), http://www.osce.org/secretariat/110559?download=true. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Alexandra Amling and Marie O’Reilly, From Global Promise to National Action: Advancing Women, Peace, 
and Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Philippines, Serbia, and Sierra Leone (Washington, D.C.: 
One Earth Future Foundation and Inclusive Security, 2016), https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/GlobalPromise_NationalAction_Digital_rev.pdf.  
12 Bjeloš, “Monitoring and Measuring Progress.” 
13 Ibid.  
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the equivalent of €400/citizen.14 Serbia was the first country outside of the EU to adopt the “EU 
Index for Gender Equality,” which assigned it a rating of 40.6% (the EU-28 Member States 
rating is 52.9%). Serbia’s highest ratings were in the domain of power at the national level, while 
its lowest were in the domains of work and money. Former Director of the EU Integration Office 
Milica Delevic agrees that EU accession contributed to greater gender inclusion, but also points 
out that gender inclusion “has never been a serious impediment for European Integration because 
it was not at a very low level where the Commission would have reprimanded us. When it comes 
to inclusion, it was mostly about sexual minorities, Roma, national minorities, disabled… those 
are the conditions I was worried about.”  
Other respondents, however, had a more negative perception on the relationship between these 
two goals—that gender inclusion is a priority pushed on to the country by external actors, and 
not because citizens and internal actors truly “buy in” to its importance. They claim that these 
goals are not true priorities but are merely tools used by the government to gain funding or favor 
in EU accession talks15 Gabor Sines, former student protest organizer during the Milosevic 
regime in Belgrade, cautions even more strongly that “the biggest danger… is trying to 
institutionalize equality.” External parties may not see the potential for entrenched cultural 
backlash towards inclusion to threaten their visions of change.16 
They also point out that external researchers and policymakers often ask Serbians to help others 
without acknowledging their own continuing struggles as a nation. Being asked to consider 
issues of inclusion and equality may feel like a luxury when faced with rising unemployment, 
economic disparity, ethnic tension, and political turmoil. Serbians also often feel that they were 
villainized by the rest of the world, which results in a distrust of foreign intervention. Natasa Kis-
Sines, former student protest organizer and current social worker, says: 
The suffering and what these people are going through… it hasn’t been acknowledged. 
There is so much blame and shame put on these people. So unless you acknowledge that 
suffering and pain, you cannot start having those conversations with people about 
helping others… People have to say “this is what happened to us, and this is what we 
need to do for others.”17 
V. IMPACTS SO FAR AND CURRENT STATUS OF GENDERED POLICY AND
POLITICS
Though Serbia still has milestones to reach in terms of structural progress for women, the 
country has made tremendous strides politically by many measures, and these gains have 
influenced the culture and mindset of the people as well—therefore ensuring the country’s 
lasting democratization. During the parliamentary elections held on May 6th, 2012, a gender 
quota system was introduced that required one third of all candidates to be women, and they 
14 “Serbia: On the Path Towards the EU,” European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
European Commission, June 12, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/serbia-
factograph.pdf.   
15 Dragana Milojevic, email interview with author, May 3, 2017.   
16 Gabor Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA, April 25, 2017.  
17 Natasa Kis-Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA April 25, 2017. 
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were elected to 84 out of 250 seats, therefore dramatically increasing their political 
representation.18 An informal “Women’s Parliamentary Network” was also formed at that time to 
promote women in politics and occasionally to “propose joint amendments specifically 
addressing women’s issues.”19 
The parliamentary quotas were extremely important for female MPs, even though there was 
resistance to them. Milica Delevic reflected that “once these quotas were introduced for MPs I 
actually benefited from that, because I can imagine that I never would have been ranked so high 
on the parliamentary list.”20 However, Sofija Mandic, legal researcher at the Belgrade Center for 
Security Policy (BCSP), points out that there has also been resistance and that norms and biases 
are slow to change, where “MPs have accepted the quota amendment as the necessary evil and 
they voted under their parties’ directions, not out of a true understanding of the need to make 
sure that the underrepresented gender should increase their presence minimally in the 
Parliament… The women MPs are often times forced to vote following the party command, and 
not according to their opinions and consciences.21 
Nonetheless, respondents agree that as their numbers have increased, and as now a third session 
of parliament contains a higher percentage of women, female politicians have become more 
comfortable and active, and cultural norms have also begun to change.22 Women are increasingly 
represented in departments that were previously considered “male domains” such as defense, 
police, border security, and infrastructure committees.23 As gendered policies and women’s 
political positions have begun to change, public perceptions of their roles in the Serbian culture 
and mentality will also be impacted. However, lasting cultural norms remain that are oppressive 
to women and which can be seen in the workplace, in the home and in the tabloid-ridden media.  
VI. Serbian Culture Today: Traditional Gender Roles in Work, Home and in the Media
Although a great deal of structural change has been achieved in Serbian policy and legislature, 
true progress will not be achieved until there are parallel cultural shifts as well—and Serbian 
culture has always been “traditional” and patriarchal in terms of gender roles, even during the 
communist era with its emphasis on equality. Many respondents identified a “macho” value 
system in Serbian culture, which manifests itself in the workplace, in home and family life, and 
in media portrayals. These elements impede on progress either by preventing structural or 
legislative changes to be passed in the first place, or even when structural change is achieved, 
longstanding cultural beliefs and values prevent them from being truly enforced.24  
18 “WPN Serbia – Four Years of Activity and Results,” National Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Women 
Parliamentary Network, February 2, 2017, https://wpnserbia.wordpress.com/2017/02/14/wpn-serbia-four-years-of-
activity-and-results/.  
19 Sofija Mandic, email interview with author, May 30, 2017 [trans. from Serbian]. 
20 Milica Delevic.  
21 Sofija Mandic.  
22 Ibid; Milica Delevic; Miki Jacevic.  
23 Miki Jacevic.  
24 Sofija Mandic.  
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For example, according to Dragana Milojevic, a social services employee in Belgrade, “in 
general, men take the better paid positions and women take the less paid ones. Women take lots 
of jobs in government, organizations as well in social services. So, even though there is a Gender 
Equality Law that was enacted, the implementation of it runs into obstacles at every step.”25 
Another example of failure to implement policies was raised in regard to the country’s generous 
parental leave policies, a legacy of socialism which many respondents mentioned as evidence 
towards a high degree of gender equality.26 However, one respondent told a story about her right 
to this policy being completely disrespected by her male boss, who threatened her into 
continuing to work for his privately-owned company even while on maternity leave.27 At home, 
women still face disproportionate expectations in terms of childcare and housework, especially 
in rural areas, where “the expectation is that even though a women graduates from University, 
she is going to take on the full house work; there is no sharing of household chores with men.”28  
Another contributing factor raised in almost every interview are the extremely popular and 
largely government-controlled tabloids of Serbian media, which promote a solely sexual and 
objectified view of women including “sensationalist reporting of domestic violence cases.” True 
inclusion and peace in Serbia will not be achieved until media and education emphasizes these 
values—resulting in cultural shifts along with structural reforms.  
VII. CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD
Many surprising facts have become clear in the course of discussions with the wide 
variety of remarkable actors that make up the story of gender, peace and security in Serbia. One 
is the collective pride that female and male activists, practitioners and experts feel about the 
progress that has been made in achieving true inclusion of women in Serbian society. When 
asked about remaining impediments or statistics about women’s status, most interviewees 
redirected conversations to focus on the progress that has been made. When asked about recent 
history and the political suppression of women during the Milosevic era, respondents 
overwhelmingly made the immediate correction that the story of women’s participation in Serbia 
starts long before then—with a history of strong Yugoslav women exercising their power, 
whether informally or formally, throughout the communist times of the 20th century and even 
before that.  
It must also be acknowledged that there are lasting improvements yet to be made in the 
Serbian way of thinking which is still so dominated by “traditional values” and patriarchy. This 
is evidenced by pay gaps in work, discrimination in workplaces and in formal culture and 
economy, media portrayals of women as sex objects, gender-based and domestic violence, and 
25 Ibid. 
26 Serbia has one of the top five most generous parental leave policies in the world, with 52 weeks of leave and 
100% of wages paid during that time. By comparison, the U.S. is in the bottom five with no guaranteed paid 
maternity leave. See Taline McPhedran, “Best and Worst Maternity Leave Policies Around the World,” CTV News, 
April 11, 2016, http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/best-and-worst-maternity-leave-policies-around-the-world-1.2854349; 
Chris Weller, “These 10 Countries Have the Best Parental Leave Policies in the World,” Business Insider, August 
22, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/countries-with-best-parental-leave-2016-8/#finland-1; Dunja Milosevic, 
email interview with author, May 10, 2017; Izabela Sremac, email interview with author, April 4, 2017. 
27 Izabela Sremac. 
28 Ibid.  
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by persistent gender roles that dictate women’s places and spaces within home and family life. 
However, the country also endured a catastrophic, tragic civil war and a little over a decade later, 
boasted one of the highest rates of female political participation in the world. As Miki Jacevic 
says, “as somebody who has lived through that war, I just don’t buy that narrative that nothing’s 
working in Serbia, or even in Bosnia. I lived through ‘nothing is working’… But, at the same 
time, what I do see, is when I do go to Leskovac, and 100 men and women show up to talk about 
security through a gender lens. That came out of something… I always say I’m more curious 
about why these things work.”29  
Clearly, in Serbia, there is a great deal that is working. As gender advocates and scholars all over 
the world, we must pay attention to the remarkable progress achieved by this small country 
against all odds, and in the face of violent division and aggressive nationalism. Change takes 
time, but it is happening in Serbia—both through sometimes small, but significant structural and 
political achievements as well as through cultural shifts occurring through a vibrant engagement 
with civil society and education that is also slowly changing the mindsets of the people. As 
Gabor Sines aptly concluded, “Equality, it’s not about percentage. It’s about some kind of inner 
change. It’s going to take generations. One man at a time. Or woman, it doesn’t matter.”30  
29 Miki Jacevic. 




AN ANALYSIS ON SEXUAL 
TERRORISM IN AFRICA 
Winona Hudak 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
George Kimble, an early twentieth century geographer, once said that “the darkest thing about 
Africa has always been our ignorance of it.1” That statement is as true today as it was when Mr. 
Kimble said it over a hundred years ago; the world continues to bask in its blissful ignorance of 
the problems rampant throughout Africa while the continent suffers alone in darkness.  
Africa is the second largest continent and hosts 16% of the world’s population2; yet, it hosts the 
sickest and poorest people, the most corrupt governments, and the deadliest conflicts. Although 
all of Africa’s problems need to be addressed, the most prevalent and, arguably, the most 
dangerous problem is the growing rise of terrorist groups throughout the continent. These groups 
arise “whenever and wherever there are serious discontents which complainants consider 
unaddressed or ignored.3” Usually, but not always, these groups exploit religion “to attract 
attention even when the main complaint is not religious;” however, these groups take advantage 
of that chaos and then religion is blamed for the disturbance4.  
Boko Haram, for example, is an African militant Islamic group, that claimed over 11,000 lives in 
2015, and has been labeled the deadliest terrorist organization currently in operation5; yet, the 
world’s headlines are littered with the exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 
Although ISIL is dangerous and a threat to international security, the death toll from their 
exploits primarily stems from combat. On the other hand, Boko Haram and the other African 
terrorist groups target civilians. In fact, many of the victims of these African terrorist groups are 
women and children, who face a constant threat of death. However, death is no longer the only 
threat. 
In recent years, African terrorist groups have added another tactic of terror into their arsenals – 
sexual terrorism. Sexual terrorism, also known as a Rape Jihad, is a “practice executed in the 
1 "George Kimble Quotes." ThinkExist.com. ThinkExist, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017. 
2 Boyes, Steve. "Getting to Know Africa: 50 Interesting Facts…." National Geographic Society. National 
Geographic Society, 25 Aug. 2014. Web. 08 May 2017. 
3 Nzwili, Fredrick. "Africa's Islamic Extremist Groups Are on the Rise." The Washington Post. WP Company, 
29 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Smith, Alex. "ISIS Owns Headlines, but Nigeria's Boko Haram Kills More Than Ever." NBCNews.com. 
NBCUniversal News Group, 01 Jan. 2016. Web. 08 May 2017. 
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name of a state, an oppositional entity, or their surrogates as part of a political, racial, religious, 
or ethnic armed conflict.6”. It involves a wide range of practices including forced marriage, rape, 
gang rape, forced impregnation, and sexual mutilation7. A component of a total war campaign, 
African terrorist groups use sexual terrorism for five main reasons: ideology, propaganda, 
indiscriminate amoral violence, voluntary compliance, and societal perceptions of terrorists and 
the terrorized8.  
Unfortunately, much like Africa’s other problems, the international community has sparsely 
addressed the increasing use of sexual terrorism by African terrorist groups and has been slow to 
react despite overwhelming evidence regarding the severity of the issue. The United Nations 
(UN) has passed six resolutions in the last twenty years on the subject, and even those only 
include international outrage and allocation for medical assistance9. The United Nations Office 
for Sexual Violence in Conflict has issued no reports, resolutions, or communiques regarding 
sexual terrorism in Africa since 201410. If the international community remains ignorant of 
Africa’s growing problem of sexual terrorism, women and children, especially, will continue to 
suffer in darkness facing the bleak future as unwilling brides.  
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SEXUAL TERRORISM 
Although sexual terrorism is a major problem on the African continent, Africa’s terrorist groups 
were not the first to utilize it. In fact, sexual terrorism is a “worldwide phenomenon with historic 
roots” reaching back to the Bible and Greek and Roman history11. Throughout the Bible, there 
are many instances of sexual terrorism including the rape of women in conquered villages, 
‘marriage’ to female captives, and the gang rape of those captives12. Similarly, the Greeks and 
Romans “wholly accepted rape as a common practice in warfare and captive women came to 
expect this a consequence of defeat.13” 
Sexual terrorism has been used for centuries but, it finds its most barbaric expression during war, 
especially under conditions of modern ‘total war’14. The term total war was coined during the 
Second Seminole War of 1840-1842 where William Tecumseh Sherman told his troops that they 
not only fought hostile armies, but also hostile people15. Mr. Sherman further stated that the 
                                                      
6 Rosen, David. "Sexual Terrorism." The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and Sexuality Studies 
(2016): 1-2. Web. 08 May 2017.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Stock, W. E. "PUBLICATIONS." NCJRS Abstract - National Criminal Justice Reference Service. National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1991. Web. 08 May 2017. 
9 "Resolutions Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict." United Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017. 
10 "Home Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict." United 
Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017. 
11 Rosen, David. 
12 Gafney, Ph.D. Rev. Wil. "God, the Bible, and Rape." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 15 Jan. 
2013. Web. 08 May 2017. 
13 Attah, Christiana E. "Boko Haram and Sexual Terrorism: The Conspiracy of Silence of the Nigerian Anti-
terrorism Laws." African Human Rights Law Journal. University of Pretoria, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017. 




soldiers must make the “young, rich and poor, feel the hard hands of war”16 by rendering war 
unappealing through whatever means necessary. Mr. Sherman’s concept of total war provided 
the basis for the modern-day definition of sexual terrorism. Today, terrorist groups believe that 
sexual terrorism serves the dual purpose of spoils and as a means of making the populace feel the 
hard hands of war.  
Sexual terrorism hit its peak following the end of World War II in 1945. Peace was expected to 
emerge and, yet, modern terrorism found its foothold on the fragile cliff of global peace. 
Although terrorism can be traced back just as far as war, modern terrorism is different “due to its 
global visibility, aided by the availability of sophisticated weapons, money, and the revolution in 
the information communication technology.17” As such, terrorist groups have been able to adapt 
and utilize different techniques that incite terror among their enemies. One such adaptation is the 
inclusion of sexual terrorism in their campaigns of total war.18 The upsurge in global terrorism is 
a direct link to the increasing use of sexual terrorism, evidenced by the atrocities of the of 
Bosnian War in the early 1990’s and those of the Rwandan Genocide in 199419. While by no 
means exhaustive, those two incidents demonstrate how terrorists have branched from traditional 
terrorism techniques to include sexual terrorism as a means of total war.  
III. MOTIVATIONS OF SEXUAL TERRORISM 
African terrorist groups, like Boko Haram and the FDLR, use sexual terrorism as a tool in their 
total war campaign for many reason: ideology, propaganda, indiscriminate amoral violence, 
voluntary compliance, and societal perceptions of terrorists and the terrorized20. 
These terrorist groups justify the use of sexual terrorism based on their ideological preferences. 
For example, members of these terrorist groups have the: incorrectly-held general belief that rape 
committed during wars and conflicts are pardonable and natural as 'a byproduct of wartime 
activity, as ‘collateral damage’ and ‘spoils of war’, not as a violation of humanitarian law'. 
Terrorists have also realized that rape can be used effectively as a weapon of terror, without 
attracting any legal penalty, even in the midst of existing laws which criminalize and prescribe 
penalties for rape21.  
Sadly, this mindset is prevalent among the African terrorist groups that utilize sexual terrorism. 
Women are no longer people but, rather, “mere toys in the hands of soldier boys” who can use 
their toys as part a badge of their victory22. Although these groups know that sexual terrorism is 
outlawed, they continue to perpetuate the terror. These groups know that there are almost no 
repercussions for their actions and, even if there were repercussions, these soldiers see sexual 
terrorism as a right bestowed upon them by their religious affiliations or mystic leanings. Boko 
Haram, for example, subscribes to the radical Islamic followings of ISIL who twists the Qur’ans 
                                                      
16 Ibid. 
17 Attah. 
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teachings to sanction the rape of Kafirs, or infidels, and non-practicing or lax-practicing 
Muslims. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), on the other hand, 
believe that raping women will allow their magic potions to work against their enemies. As such, 
the FDLR believe that they must rape as many women as possible or their enemies will not be 
vanquished.  Regardless of the ideological justifications, religion, magic, or otherwise, sexual 
terrorism is “one of the most horrific weapons of war” and the “most intimate of violations” 
against women23. 
Sexual terrorism is also used as a propaganda tool to entice new recruits into these organizations. 
It is the belief in these terrorist groups that “sexual violence is necessary to serve as a morale 
booster for the troops and to keep soldiers happy.24” Of the 1.1 billion people in Africa, 52% of 
the population is under the age of twenty-five, making it the world’s youngest region25. Despite 
the young population, most the region is either unemployed or working at poverty rates; in fact, 
70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s working youth lives in extreme or moderate poverty or at less than 
$3.10 a day26. The region continues to report the highest youth working poverty rates globally27. 
As a result, many men are enticed into terrorist groups with the promise of escaping the poverty 
that runs rampant amongst the young people.  
In addition to poverty, religion plays a determinative role in whether young men join terrorist 
groups. Islam and Christianity are prevalent among Africans; the two faiths have approximately 
900 million followers throughout the continent28. As such, many followers subscribe to each 
religion’s abstinence doctrine which requires the follower to refrain from sexual activity until the 
bounds of matrimony. Knowing this doctrine, terrorist groups exploit the sexual frustration of the 
youth by offering young women as ‘brides’ to slack their unspent lust. Therefore, terrorist groups 
use sexual terrorism to entice new recruits with the promise of better lives – ones without abject 
poverty and sexual frustration.  
Indiscriminate amoral violence is another motivating factor for the use of sexual terrorism by 
terrorist groups. These groups have discovered that rape as a tactic of terrorism is a “relatively 
cheaper means of achieving their aims and it does not require the purchase or use of guns and 
bullets on enemy targets, yet its effects on the victims are no less devastating.29” In fact, terrorist 
use of sexual terrorism is:  
 




26 "Youth Unemployment Challenge Worsening in Africa." World Employment and Social Outlook 2016: 
Trends for Youth: Youth Unemployment Challenge Worsening in Africa. International Labor Organization, 24 Aug. 
2016. Web. 08 May 2017. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Liu, Joseph. "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa." Pew Research Center's 




an effort to dehumanize and defeat the enemy, leaving an entire society with long-term suffering 
as victims cascade across generational divides. The scourge of rape as a weapon, affects not only 
the individual lives of the victims, but the entire family and community in which they live. 
Leaving their lasting marks on the entire country's civil society, this in turn affects our globalized 
world30. 
These groups’ aim is to incite as much fear as possible and the most effective means to do so is 
with the “one weapon all men carry and more often use” – their manhood31.  
Sexual terrorism uses indiscriminate, amoral violence to garner voluntary compliance from the 
terrorized. The FDLR, for example, have no qualms about the age of their victims – they have 
raped babies as young as two and grandmothers as old as eighty32. The FDLR will gang rapes its 
victims, force family members to watch, and, continually, mutilate their bodies33. The public 
display of sexual terrorism and subsequent mutilations are messages to fall in line or face the 
same fate – a fate, to some, worse than death.  
Lastly, sexual terrorism manipulates African perceptions of terrorists and the terrorized. Sexual 
terrorism reduces women to mere pawns in the hands of the perpetrators who are then used to 
send powerful messages to the opposing political leaders to accede to the demands of the 
group.34 This tactic becomes most effective because of: the high premium placed on the chastity 
of women by most societies. The act of rape, therefore, humiliates not only the women but also 
the male members of society who are portrayed as incapable of protecting their women.35 
An accurate numerical representation of the sexual terrorism throughout Africa is unknown. 
Many attacks go unreported because the victims are threatened by their attackers, deterring 
victims reporting36. Additionally, victims are often held in shame and are frequently ostracized 
by their families and communities37. Another problem is the lack of medical care in the region; 
many victims develop serious medical complications and frequently die from their wounds due 
to the lack of accessible medical care38. If the victims do not die from their wounds, they are 
ostracized due to their lack of chastity, STIs or HIV/AIDS infections, and bearing enemy 
offspring39.  
 
                                                      
30 Ibid. 
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Rights Watch, 02 July 2015. Web. 08 May 2017. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Holmes, John. "Congo's Rape War." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 11 Oct. 2007. Web. 10 May 
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IV. BOKO HARAM 
On April 14, 2014, members of the extremist Islamic group, Boko Haram, stormed the Chibok 
secondary school in Borno, the Northern portion of Nigeria, and forced 276 students onto a 
convoy of trucks; 113 of those students have never been seen again40. While heavily publicized, 
the Chibok kidnapping is not the first of Boko Haram’s sexual terrorism campaign; in fact, 
according to an Amnesty International report, an estimated 2,000 women and girls have been 
abducted since 201441. What happens to these women once abducted is not entirely clear; 
however, Boko Haram’s leader, Abubaker Shekau, has stated that God has instructed him to sell 
these girls42.  
Ryan Cummings, a member of the Nigerian Security Network, believes the Chibok girls, like the 
other abducted women, "were probably divided up and sent to various areas"43. Mr. Cummings 
continues to say that: a large number of them have perhaps been married off to Boko Haram 
combatants [and, there is] a possibility that some of them may have been subject to human 
trafficking. [Additionally], some of them may have been deployed as potential suicide bombers 
or made to assume other logistical, operational roles in the Boko Haram war machine44.  
Regardless of which path these girls were forced, it is evident that Boko Haram is using sexual 
terrorism to fulfill their primary motivations – generating revenue, enticing recruits, and 
decimating communities.  
Boko Haram is primarily funded as a direct result of crime: bank robberies and drugs45. 
However, abductions have become a major source of funding in terms of monetary means, 
governmental concessions, and fear46. The abductions of the Chibok girls are no different. Boko 
Haram first tried to broker a deal for the return of the girls with the Red Cross, on behalf of the 
Nigerian government, in September of 201447. Yet, the deal fell through when Boko Haram 
demanded the release of prisoners the Nigerian government did not have48. On April 9, 2016, 
Boko Haram released a ‘proof of life’ video, shot on December 25, 2015, that features what 
appears to be fifteen of the Chibok girls49. This is the first time in almost two years that any 
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evidence of their well-being has been recovered50. On May 6, 2017, eighty-two of the missing 
girls were released in exchange for captured members of Boko Haram; however, the fate of 113 
girls remains a mystery51 
It is believed that some of the girls have been given to existing militants as ‘brides’. These brides 
are repeatedly gang raped for months, and beaten if they become pregnant52. The girls who have 
lost their value are then sold to other militants as sexual slaves in order to fund the Boko Haram 
terror machine and are rarely seen again53. These girls and women are sold for a nominal bride 
price of $12 USD54, suggesting that Boko Haram’s main objective is to demoralize the 
conquered55 rather than increase their coffers. In fact, Boko Haram often uses their captives as 
suicide bombers; women who gladly volunteer to die in order to be free from their sexual 
prisons.  
It is also hypothesized that these girls are being used to lure new recruits. In their recruitment 
materials, Boko Haram promises sexual access to women and children which, unfortunately, has 
been a relatively successful inducement56. Nigeria is an oil-rich country that is one of the richest 
in sub-Saharan Africa; however, 70% of the population lives off less than $1/day57. Boko Haram, 
like other terrorist groups, promises a way out of the abject poverty and the additional enticement 
of sex from the girls proves too strong for many young, religious men to resist.  
While some consider the actions of Boko Haram to be human trafficking, Boko Haram’s sexual 
terrorism aims to decimate the community so they may rule the area themselves; as such, Boko 
Haram’s actions are much more terrifying. Since the start of its campaign, Boko Haram has 
displaced 2.6 million people who fear rape, sexual violence, slavery, and death58. Those who 
remain, withdraw their daughters from school, and encourage them to marry and leave the area59. 
Additionally, those who stay, are forcibly converted and recruited, or killed for their defiance60. 
As of 2017, approximately 20,000 civilians have been killed in Boko Haram controlled areas61. 
However, due to their nomadic nature and the lack of reliable information on their travels, the 
death count attributed to Boko Haram could be much higher than reported. Regardless of the 
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actual death count, Boko Haram has left a path of destruction, and darkness, in its wake that 
cannot be tamed without the assistance of the international community. 
V. DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR) 
Every hour, forty-eight women are raped in the Democratic Republic of Congo making it the 
rape capital of the world62. In the last two decades, horrific levels of sexual terrorism have 
plagued the country. Tens of thousands of people have suffered sexual violence at the hands of 
terrorist groups like the FDLR; however, the exact number of victims remains unknown63. 
Although sexual terrorism is rampant in the Congo by several groups, the FDLR are the most 
prolific in the region.  
The FDLR first began in the early 1990’s as a Rwandan Hutu extremist faction. They are the 
group directly responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and continue to fight against the 
Congolese government in one the bloodiest civil wars in history64. Today the FDLR is an exiled 
terrorist group comprised of key members from the Rwandan genocide, Hutu members from the 
Rwandan army, and some displaced Rwandan Hutus. In their fight against the Tutsi-dominated 
government in Rwanda and the transitional Congolese government, the FDLR has “used rape as 
a weapon of war to ‘punish’ civilians belonging to a particular ethnic group, or those accused of 
supporting the enemy.65”  
Although both groups employ sexual terrorism, the FDLR differs from Boko Haram due to the 
sheer magnitude of the incidents and the brutality of the violence66. It is estimated that “13% of 
[FDLR] victims are under the age of fourteen, 3% die as a result of the rape, 10-12% contract 
HIV/AIDS” and countless others are impregnated67.  
Similar to Boko Haram, the FDLR has many motivations for the use of sexual terrorism in their 
campaigns of total war. However, their main motivation is to use sexual terrorism as a tool “to 
win and maintain authority over civilians in territories occupied by rebel groups.68” In 2010, it is 
reported that the FDLR committed 15,000 rapes during a brutal civil war in the Kivus region69. 
As such, these women were no longer human but, rather, “legitimate military targets” that need 
to be vanquished in the FDLR’s fight to garner power over a weak state’s abundance of mineral 
wealth70. Additionally, the rapes were committed to “humiliate the community for their ‘support’ 
of the Congolese government.71” 
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Not only have the FDLR surpassed Boko Haram in terms of volume of sexual terrorist attacks, 
they also are far more brutal than their counterparts. While Boko Haram employs most of the 
same techniques in their campaign of sexual terrorism, the FDLR’s techniques are more violent. 
While Boko Haram’s use of sexual terrorism against the Chibok girls is terrible, their cruelty 
dims when compared to the atrocities of the FDLR. One women reported that she was tied to a 
tree and raped by five men while her husband and children were forced to watch72. She says that 
she got one hand free and, while a soldier was on top of her, he cut it off with his machete73. 
Another woman recounts her story where she was gang raped by eleven men in front of her 
husband and, once they were done, she was forced to watch while the soldiers cut him into 
pieces74. She goes on to explain that the soldiers also forced her to eat some of her husband’s 
body parts before they raped her again75. These two instances are just a fraction of the FDLR’s 
brutality which will continue as long as the FDLR wishes to exert its control over the people and 
without viable actions to stop them.  
Even though sexual terrorism through Africa is an epidemic, the violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is cancerous. The FDLR is more voluminous and violent in its attacks of 
sexual terrorism and the number of affected women continues to rise. Until the international 
community offers more than legal or medical aid, the problem of sexual terrorism in the Congo 
will remain unhindered and continue to grow.  
VI. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
Overall, the international response to the epidemic of sexual terrorism in Africa has been slow 
and minimal. From 2000-2017, the United Nations (UN) has passed six resolutions condemning 
sexual terrorism in the African region. The last resolution on the subject was passed in 2015.  
These resolutions offer, primarily, legal and medical solutions to a rapidly growing problem. The 
first of these resolutions S/RES/1325, the premier resolution, was passed in 2000 and called for 
increased HIV awareness among survivors of sexual terrorism76. The following four resolutions 
(S/RES/1820, S/RES/1888, S/RES/1960, and S/RES/2106) all call for the countries to strengthen 
their rule of law, provide more police vigilance, and establish medical assistance for survivors77. 
The resolution with the most clout is the 2015 Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2242. 
S/RES/2242 tries to address the main cause of sexual terrorism – terrorism – by offering vague 
solutions. S/RES/2242 is the most popular Security Council Resolution ever drafted and was 
unanimously approved by the Security Council and all other members of the UN78. Despite its 
overwhelming support, S/RES/2242, offers little to African governments who require viable and 
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concrete solutions to the problem of sexual terrorism. Furthermore, S/RES/2242 is too little too 
late, especially in terms of the Congo, whose problem with sexual terrorism is terminal without 
the right treatment. Unfortunately, the international response, thus far, is not the right treatment 
for Africa. 
 In addition to the lack of response by the UN, the United Nations Office for Sexual Violence in 
Conflict has been relatively silent despite the alarming rate of sexual terrorism purported in 
Africa. Their last communique or report about sexual terrorism in Africa was released in 201479. 
Furthermore, the General Assembly and other organs of the UN have very few acting documents 
to guide countries facing sexual terrorism and have also been silent on Africa’s growing problem 
of sexual terrorism.  
While the international community recognizes the problem of sexual terrorism in Africa, it is not 
wholly to blame for the overall lack or response. Nigeria and the Congo, like other governments 
plagued with sexual terrorism, have been reticent to ask the international community to address 
the issue. These countries, like the other African nations, are in the midst of internal and external 
conflicts between terrorist groups, small civil factions, the central governments themselves, and 
outside militants. Additionally, these groups have caused hysteria and mass migrations for which 
the governments are ill-prepared to handle. The governments lack resources and, with rampant 
corruption and weakened states, sexual terrorism has taken a back seat to other more ‘pressing’ 
issues. As such, these countries have involved the international community with what they deem 
to be more ‘pressing’ issues while the growing problem of sexual terrorism festers.  
Although the international community is not wholly to blame for the current growth of sexual 
terrorism in Africa, their lack of response is worrisome. Despite the evidence of sexual terrorism, 
particularly the Chibok kidnappings and the brutality of the FDLR, the international 
community’s blissful ignorance of the continuing problem has established vague solutions, little 
action, and a continent shrouded in darkness.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The international community has sat idle for far too long and allowed Africa to muddle through 
the darkness. The darkness is not receding but, rather, increasing due to the indiscriminate use of 
sexual terrorism by terrorist groups in the region. Although sexual terrorism is not a new 
phenomenon, Boko Haram and the FDLR’s attacks have bred a new era of sexual terrorism due 
to the magnitude and sheer violence of the attacks.  
These groups’ motives for the use of sexual terrorism have evolved to include: ideological 
leanings (whether religious or mystic); propaganda (sex as an enticement for impoverished and 
sexually frustrated men); indiscriminate, amoral violence (brutal attacks to demoralize the 
terrorized); voluntary compliance (attacks that prevent other rebellions that fear the same 
treatment); and, Africa’s views of terrorists and terrorized (capitalizing on the stigma used 
women and the men who could not protect them).  
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The motivations behind sexual terrorism are not important when the international community has 
done nothing to combat this epidemic. The number of attacks is not stopping; in fact, the number 
of victims rises every single year. This problem will not be solved by publishing six resolutions 
in two decades that dedicate legal and medical aid, but little else. This problem will not be solved 
by issuing press releases that spark outrage at the attacks on women in Africa. Outrage is no 
substitute for action. The international community, having recognized the horror of this issue, 
“has a responsibility to design an equally systemic, and global, response” to sexual terrorism in 
Africa80. The international community “cannot hope to put a dent in this phenomenon merely by 
condemning it” or by calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice81. The states in Africa 
are too corrupt, too poor, and too fragile to combat this issue alone, and in the darkness, any 
longer. If the international community does not cease its ignorance of Africa and its many 
problems, particularly the rampant sexual terrorism, Africa’s people will remain in the darkness 
and face the bleak future as unwilling brides to war machine spinning out of control. 
80 Tramontano, Marisa, and Michael Soussan. "Beyond Outrage -- Bringing Sexual Terrorists to Justice." The 
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NEW HORIZONS IN THE TRAINING OF SPANISH 
OFFICERS ACCORDING TO GENDER 
PERSPECTIVE 
Beatriz Berne Macipe 
1.- INTRODUCTION: GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN SPAIN 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978, the basis and pillar on which the principles and 
values of our Nation are based, proclaims, in its Article 14, the right to equality and 
non-discrimination on grounds of sex. Moreover, Article 9.2 mandates public 
authorities to promote conditions so that the equality of the individual and of the groups 
in which it is integrated is real and effective.   
The right to equality, therefore, is not a mere proclamation of intentions but an 
obligation and a priority for our Nation ; as indeed it is reflected in the legislative 
development with laws such as the effective equality between men and women of 2007 
in which “ it is intended to combat all forms of discrimination, which still continue to 
exist, whether directly or indirectly on sex-based, and to promote real equality between 
men and women, with the removal of obstacles and social stereotypes that prevent them 
from achieving it “i. Also, it is necessary to highlight the law on comprehensive 
protection measures against gender-based violence in 2004, which following the 
recommendations of international organisations, aims to provide a global response to 
the serious problem of the violence against women, The law goes beyond mere punitive 
actions against the agressor by dealing with preventive, educational, social, victim care 
aspects. 
Moreover, Spain, as a member of supranational organisms (UN, NATO or EU, among 
others), assumes the commitments concluded in this field, by incorporating international 
texts into the internal regulations and by internalizing the values and principles therein. 
One example is the Plan of Action of the Government of Spain  for the implementation 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and 
Security, which constitutes the decisive political framework to incorporate gender 
perspective in the prevention, management and solution of military conflicts. 
Our Armed Forces (FAS)ii, fully integrated in the society they serve, are equally 
sensitive to this issue incorporating to its structure and organization all those measures 
which allow them to evolve from a gender perspective. In this way, we can highlight the 
creation of the Military observatory for the equality of men and women in 2005 or the 
Protocol of action against sexual harassment and by reason of sex in 2015. 
The Academia General Military (AGM),  popularly known as la General,  responsible 
for the formation of all the  Officers of the Army has set itself the main task of 
providing Spain with the best Officers, being fully aware of the importance of the 
formation from a gender perspective. This paper aims to describe what is currently 
being done in this field, to later on show the horizons towards which to look at in the 
future.  
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2.- THE ACADEMIA GENERAL MILITAR 
2.1.- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The AGMiii has a long and glorious tradition in the formation of Spanish Army Officers. 
Although there are research projects which place  its historical precedent in 1340 with 
the creation of the “Company of the One Hundred Young Noblemen, it is necessary to 
wait until 1674 with the foundation of the Military Academy of the Army in the 
Netherlands, where it is possible to find the first attempt of progressive teaching of the 
general common ground of all the Branches together with the specific  scope of each 
one of them.  
Several projects, such as the General Schools of Leon Island, Segovia or Toledo, were 
needed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, until, definitely, the AGM was created 
in 1882iv located in its first Epoch in the town of Toledo; during the eleven-year 
activity, a career profile was developed and which consisted of two stages where the 
common part would be carried out at la General and the specific part at their respective 
Academies for each branch. Brief journey but transcendental legacy: The Colours of la 
General were handed in to the center in 1886, being since then a privileged witness of 
the Oath of Allegiance that all cadets pledge. Moreover, during this period the so-called 
“Esprit of la General ” was born, which implies the cohesive feeling of comradeship 
and unity of origin, forged through the close coexistence of all students subjected to a 
harsh daily routine and a diligent moral formation; sentiment which is still present 
nowadays.  
It was necessary to wait until 1927v so that, once again, the Academy opened its doors, 
although just for a short period of time of only three years, and in this case in Zaragoza, 
a city located half way between Madrid and Barcelona. The Second Epoch was a 
continuation in all aspects, including the teaching and pedagogical fields of its 
predecessor, the Academy in Toledo. The regime of strict military boarding system, the 
rehabilitation of the status of “cadet” and “gentleman” with the cultivation of courtesy 
and good manners, “the Cadet Decalogue”, set of values and fundamental virtues that 
cadets have to seek and that are still recited nowadays in different events and parades, 
represent a brilliant example of educative coherence, which has made la General be one 
of the most modern teaching centers of its time. 
In 1940vi the AGM was reestablished again in Zaragoza, maintaining its activity 
uninterrupted until now. Throughout these years, la General has consolidated itself as a 
reference center of the Military Education in Spain. The curricular evolution has 
adapted the scientific and technological studies to the factors that have emerged from 
the conflicts, completing them with a necessary preparation in humanities and values, 
trying to find a balance in the integral formation that shapes the would-be officer’s 
profile. In this extended period, outstanding students such as HM the King of Spain in 
1985 and formerly his father 30 years before have attended classes there. It was in 1988 
when the first woman entered la General with the Royal Decree 1/1988, which 
regulated the incorporation of the women in the Spanish Armed Forces. 
2.2.- OUR CADETS 
Currently Officer Cadets of the Army are trained at the AGM. They are integrated into 
different fundamental branches: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, 
172
Macipe 
Quartermaster Corps and Polytechnic Engineer Corps. Also the Defense Common 
Corpsvii, as well as the Civil Guard Officers, Police Military Corps who shares their two 
first years of formation integrated with their Army comrades. 
Of these, the present document will deal with the students of the Officer Cadets of the 
Army, who remain four of the five-year formation at the AGM and represent the highest 
percentage of the student body. 
Generally, our cadets enter the AGM at the age of 18-20, being the access mode similar 
to any university studies, where, for those who meet the general requirements 
demanded, the decisive factor is the grade achieved in high school together with the 
mark got in the public entrance exam to get to University. The mark required for the 
AGM is one of the highest of the Spanish University system. Moreover, the candidates 
have to pass different exams: a second language test, a physicalviii test and a medical 
check-up so as to achieve their goal of entering the AGM. Lately, the percentage of 
women in 2016 was 10.4% 
The syllabus, set up since 2010, includes in its formation: “on the one hand, the military 
general training and the specific one, and, on the other hand, the corresponding 
university degree from the general education system, as well as the formation for the 
acquisition of the fundamental requirements needed to develop the different tasks of 
each corps”ix. On the whole, the syllabus consists of 333 ECTSx  and 52 military 
training weeks, which are given during the five academic years, the first four ones at la 
General and the last one is the specific training provided in each of the Academies for 
each branch. 
After accomplishing the syllabus, cadets are both commissioned as First Lieutenants 
and graduated in the university degree of Management Engineeringxi. Therefore this is 
an all-round university multidisciplinary education (scientific, technological, 
humanistic, job training and, essentially, a formation on values). 
Professors from the Centro Universitario de la Defensa (organization under the 
Ministry of Defense, currently attached to the University of Zaragoza, and located 
inside the AGM),  together with the teachers and instructors from the Academia 
General Military take part enthusiastically, in the success of such important task. The 
former are specifically in charge of the subjects necessary for the university degree and 
the latter are responsible for the military training and education. All of them work in a 
devoted and committed way so as to embed the corresponding values needed for the 
young soldiers called to lead units and, therefore, people, wherever Spain needs them. 
 
3.- GENDER PERSPECTIVE FORMATION AT THE ACADEMIA GENERAL 
MILITAR 
3.1.- SYLLABUS 
Our cadets attend different subjects in which they study gender perspective in a specific 
or cross-curricular way. 
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Throughout discussion and analysis of the international, national and specific 
regulations of the Armed Forces, teachers pursue further study in aspects of vital 
importance in this field with the aim of not only allowing students to get the necessary 
knowledge but also interiorizing what gender perspective entails. 
It begins in such a way with the analysis of the universal right of equality of all people 
before the Lawxii and it goes on with the study of the Armed Forces Royal 
Regulationsxiii, a compendium of values and virtues that all soldiers need to have and in 
which Commanders are ordered to ensure the implementation of the criteria and norms 
related to the effective equality of men and women, and the prevention of gender 
violence. 
Cadets also learn that there is no discrimination on the basis of gender or sexxiv in the 
Armed Forces and that the expressions of contempt for gender are not only disapproved 
in their disciplinary systemxv but they are also prevented and avoided by the 
commanders. 
From an administrative point of view, all regulations related to equality, the prevention 
of gender violence, reconciliation of the professional, personal and family life and the 
one helping to facilitate the access and professional promotion of women, i.e. the leave 
for being a gender violence victim, other specific leaves on this matter or the facilities 
and protection for childbirth, pregnancy, adoption or foster care. 
The Armed Forces, reference in the fight against sex-based or sexual harassment have a 
wide range of regulations which emanated from the Agreement of the Ministers’ 
Council of November 20, 2015. Students discuss and analyze this subject while being 
aware of its importance in their near future in their posts as Commanders who will have 
to face situations related to harassment. 
When addressing the quality review of the organizations, students are told about the 
essential parameters to take into account in determining the academic excellence, 
especially the ones related to the systems of ethics management, in which the 
organizations deal with the problem of sexual harassment, workplace harassment, 
equality and gender violence. 
In a cross-curricular way, the gender perspective is present in all subjects, such as 
Constitutional Law, International Law of the Armed Conflicts, where in a repetitive 
way there is a reference to the principle of equality, non-discrimination due to sex or the 
treatment of women in armed conflicts; in other cases, teachers use the topic of “gender 
roles” to set some examples and activities related to their subject. 
3.2.- ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
In addition to everything outlined in the syllabus, the AGM makes an additional effort 
to promote training in the field of women, peace and security, due to the importance it 
has for the immediate future of its students. In order to do so, a series of measures, 
which will be explained below, are being carried out. 
New students are given lectures on Gender Violence Sheets and Information Security 
talks where they are specifically talked about sexting and other problems that may arise 
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from the misuse of social networks. Moreover, female Second Lieutenants give 
informative talks to the Cadet Ladies and advise them in a practical way over their new 
way of life.  
With respect to the Sexual Harassment Protocol in the Armed Forces and the 
Prevention of Gender Violence, all students and teachers attend different informative 
lectures in which the different ways of behaving are outlined in detail, whether victims 
or witnesses. Commanders are in charge of carrying out relevant proceedings to solve or 
punish what happened. 
Once the present academic year is over, a Conference about Gender Perspective aimed 
at all the teachers of the Academy and fifth-year students will be held in order to 
correctly conclude the process of interiorizing the gender perspective. This is a key 
aspect to carry out the command action in the present society. The lectures will be given 
by highly qualified personnel, both from the Army and the Civil Guard, and they will 
deal with the protocol of sexual harassment, gender violence and the figures of 
Authority Agent and Gender Advisor in International Missions.  
4.- FUTURE VISION 
The great concern that the leading staff of the AGM presents before gender perspective 
allows to augur a promising future in this field. This is why, during the current course, a 
new Working Group, called Gender Perspective, has been created. The members of 
such a group are working precisely on the analysis of the present situation and in the 
search of formative improvements in this area. 
In the short term, some initiatives have already been developed, such as the inclusion in 
the Cervantes Chairxvi of a conference related to this topic, or the proposal of doing 
some of the end-of-degree projects based on the topic of women, peace and security in 
the following academic years. 
In the medium term, it is hoped that the formation of the cadet encompasses all those 
aspects which cover such a wide field as the one dealt with in the current essay. The 
formative process should be progressive and continuous throughout the different 
courses and it will accomplish the following aims: 
• Structure the teaching imparted, fundamentally, at the beginning and at the 
end of their studies. Upon their incorporation into the AGM, students will 
receive basic training, becoming aware of the importance of this subject. 
During the following years, the focus will be on the learning and 
internalization. To finish, students will be given a series of lectures on the 
aspects of greatest impact and importance that, from the commanders’ point 
of view, must be known and taken into account to reach the optimal 
professional capacity. 
• Study, analyze and synthesize the advantages and disadvantages of the 
presence of women in the front line or their presence in the operations 
theatre so that our would-be officers have the tools to take full advantage of 
the human resources.  
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• Train teachers with specific courses, such as the Gender Advisor Course in 
order to transfer this knowledge to the students. 
• Make an international or European comparison with other armies and police 
military corps to learn new ways of integrating gender perspective in our 
teaching and share experiences in this field. 
In the long term, it is essential to lead, through the working group or other teachers from 
the Center, research projects which analyze and think over gender perspective so as to 
contribute to make an even better Army. 
5.- CONCLUSIONS 
• There is a great concern in the field of women, peace and security nationally 
and internationally speaking, also among the Spanish Armed Forces and at 
the AGM. 
• Due to its importance, this subject should be present throughout the whole 
cadet’s formative process with periods of special intensity, such as the first 
steps in the military life when they enter the AGM and the previous 
moments when a First Lieutenant begins to command. 
• The curriculum gathers different aspects of gender perspective specifically in 
certain subjects of the different courses and it also deals with them in a 
cross-curricular way in many other subjects and activities throughout all the 
academic courses. 
• The interest of the AGM in this subject has led to the need to improve the 
cadets’ formation with complementary actions (conferences, lectures, 
formative talks, etc), as well as those ones which may also be approved for 
being considered of interest.  
• As a result of the need of continuous improvement, there is the creation of 
the working group of gender perspective, whose fundamental purpose is to 
detect the deficiencies or formative needs so as to propose the lines of action 
which allow to improve the educative process in the difficult task of 
pursuing excellence.  
• The educational integral system, which fundamental pillar is the instruction 
in values should have gender perspective in a prominent place; as the Article 
5 from the Teachers Decalogue of the Academia General Military claims: 
“Thechers will devote all their effort to the integral formation of the cadet, 
conscious that ethical principles such as maturity and professional capacity 






i Memorandum of Organic Law 3/2007, of 22 March, for the effective equality of women and men. 
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ii Article 8.1 of the Spanish Constitution. The Armed Forces, constituted by the Army, the Navy and 
the Air Force, have as their mission to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its 
territorial integrity and the constitutional order. 
iii http://www.ejercito.mde.es/unidades/Zaragoza/agm/ 
iv By Royal Decree of February 20, 1882, the General Military Academy was created in the Alcázar 
of Toledo 
v By Royal Decree of 20 of February of 1927, the General Military Academy was created in 
Saragossa. 
vi By Law of September 27, 1940, by which the General Military Academy is reestablished in 
Zaragoza. 
vii Constituted by Judicial Corps, Comptrollers, Medics and the unit of music. 
viii In 2007, the requirements for the evaluation of physical tests were modified to incorporate gender 
differentiation. 
ix Article 44 of Law 39/2007 of the Military Career 
x European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System  
xi The university degree of Management Engineering consists of 240 ECTS 
xii Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution 
xiii R.D. 96/2009 that regulates the Royal Orders of the Spanish Armed Forces 
xiv Organic Law 9/2011 on Rights and Duties of the Spanish Armed Forces 
xv Organic Law 8/2014 of  the Spanish Armed Forces Disciplinary Regime 
xvi Cycle of Conferences (www.ejercito.mde/units/Zaragoza/agm/Catedra/index.html) that is carried 
out at the Academia General Military as a complement to the training of the cadets and in which there are 




GENDER AWARENESS TRAINING: 
 A COMPARISON OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS 
TO NATO/PFP MILITARY UNITS 
By Elizabeth Owens Lape 
INTRODUCTION 
"The empowerment of woman in unstable countries benefits not only them, but all of us.  It is a 
crucial component of a comprehensive approach to the security challenges of the 21st century.” 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (UN, 2000), initially adopted on 31 
October 2000 and updated with a resolution in 2009 (UN, 2009), proclaimed that all 
peacekeeping personnel – military, police and civilian, receive training on the protection, rights 
and the needs of the women, as well as on the importance of women in all peacekeeping and 
peace building measures (Lyytikäinen, 2007).  Enforcing such a resolution can be difficult as 
there are often barriers to leaders accepting the issue as one that needs to be changed.  These 
barriers can be time, resources, community values, policies and lack of a desire (Cameron-
McCabe, 2008).  Even though the resolution has been in place since 2000, countries have been 
slow to adopt their implementation plans (Tirman, 2011). There are currently 64 countries that 
have passed National Action plans with the first being the Danish plan in June 2005 followed by 
the Norwegian plan in March 2006 (PeaceWoman, 2013).   The first U.S. National Action Plan 
on Women, Peace and Security was not passed until December 2011 (The White House, 2011), 
and then updated in June 2016 (The White House, 2016).   
Within the U.S. National Action Plan, DOD has “actions” (or tasks) identified that require 
attention by the office of primary responsibility for implementation of that area (DOD, 2012).  It 
also emphasized the requirement for all DOD components to monitor the outcomes and actions 
listed in the plan so that everyone can have a better understanding of the requirements.  An 
understanding is important to know how they may have an effect when planning for operations, 
whether they are security operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, stabilization 
programming and/or engaging with the civilian population.  Three of these actions assist in 
institutionalizing a gender-sensitive approach by conducting training and education on the 
subject. 
Training and educating all personnel on the dynamics of gender integration will become even 
more critical with the complete integration of women into areas within the services that 
previously were only open to men. On January 24, 2013, the 1994 rule excluding women from 
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combat was lifted.  This change allows women to be assigned to units and positions where the 
primary mission is to engage in ground combat (DOD, 2013).  The different services are now 
required to develop gender-neutral occupational standards.  The implementation of these new 
positions is to begin immediately and to be finished by January 1, 2016.  Currently, 15% of the 
U.S. military is comprised of women.  This new ruling will allow more new recruits to 
request/apply for positions that were previously off-limits and will insert women into positions 
where previously there were only men.  With the workplace dynamic changing, there needs to be 
a concern for the treatment and security of women in areas where women previously did not 
work.  Additionally, there will now be more women as a part of a unit available to interact with 
the local population in countries that culturally prohibits the local women from talking to male 
soldiers. All the above are reasons that the current and future forces need to be aware of 
including a gender perspective when planning operations.  One way to increase awareness is 
through training and education. 
Research was conducted in order to provide a means of determining if U.S. military units are 
behind or ahead of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
countries in regard to gender awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325.  It 
provided a cross-country examination of how militaries in specific countries are 
institutionalizing gender as a planning factor that will assist in operational effectiveness and any 
cultural considerations.  The resulting information assisted in determining if there are areas in the 
U.S. implementation of the National Action Plan that could be improved upon based upon the 
work conducted by other countries. 
Research Questions 
1. Are U.S. military units behind or ahead of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)/Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in regards to implementation of gender 
awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325? 
a. What has the U.S. military done with regards to Gender Awareness training 
b. What have other NATO and PfP countries militaries done with regards to Gender 
Awareness training?  
c. What are the factors that affect the outcome of these questions 
i. What are the gender/sexual harassment/sexual violence issues within the 
respective countries? 
ii. Are there culture barriers or other factors that might affect the support of 
the training? 
iii. Have the countries developed a particular position on their staffs that is 
specifically in place to advise on gender issues? 
iv. Have professional military education institutions of the respective 
countries inculcated gender awareness training as a standard in the 
curriculum? 
METHODOLOGY 
To answer the proposed research questions, the qualitative design best suited to study this theme 
is “phenomenology.” Per Hayes & Singh (2012), phenomenology tries to discover how people 
experience a phenomenon, and how they think about that experience. It also values the 
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perspectives that the person being researched has about the experience. By using a 
phenomenological approach, I was able to collect data on the various training programs within 
the NATO/PfP countries, along with information discovered regarding what training the U.S. is 
conducting on gender awareness. This involved studying the details about the programs, 
categorizing the data, interpretation of the information, identification of any patterns, and 
synthesis and generalizations regarding the findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). 
PARTICIPANTS 
The population size of the U.S. military, along with members of other country militaries, is 
impossible to consider as a group to study.  Polkinghorne (1989) recommends that in 
phenomenological study, the sample should be 5-25.  A representative sample of 12 individuals 
was selected and interviewed twice which adequately provided information in response to the 
research questions.  The purposeful sampling strategy used to select the participants of this study 
was criterion sampling. Criterion sampling is defined as “purposefully picking all cases that meet 
some criterion” (Patton, 2002, p. 243).  This kind of sampling was used since there are several 
military members of the U.S., European countries and PfP countries at my current employment, 
and the NATO command “Allied Command Transformation” is in Norfolk close to Old 
Dominion’s campus.  This allowed for the different variations in the approach to the training and 
education of gender awareness.  Since all the people being interviewed are military members, or 
those who work with the military, the variation was narrower which enabled the common 
patterns to be more easily analyzed.  The relatively small number of personnel of the same type 
being interviewed was a limitation in this design strategy as I was only able to depend upon the 
opinions of a small part of the population.  
Of the thirteen people who were interviewed, I included a cross-section of the different 
categories of personnel.  From the U.S., I interviewed members of the military and civilians who 
have been involved with the training programs of military members.  These personnel were 
either interviewed in person or by Skype if they are in a different location.  Additionally, there 
were interviewees selected from civilians who work at Allied Command Transformation and 
other local offices who have been involved with training of their NATO forces and military 
members from either NATO or PfP countries.  Some of the latter were members who work in the 
Hampton Roads area or Washing, DC, or were contacts I have made from past working groups.  
Those who meet the criteria noted above were contacted either in person, by telephone, or by 
email if overseas to ask for participation.  I used the snowball method (Patton, 2002) to “sample 
people who know people who know people” (p. 243) to find other knowledgeable participants. 
Thus, I could obtain diversity between men and women and between those from the U.S. and 
those from other countries. The demographic factors of male or female, and country of residence 
are known, but specific names are kept confidential. The participant’s names were extracted 
from the transcription and replaced with a representative code. 
These interviews were conducted face to face in the participant’s offices within the Joint Staff 
building in Suffolk, or in their respective offices.  For those being interviewed by Skype or 
telephone, I conducted the interviews from a confidential area of my home or office. All the 
interviews were scheduled at a time convenient for the interviewees. I requested permission from 
the interviewees to be recorded.  Upon granting permission, the interviews were recorded using a 
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small recorder that was used to assist with transcription. After all the interviews have been 
transcribed, the recordings will be destroyed.  
DATA COLLECTION 
Two strategies for data collection were used for this study, the analysis of archival organizational 
documents that assisted in explaining the organizational environment and the semi-structured 
interviews.   
The initial step of this analysis was to conduct a document analysis of all the National Action 
Plans of NATO and PfP countries.  These plans were reviewed for specific data on their 
application to their defense departments and any documentation of training and/or education 
required to be implemented.  These documents collected will be the background information 
regarding the various programs within the different countries and provided a rich source of 
information regarding the implementation of a gender awareness training and education program 
within the different organizations.  A matrix was developed to aid in the accumulation of the data 
and to visually look for trends.  These documents helped provide information on the processes 
and decisions relevant to that organization, and helped stimulate further areas for review during 
the interviews (Patton, 2002). 
The other phase of the data collection were semi-structured interviews. Interviews are used in 
qualitative research as “we interview people to find out from them those things we cannot 
directly observe” (Patton, 2012, p. 340).  Data was collected through two sets of 13 face to face 
interviews where the participants will be asked to respond to a semi-structured interview (Hayes 
& Singh, 2012).  The interviewees were told that they will be recorded, and agreed to participate 
in the study. The semi-structured interviews took about 45 minutes each and included 
approximately 20 open ended questions each using probes as required. The interviews were 
recorded using technology available and will be transcribed from the audio recording into a 
document that will be coded to protect participant’s confidentiality.  Any identification of the 
interviewees was deleted from the final research report to ensure anonymity. The participants 
were given a copy of their transcript as a method of member checking (Hayes & Singh, 2012) to 
ensure their views were properly recorded.  After a cursory review of the responses from all the 
participants, a second round of interviews was conducted to cover any additional questions that 
might have been raised in the first round of questions or to follow-up on information presented in 
the first round.  
ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
A simple, iterative framework was used to help with the analysis of the data collected. Per 
Srivastava & Hopwood (2009), the continual review of patterns within a loop for the process of 
continuous meaning-making of the material which will result in a progressive understanding 
through the analysis process. 
The first step of the analysis was to review the matrix developed through the document analysis.  
This review looked for application of the National Action Plan within the defense departments, 
and showed if there is any emphasis in training and education.  From this review, the draft 
interview questions were finalized inserting appropriate information as required. 
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Figure 2. Iterative framework for the qualitative analysis of UNSCR 1325 implementation with a 












Figure 2. A sequential review of the data obtained from the NATO/PfP countries National 
Action Plans as a feedback loop refining the interview questions. Adapted from “A Practical 
Iterative Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis,” by P. Srivastava and N. Hopwood, 2009, 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8(1), 76-84. 
 
Significance of the Study  
Through the interviews I explored how the United States and other countries' military 
organizations have instituted programs to educate and train their military to be able to have a 
gender perspective during military operations and what these forces have done to further the 
overall use of gender as a planning factor in a military organization.  Through the questioning I 
looked for any barriers the individuals may have had to incorporating a gender perspective into 
their operations, and any security issues the individuals may perceive within their organizations 
regarding gender.  The results should be useful in improving upon a country’s plan by 
highlighting successful gender awareness implementation and if any available training increased 
the county’s successful implementation.  This increased awareness should assist in improving 
actions taken by the NATO/PfP countries by giving areas to incorporate in the military planning 
process to meet the objectives of their respective National Action Plans.  Meeting the goals of 
the UNSCR 1325 will ultimately benefit peace and security of women.  My research agenda was 
designed to explore a comparison of U.S. and NATO/PfP countries when integrating gender 
awareness as a planning factor for operational effectiveness.  A rationale for using a 
phenomenological approach was offered, and methods of data collection and analysis were 
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pictures of how the individual interviewees perceive their programs within their respective 
countries.  Finally, I discussed with the interviewees measures that were taken to ensure 
objectivity and trustworthiness of the findings.  
Document Review Findings 
Based upon the requirements of UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2000), the President of the UN Security 
Council signed a statement that “welcomes the efforts of Member States in implementing 
resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level.” Through several reports of the Secretary-General 
on women and peace and security in S/PRST/2001/31, 2002/32 and 2004/40 (UN, 2001, 2002, 
and 2004) there was increasing concern that not enough action was being taken to implement the 
requirements. Based upon the report submitted in 2004, the Security Council requested the 
Secretary-General submit an action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (UN, 2000) 
on women and peace and security across the United Nations system to strengthen commitment 
and accountability at all levels (UN, 2005). The Task Force organized to develop the plan that 
consisted of 22 United Nations member entities with representatives from intergovernmental 
organizations and civil society. The initial step of the task force was to develop an accountability 
matrix based on mandates stated in UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2005).  This framework was briefed by 
the UN Special Advisor on Gender Issues Advancement of Women to the Executive Committee 
on Peace and Security.  The Committee endorsed the plan and stated the framework proposed 
was a way member states could implement UNSCR 1325.  The structure of the system-wide 
plan, signed on 10 October 2005, was based upon the following 12 areas of action (UN, 2005): 
A. Conflict prevention and early warning 
B. Peacemaking and peacebuilding 
C. Peacekeeping Operations 
D. Humanitarian Response 
E. Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation 
F. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
G. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence in armed conflict 
H. Preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff, 
related personnel and United Nations partners 
I. Gender Balance 
J. Coordination and partnership 
K. Monitoring and reporting 
L. Financial Resources 
Earlier submitted annual reports were not clear and consistent on what was being reported in 
regard to implementation (UN, 2005). As the member states are accountable to provide their own 
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report on how they are doing in the mainstreaming of gender, the system wide plan would 
provide a resource in assisting in presenting their submissions.  
OVERALL  
UNSCR 1325 was a call to all the countries within the United Nations to implement a plan to 
address the concerns listed. Within NATO, the NATO EAPC (NATO, 2014) and the Bi SC 
Directive 40-1 (rev 1) (NATO, 2009) directed the NATO member countries to integrate UNSCR 
1325 into their national defense and security policies and activities, the national level 
implementation as well as that of military forces. By 2016, 17 out of 28 NATO member states 
and 9 out of 41 NATO partner countries had developed NAPs implementing UNSCR 1325 
(peacewomen.org). Upon review of the nine NAPs, it was apparent they vary greatly in terms of 
structure, objectives, focus, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The Department of 
Defense/Ministries of Defense have important implementation responsibilities for the WPS 
requirements, but these requirements also vary greatly. These disparities make it difficult to 
directly line by line evaluate how NATO and partner countries are doing to compare efforts 
among these nations. The scoring matrix reviewed and discussed above lends a more qualitative 
method to consider the different themes.  Upon tallying of the 10 themes across the nine 
countries, the scores individually discussed above were tallied and an average of these scores 
was taken. With the overall average being 17.33, there were four countries that scored above the 
average with The Netherlands having the highest score of 22.  The countries with the next 
highest scores were the USA and Germany and with 19, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina with 18.  
At the bottom was Bulgaria with the lowest score of 13, and then next were Sweden and France 
with 14. 
INTERVIEWS 
The next step of this analysis was to conduct a series of interviews with various members of 
NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, as well as the United States.  These respondents 
were selected to be interviewed based upon at least a basic understanding of the topic.  The 
interviews were conducted in a variety of methods as indicated in the individual profiles.   
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, participants described various aspects of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 
how a training and education program can influence the implementation.  The findings supported 
the purpose of this research which was to determine if U.S. military units are behind or ahead of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in regards to 
the implementation of gender awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325. It 
provided a cross-country examination of how militaries in specific countries are 
institutionalizing gender as a planning factor that will assist in operational effectiveness, and 
should eventually result in a decrease in sexual gender based violence. The results will be 
analyzed and discussed based upon each of the pillars of the UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2000) of 
participation of women within peace processes, prevention of harm, and protection of women 
and their rights as objectives of the original UNSCR 1325 and emphasized in the system-wide 
plan (UN, 2005a) have been reviewed for inclusion in the NAPs, along with additional objectives 
that the various National Action Plans have delineated. 
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PARTICIPATION 
   It is clear the United States military is leading the way in providing a gender balance in the 
forces which will ultimately affect the participation of women in leadership positions, one of the 
pillars of the National Action Plan.  The U.S National Plan not only discusses a gender balance 
within the U.S. Forces, but specifically discusses assisting other nations in the recruitment of 
women into their own force, or the inclusion of women then are sent over the U.S. for training 
purposes.  The number of women currently in the force listed in Figure 3 shows that the U.S. is 
leading the way in inclusion of women into the military over the other countries that were a part 
of this research.  This number was confirmed by all the interviewees during the second round of 
the interviews.  During the interviews, all the members from the U.S. stated that the increase in 
the participation of women within the U.S. forces was positive and seemed to be supported by 
all. These respondents also commented that the inclusion of women was a positive aspect and 
should be a benefit to operations as more women are included and the pillar of participation is 
supported. As more women enter the force, there will eventually be more women in leadership 
positions to continue to affect the support and perspective form a different point of view, which 
should assist in peace processes. This objective appears to be met by the U.S. and those countries 
researched. 
PREVENTION 
 This pillar from the UNSCR 1325 was an objective to ensure women and children were 
prevented from being harmed.  This study confirmed that all the country NAPs reviewed for this 
research indicated internal sexual harassment training was a requirement.  The members 
interviewed from the respective countries indicated that this training was being emphasized and 
was being conducted.  With the continued emphasis on this training, and the additional women to 
the force, the number of sexual harassment complaints should be reduced. 
This pillar is also supported by the training conducted to ensure the women externally within the 
countries where forces are being deployed are being protected from sexual exploitation and 
abuse from the individual sent to protect them.  This type of training is also mentioned as a 
requirement in most of the NAPs reviewed, to include the U.S National Action Plan.  The 
subjects interviewed from the U.S. positively agreed that this was also occurring, and most of the 
NATO and partner countries commented positively in this requirement being met.  Therefore, 
this objective seems to be met by the U.S. and most of the countries who had members 
interviewed, though continued training and support is necessary to ensure women and children 
are prevented from harm. 
PROTECTION 
This objective of UNSCR 1325 is to ensure the protection of women and their rights.  A critical 
element to ensure this objective is being met includes a training and education program that 
discusses what those rights are, and how including a gender perspective in the conduct of 
operations will lead to operational effectiveness by not only protecting the women, but by 
considering their rights as it affects the stability of the area. 
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The presence of a training and education program assisted in the awareness of what having a 
gender perspective is and indicated an understanding of the framework documents.  Though all 
the National Action Plans require a training program, it was clear by the interviews of the U.S. 
members that training in this area was lacking behind that conducted within the NATO and 
partner countries. The presence of at least a training program is related to the countries attitudes 
and perceptions of how having a gender perspective can have a positive influence on operational 
effectiveness. This was made apparent from some of the responses from the NATO members 
interviewed. It appears through this research that there is still some work that needs to be done in 
meeting this objective. Including more leadership in Key Leader seminars so they understand the 
topic will begin the support from the top of the chain of command that will permeate throughout 
the staff. The inclusion of protection of women and children into exercises will be a way to train 
many people who will “train as they fight” through meeting the exercise objectives. 
There were obstacles identified that may be contributors to this objective not being reached. The 
leadership involvement, resources, and culture (within the nation or between men and women) 
are factors of concern globally to all the countries interviewed.   
Participants discussed how having the support of leadership is crucial to having a strong training 
and education program that will eventually have an impact on the protection of women in the 
community, and the overall ability to mainstream gender through all military operations. The 
leadership theme was developed when the interviews revealed that even in the countries that had 
a training program established, it was sometimes not supported. It was evident that countries that 
have leadership who actively promote elements of UNSCR 1325, such as Sweden and Bosnia 
Herzegovina, are much more likely to have members who are informed of and engaged in 
initiatives that support a gender perspective. 
Resources to implement an effective program were mentioned by members from the U.S. and 
most of the NATO countries.  The only countries who had subject members who did not 
specifically note this as an issue was Sweden, Germany and Canada.    Resources provided to 
support a trained network of gender advisors is the ultimate outcome desired for future 
operations. Countries need to invest the resources for an effective program and view it as 
valuable and perceive it is the right thing to do for the country.  Financial resources may be more 
difficult to provide during cutbacks in funding.  But the assignment of a Gender Advisor position 
at least part-time if not full-time will assist in including this perspective when planning for 
operations. 
There did not appear to be a correlation in comparing the NAPs, the requirements from the 
NATO Action Plan, the number of women in the force and the interview responses. Culture 
among some of the male leadership did seem to affect the full acceptance of a gender perspective 
more in the NATO countries than in the U.S. The interviews of the member from Sweden stated 
they had an excellent training program with more gender advisors resulting in the more 
acceptance of women as equal. But a review of the National Action Plans in Appendix 3 resulted 
in Sweden having one of the lowest scores, and they also have one of the lower percentages of 
women in the force noted in Figure 3. This same member commented that the warfighting 
culture for predominantly older men seems to influence their understanding and awareness of 
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what exactly is being discussed regarding implementing a gender perspective, and therefore still 
was not completely accepted by all. The member interviewed from France stated their training 
program seems to be well established, and they do have one of the higher numbers of women in 
the force, but the NAP from France also resulted in one of the lowest scores, and the interviewee 
commented that “moreover for some of them there is also a lot of misunderstanding with the 
word gender they think it is all about women and they categorically refuse to be train on this 
subject.”  The training program described by the member from Bosnia Herzegovina seems to be 
one of the most extensive, and their NAP resulted in one of the higher scores, yet the number of 
women in the service is the lowest of the countries reviewed.  This is also true of The 
Netherlands with a comment made “There is limited general knowledge about the topic and the 
gender expert capacity is limited to develop good scenarios, injects or provide training” and that 
“For more traditional warfare operations, it is seen as not relevant.”  The number of women in 
the service from Norway is right in the middle, as was their NAP score, and their training 
program appears stagnant per comments made by the member from Norway.  She stated that 
there is resistance to this topic “due to organizational culture (gender issues have low status, 
immaturity towards gender issues, suboptimizing, fight for funds etc), lack of knowledge, 
organizational structures and functions that give too much power to individual staff workers) and 
lack of leadership commitment.”  The U.S. NAP scored near the top based upon the rubric used, 
and has the highest number of women in the military forces.  Yet the training and education 
program seems to be lacking based upon the interviews, along with the resources and support 
from leadership. One member commented in the interview 
In my opinion, the US Department of Defense does not yet believe that women play a role in 
conflict stability and military operations.  They still see the enemy as being male in gender.  
They do not see the bigger picture that, in this day and age, war cannot be won by battle alone.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were a different way of fighting a conflict than had been in the 
past as the area was more urban, and there was more of a desire for nation building.  This nation 
building concept seems to be prevailing within the military and most likely will continue with 
the goal of stability operations.  In such an environment, the human contact will be unavoidable.  
The military needs to consider how to protect the civilians, and how to use all the resources they 
have for operational effectiveness.  Therefore, based upon the findings in this research, the 
following recommendations are provided to enable the U.S. and NATO to meet the needs of the 
changing environment. 
RECOMMENDATION 1 – KEY LEADER TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
Because most the nations reviewed for this study commented upon leadership as a factor 
affecting implementation, any direction regarding this phenomenon could be applied across the 
countries.  The Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations conducts a Key Leader Seminar 
periodically. Per their website (NCGM, 2016), the seminar aim is to “increase key leader’s 
knowledge on how to integrate gender perspectives into operations planning, execution and 
evaluation at strategic and operational level and how to argue in favour of integrating gender 
perspectives at political- and military strategic level.” The recommendation would be to conduct 
one of these seminars in the Washington, D.C. area held at the National Defense University. 
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Having it conducted in that area would allow for more of the senior level leaders at the 
political/strategic level to attend.  It would be important that the attendees not only be U.S. 
members, but to include Foreign Liaison Officers from other NATO countries who are in the 
same geographic area to get the cross exchange of ideas and best practices. This seminar would 
enable leaders in top positions to have a better understanding of what is being discussed in regard 
to including a gender perspective, and then the knowledge could trickle down within the services 
and other military organizations. These leaders must then be held accountable for the 
requirements in the National Action Plans. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 – CHANGE THE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATION POLICY  
The current policy document governing U.S. Joint Professional Military Education (DOD, 2015) 
lists the following as one of the required learning areas: “Comprehend the roles that factors such 
as geopolitics, culture, region, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force 
operations.” The inclusion of the word “gender” in this sentence as one of the factors would 
necessitate the education institutions to teach this topic within the colleges as this would be part 
of their accreditation requirements viewed by the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education.  
The “how” to teach this topic could be discussed during the annual Joint Faculty Education 
Conference. Any best practices in this area could be discussed with the other NATO nations 
during the Annual NATO Education and Training Discipline Conference.  As this policy 
addresses senior level education all the way down the military academies, changing this policy 
would be one step in addressing the structural change of including the gender perspective right 
from the start of a member’s career where eventually the discussion of gender mainstreaming 
will be common to all. 
RECOMMENDATION 3 – SUPPORT THE POSITION OF A GENDER ADVISOR 
Discuss with the Combatant Commands and the services about including a Gender Advisor as 
either a full time or part time position. This position has been recently established at three of the 
six geographic combatant commands and one of the services. This person would be the advisor 
to the Commander in regards how to implement a gender perspective within operations. The 
training for this position could be conducted at the Nordic Center for Gender in Military 
Operations in the Gender Advisor course.  Some of the interviewees from the NATO countries 
indicated they already had people acting in this position, and others mentioned that it had been 
tried but not supported.  Seeing this position of gender advisor supported in operations, and the 
potential for an increase in operational effectiveness, should assist in generalizing this 
phenomenon across the other NATO nations. 
RECOMMENDATION 4 – INCREASE INCLUSION OF GENDER IN EXERCISES 
The quickest way to get to a large group of people is through exercises.  Including gender 
perspectives as an objective within exercises, whether they are conducted jointly or single 
service, will reach a large training audience ensuring more are aware of the topic and the 
potential benefits.  Many of these exercises are conducted in partnership with NATO and other 
countries, so the training would reach more than just a U.S. audience, therefore assisting the 
other countries in implementing their programs. The inclusion of exercise injects that focus on 
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sexual exploitation and abuse would have the additional benefit of how to react and report on 
issues of concern regarding this topic.  
RECOMMENDATION 5 – RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN 
The U.S. is leading the other nations in the recruitment of women into the military force. The 
increase in the number of women will eventually lead to more women in leadership positions.  
The participation of women in the leadership ranks will visually show other countries that the 
U.S. supports women’s participation. In addition, any positive effects that occurred in operations 
should assist in the change of the affective domain regarding the acceptance into these positions. 
The U.S. modeling this support to women in key positions will be noted by other countries, 
particularly when conducting joint operations.  They would then have more proof to leaders 
within their countries that the inclusion of women can cause positive change. 
RECOMMENDATION 6 – DRAFT AN “INSIGHTS AND BEST PRACTICES” PAPER 
OR HANDBOOK 
These papers are written by members of the Joint Staff through lessons observed during 
exercises. The lessons are collected and compared between other organizations drawing out the 
lessons learned. Recommendations are given that are best practices, but not necessarily doctrine.  
The information provided could lead to a doctrinal change, but also provide others with 
education on the topic.  These papers are published and sent out around the world as best 
practices on the topic. Including gender perspectives in operations has been written by other 
organizations at the tactical level, but there has not been anything published on how to include 
gender at the operational or strategic levels. A handbook would not only give best practices, but 
would also address “how” a gender perspective would be implemented.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As mentioned in one of the recommendations, including the gender perspective into more 
exercises should be able to reach and train more people, which would result in a broader number 
of personnel understanding and being able to apply the subject. It would not only be beneficial to 
prove to leadership that this transfer of knowledge is occurring, but that a change in the affective 
domain regarding the subject matter has also occurred. 
One way to accomplish this would be to take a blended approach to evaluate a phenomenological 
change in behavior.  The U.S. Pacific Command Talisman Sabre series of exercises would be a 
good example of an exercise sequence of events where this type of research could be applied. 
This exercise is a bi-lateral exercise conducted biennially with the U.S. and Australia supporting 
the established Joint Task Force Headquarters with some assistance from New Zealand.  It is a 
large-scale exercise that has many story lines within the exercise, to include several involving 
aspects of a human dimension.  There are several hundred people that usually participate in this 
exercise. As soon as the members receive notification that they will be supporting the exercise, 
they would be assigned the NATO course on Gender Awareness to take online.  The next step 
would be the participation of the staff in the two-week Staff exercise where the staff will conduct 
planning for the scenario.  A gender perspective would need to be included within all the stages 
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of the planning process.  The final step would be the three-week execution where the plan would 
be executed in the exercise. 
The knowledge transfer within the cognitive domain could be monitored throughout the process 
by viewing the products that were produced.  The change in the affective domain would be 
determined by interviewing the participants after the Staff exercise, and then upon completion of 
the entire exercise. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
The U.S. is behind NATO in developing a training program and in all the training requirements 
mandated by UNSCR 1325 when compared to many NATO countries. A training and education 
program must be implemented immediately that starts with the commanders at the top, the 
leaders in the field.  This is a country with many opportunities available to enhance the education 
and training process, though it is also a country that will be difficult to provide robust support 
behind raising the awareness of gender security as a concern.  The U.S. will most likely never 
again conduct an operation on its own, and therefore will be conducting operations next to 
countries that may have already instituted education and training programs regarding UNSCR 
1325, and would expect similar support and understanding from contributing nations. As this is 
being written, there is a Women, Peace and Security Act that was passed through the House. If 
this Act were to be signed by the Senate, then the legislation would require DOD to train 
deploying personnel involved in the following areas: conflict prevention, mitigation and 
resolution, protecting civilians from violence, and combating human trafficking. This Act, 
presented by a non-governmental organization, shows the importance of this topic to all, and 
passage would be an endorsement of the critical requirement to fill a needed gap.  
There must be tangible steps identified to further streamline current training and education 
within NATO organizations and by individual members in partner countries.  An assessment 
must be taken of available courses to determine the knowledge base, and to discover if there are 
is a shortfall in any area.  Only through training and education can these gaps be filled for the 
awareness level of gender security concerns can be raised among military and civilians so they 
can contribute to the effectiveness of military operations.  Continued education by the member 
NATO nations and PfP partners regarding UNSCR 1325 will assist in changing the mindsets of 
personnel who may not realize the full impact of supporting this resolution.   
The last 15 years of war have demonstrated many differences in the approaches to conflict and 
peacekeeping operations globally.  Particularly in Afghanistan, and in some of the operations in 
Africa, the scope of peacekeeping operations has widened considerably beyond only military 
tasks. Through this period there were eight other UNSCR resolutions that have been passed with 
each one being consistently stronger in language in regards to what the member nations should 
do to support the efforts of women, peace and security.  The last one published (UN, 2015) was 
strong in the message that violent extremism is also an increasing concern when it comes to 
protecting women and children, but it also brought up the fact that women must be considered as 
actors also.  
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For units to properly accomplish their mission, consideration must be given for protection and 
security of all their members, as well as innocent civilians. Overall understanding violence and 
security should not only single out women as victims: women as both men and women are 
victims of gender-based violence.  An important planning factor when dealing with this concept 
as a planning factor is what training must be provided to the troops to help them gain an 
understanding of the issues. 
The issue of gender inequality is one the military has acknowledged is still an issue. 
Acknowledgement of a social injustice issue by the leadership is a critical first step in the ability 
to get any changes made.  But also important is the requirement to hold these leaders accountable 
for their actions in the carrying out of the requirements to change the injustice. Sometimes these 
requirements are only implied, but the UN Security Council Resolutions have mandated these 
changes to gender security and awareness occur for the safety of all. 
With the appearance of growing support for UNSCR 1325 among many of the NATO 
organizations, the institutionalization of this concept among the defense organizations would be 
the easiest approach since they usually work together for the benefit of a coalition operation.  
Raising the number of women in these organizations is certainly important to provide a gender 
balance, but it is also important to raise the awareness of gender mainstreaming among the 
personnel because only when a country has both, can gender equality even be considered.  
Also important is to include gender advisors in each of the operational units as the concern for 
security can be applied to both genders.  Future conflicts are only going to become more 
complex and must face difficult human challenges within the security environment. 
With this research shortly following the 15-year anniversary of the original passage of the 
resolution, it is evident that high level commitment of support is present, and that additional 
guidance now needs to be provided and implemented throughout the U.S., NATO and supporting 
PfP countries. While NATO has begun the slow process of changing tough mindsets and 
behaviors by introducing gender perspective throughout its operations, they now need to include 
more women in key positions within key countries to help protect those on the ground. 
Today's conflicts not only call for military responses should include all necessary resources when 
working in crisis situations.  NATO's operational effectiveness includes making contributions 
sustainable and lasting peace, within which gender equality is a key factor. Future operations will 
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WHAT IS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN SPAIN? 
Spain is a democracy since 1977, after the dictatorship of General Franco. From this 
moment a democratic model is established in which the sovereignty resides in the town. 
Like any other democracy, from its beginnings, this one has been evolving, adapting to 
the new times. With the passage of time, the woman has been having more presence and 
its presence is more relevant. 
In Spain, by means of the vote the Congress of the Deputies is configured. The deputies 
who form it elect by vote to which will be the President of the Government, and this in 
turn chooses the equipment of Ministers with which it goes to work. In this team is 
where you choose who will be the Minister of Defense. 
The Ministry of Defense was created with the first democratic government of Adolfo 
Suárez in July 1977, and merged the former ministries of the Army, Navy and Air. It is 
the only ministry of the democratic period that has kept its original name in all 
ministerial restructurings carried out to date. 
Start Ending Name Party 
July 4, 1977 April 6, 1979 Manuel Gutiérrez 
Mellado 
Military 
July 5, 1977 February 26, 1981 Agustín Rodríguez 
Sahagún 
UCD
February 26, 1981 December 3, 1982 Alberto Oliart 
Saussol
UCD
December 3, 1982 March 12, 1991 Narcís Serra Serra PSOE
March 12, 1991 July 3, 1995 Julián García 
Vargas 
PSOE
July 3, 1995 May 5, 1996 Gustavo Suárez 
Pertierra
PSOE






2017 Women, Peace, and Security Conference Working Papers 




April 18, 2004 April 7, 2006 José Bono Martínez PSOE
April 7, 2006 April 14, 2008 José Antonio 
Alonso Suárez
PSOE
April 14, 2008 December 22, 2011 Carme Chacón 
Piqueras
PSOE
December 22, 2011 November 2, 2016 Pedro Morenés y 




November 2, 2016 Today Maria Dolores de 
Cospedal García
PP 
HOW DOES THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WORK? 
The Ministry of Defense in Spain, according to different surveys, is the most valued of 
all Ministries. In Spain the work carried out by the Armed Forces is one of the most 
valued by all the work of the Public Administration. This work in defense usually 
carries much recognition by the citizens. 
The Minister of Defense is not usually a military man, he was only the first in the 
democracy, when he was still in a period of transition. Usually the Ministry of Defense 
is a civilian, a politician. Since 1977 we have had thirteen ministers, of whom only two 
have been women, and have been in recent times. 
The Ministry of Defense in the political arena is one of the most desired ministries. This 
is because the Minister in charge is usually not a Minister who goes awry. This Minister 
is usually well regarded with regard to citizenship. In addition, to add that his work does 
not depend much of political decisions that he takes the same, but that depends more on 
the membership to International Organizations and of decisions that already have taken 
with respect to the security and defense. 
In general, whenever ministers are appointed, intrigues are often inflicted by those who 
occupy each ministry, and when they are revealed by the media, there is always some 
guess as to the reasons why that candidate has been chosen. 
In the case of the Minister Chacón, by the media, the coverage and the amount of 
information was very great. The mere presence of the Minister in acts of the Ministry, 
was news. It was the first time this happened, and also in conditions that made it even 
more striking. She was pregnant. 
In the second case with the Minister Cospedal, the stir was not so great. The important 




Carme Maria Chacón Piqueras (Barcelona, March 13, 1971-Madrid, April 9, 2017), was 
a lawyer and university professor rather than political. 
It always had a close connection with the PSOE. She was vice-president of the Congress 
of Deputies during more than half of the eighth legislature, assuming in 2007 the 
portfolio of Housing of the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and in 2008, 
the one of Defense, being the first woman to hold such position in Spain. In the 38 
congress of the PSOE, celebrated 4 of February of 2012, presented like candidate to 
general secretary of the PSOE; His rival was Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, before which he 
lost by 22 votes. In the extraordinary congress of the PSOE celebrated 26 and 27 of July 
of 2014 was chosen secretary of International Relations of the PSOE until 2016, when it 
presented its resignation. 
On April 14, 2008, seven months pregnant, she became the first Minister of Defense of 
Spain and the Spanish Prime Minister who agreed to a pregnant ministry, which was 
widely spread in the rest of Europe due to its exceptionality. Among his first decisions 
was his visit to the Spanish troops of the Spanish detachment in Herat (Afghanistan). 
During his term of office, the Minister of the Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, 
replaced the minister and was in charge of the dispatch of ordinary affairs of the 
Ministry of Defense until his reinstatement 
The image reviewing the troops in Afghanistan seven months pregnant became one of 
the icons of the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Zapatero had put a 
woman more traditionally masculine at the head of the ministry and had done it 
knowing that he was in the final stretch of his pregnancy. 
She was 37 years old, when she was admitted to the position she declared "Pregnant or 
not, I was clear that my first obligation was to visit those who are capable of putting 
their lives at risk for higher values: the freedom of others. That it is harder to be a 
cashier and to stand all day. I wanted to express the gratitude of society to those who 
take risks for there to be peace in regions of conflicto”. 
MARÍA DOLORES DE COSPEDAL 
María Dolores de Cospedal García (Madrid, December 13, 1965) is a lawyer (state 
lawyer) and Spanish policy, current Minister of Defense of Spain. She is the secretary 
general of the Popular Party and the president of the PP of Castilla-La Mancha. From 
2011 to 2015 she was president of the Board of Communities of Castilla-La Mancha. 
In July of 2015 lost the regional government in spite of to have won the autonomic 
elections celebrated in May of that same year. Dismissed from power, in November of 
2015 it was announced that Maria Dolores de Cospedal would be the head of list of 
Popular Party to the Congress of the Deputies in the general elections of 20 of 
December of 2015 by the circumscription of Toledo, being chosen. After the repetition 
of the elections the 26 of June, it returned to be re-elected deputy. On October 29, 
Mariano Rajoy was inaugurated as President of the Government of Spain and on 
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November 3 announced the composition of his second executive, with María Dolores de 
Cospedal being appointed Minister of Defense. On November 4 he vowed his position 
before King Philip VI and took office as minister receiving the Defense Portfolio from 
the hand of his predecessor, Pedro Morenés. She is the second woman in charge after 
Carme Chacón. 
WHAT IS THE "GLASS CEILING"? 
It is called a glass ceiling to the veiled limitation of the labor increase of the women 
inside the organizations. This is a ceiling that limits their professional careers, difficult 
to overcome and that prevents them from further progress. It is invisible because there 
are no established or official social laws or devices that impose an explicit limitation on 
the labor career of women. 
The term "glass ceiling barriers" first appeared in a 1986 Wall Street Journal article in 
the United States. The article described the invisible barriers faced by highly skilled 
women workers who were unable to reach the highest hierarchical levels in the business 
world, regardless of their achievements and merits. 
Since then, several scholars in sociology have described this concept as referring to 
women's work since women make up half of the world's population but occupy a 
disproportionately low percentage of management positions. Authors like Carr-Ruffino 
(1991), Lynn Martin (1991), Davidson and Cooper (1992), Morrison (1992), Holloway 
(2002) among others. 
The glass ceiling is built on the basis of features that are difficult to detect, so it is not 
seen and is called glass. This invisible barrier appears when women approach the top of 
the corporate hierarchy and block the possibility of advancing in their professional 
career towards managerial and executive positions. 
Although the concept was originally used to analyze the careers of women who had had 
high qualifications in their jobs thanks to their superior educational background and 
could not ascend because they encountered that invisible top surface or glass ceiling, the 
metaphor quickly spread To refer to the obstacles that impede the progress of minorities 
in general: racial minorities, religious minorities, sexual orientation, nationality, etc. 
Throughout the 13 years of her work in the forefront of Spanish politics, Carmen 
Chacón wanted to break the glass ceiling that prevents women from rising to first place 
in their careers. Chacón got it in several areas. In addition to being the first woman 
named Defense Minister, she was also the first to arrive at a ministry while pregnant. 
SIMILARITIES OR DIFFERENCES? 
Between the two women as defense portfolio holders, they can differentiate between 
two completely different styles. In the analysis of the press material made, from the 
main Spanish newspapers, the results are very interesting. 
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The newspapers analyzed have been El Pais, El Mundo, ABC and the Vanguard, of 
such newspapers, has analyzed the photograph that has accompanied in the news 
written, in all those news that had the name of one of the two ministers. 
The photographs of most cases were provided by the Ministry of Defense itself, or in 
one way or another they were managed by the Ministry. 
We find the images referring to Minister Chacón, where the vast majority refers to 
images that seek to make strong their position as a woman in the Ministry, when on the 
side of the Minister Cospedal, what we find is to generate a masculine image, aseptic . 
Both ministers reflect very different images, although both, being of different political 
parties, have defended the position of women with respect to having responsibility in 
security and defense areas. 
Of note is the image of the Minister Chacón reviewing the Spanish troops in 
Afghanistan pregnant seven months. That image is iconic of what is the step of the 
Minister by the ministry. It is the most reproduced and recognized image of the 
minister. The other most notable image is the style he wore in a tuxedo at the Military 
Easter, where usually this dress is reserved for men and women wear a long dress. Both 
images are transgressors to the institutionalized system. 
On the death of Carma Chacón the head of Defense Cospedal said that he showed "his 
respects" to Chacón, "as a Spanish woman" and also as a minister. 
It is through the Minister Chacón, for whom the glass ceiling is broken, and the 
contribution of women is established as the space of peace and international security 
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Abstract: Previous research has found that when a higher percentage of women hold legislative 
office, defense spending is lower in established democracies (Koch and Fulton 2011).  However, 
since this relationship has been studied only in established democracies, existing studies have 
overlooked an important determinant of military spending that interacts with gender: the 
domestic security environment. The security environment interacts with gender to affect 
legislative preferences through both substantive representation and electoral incentives. As has 
been argued elsewhere (Shea and Christian 2016), women legislators may be particularly 
sensitive to the gendered costs of war (i.e., dislocation, sexual violence, etc.) and so favor more 
military action (and, thus, spending) to provide substantive representation for their 
countrywomen who are threatened by conflict. We present evidence from a cross-national time 
series panel. The interaction of conflict and women’s representation increases military spending. 
Refinements show that this is driven primarily by the effects of civil conflicts.  
Most studies on gender gaps in conflict-related policy preferences occur in North American and 
European states. American women, for example, were less supportive than men of World War II 
and the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), the Gulf War (Bendyna 
et al. 1996), and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and the Iraq War (Huddy et al. 2005). 
In North America and Europe, security threats revolve around economic or strategic interests, 
rather than direct military threats within or near their borders. Military policy also frequently 
concerns overseas interventions and direct and extended deterrence. However, most studies on 
gender gaps in conflict-related policy preferences do not allow us to consider whether women 
view the use of force for self-defense differently than do men.   
In the few studies that examine public opinion in countries with higher levels of security threat, 
no evidence of a gender gap in preferences over military action and spending exists. Morgan 
(1996) finds similar conflict attitudes between men and women in Northern Ireland.  Inglehart 
and Norris (2000) report no difference between men and women in political ideology in 
individual post-communist countries. Tessler and Warriner (1997) and Tessler, Nachtwey, and 
Grant (1999) find no significant gender gap in attitudes toward international conflict in Middle 
Eastern countries. However, these studies do not capture the full range of security environments 
as survey data from populations experiencing current conflict is rarely collected. 
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Thus, current research leaves unanswered whether gender gaps exist among elites or the public 
in less secure environments. As such, we explore the relationship between women legislators and 
military spending, mediated by the domestic security environment, in a broad cross-national 
panel of democracies. 
THEORY 
If physical and economic vulnerability (Tickner 1992, Sylvester 1994, Confortini 2012) (or 
motherhood (Conover and Sapiro 1993, Ruddick 1989)) make women more likely than men to 
want to avoid involvement in war, because they (or their children) are likely to be harmed, how 
does that desire and self-interest extend to situations where national involvement in war is not 
avoidable? Preferences over military spending increase more sharply for women than men as the 
likelihood or the costs of potential conflict increase. Escalating threat of attack by state or non-
state actors may prompt women to prefer that the state strengthen its deterrent capability, still to 
avoid war and some of its costs. Where conflict has begun, similar concerns about war costs 
should prompt women to make sacrifices to bolster military spending if it increases the 
probability of quick, decisive victory. Concerns about the death of husbands and sons will shift 
women from preferring non-involvement to strong preferences for an adequately provisioned 
army (and the spending required for the purchase of weapons, body armor, etc.), once conflict 
has started.  
Figure 1 graphically represents the posited interaction of gender and the domestic security 
environment and its effects on women’s spending preferences. 
Figure 1: Likelihood of Conflict and Increasing Military Priorities of Women 
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We argue that women legislators and their military preferences are influenced by concerns about 
both representation and re-election. In terms of representation, women legislators’ views are 
more influenced than men’s by the gendered costs of conflict. During and following conflict, 
sexual violence and impunity are widespread (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Targeted and 
accidental attacks maim women in fields, preventing their food production and resulting in 
husbands abandoning wives (Mann et al. 1994). Women and children in refugee camps starve at 
higher rates than men (Ashford & Huet-Vaughn, 1997). Civil war devastates educational 
expenditures and enrollment by hurting infrastructure and personnel (Lai and Thyne 2007) and 
hospitals (Ghobarah et al. 2004).  
These concerns are likely to only indirectly impact elite women, those elected to the legislature. 
Nonetheless, women legislators are more sensitive to the suffering and fears of general 
populations.  Shea and Christian (2016) argue that, even in countries considering foreign 
interventions, women legislators support military involvement when concerned for the plight of 
women and children. This effect on women legislators’ military preferences should be even 
stronger regarding their own populations.  
Additionally, insensitivity to these costs has potential consequences for women retaining office.  
Obviously, a conflict of sufficient severity risks a turnover in government due to overthrow or 
domestic revolt sparked by war-imposed difficulties. In democracies, legislators’ constituencies 
affected by the conflict, or the risk of it spreading, will punish legislators if they perceive an 
insufficient dedication to resources. In less democratic regimes, failure to respond to these issues 
threaten entire governments and elite classes. These office-preserving mechanisms interact with 
women’s enhanced sensitivity to the problems producing greater impact on legislative outcomes. 
Both male and female incumbents face the possibility of loss of office. If women are present in 
higher numbers in the legislature and are particularly sensitive to conflict’s impact, they can 
discuss these impacts in committee, deliberation, or intra-party discussions to heighten men’s 
awareness, both to the problem and to their self-interest in acting. 
OUR HYPOTHESES ARE THEN AS FOLLOWS: 
H1: Military expenditures will increase as the percentage of women in the legislature increases in 
countries experiencing conflict. 
H2: The effect of women legislators on military spending will occur in interaction with 
militarized violence, but not with non-militarized political violence. 
H3: The magnitude of the effect of women legislators on military spending will increase as the 
effect of the conflict on the domestic population increases.  
DATA 
To test these hypotheses, we use 1988-2009 country-year data on major political violence, 
women in legislatures, and military spending as a percent of GDP.  
Our dependent variable is military expenditure as a percent of GDP, a World Bank World 
Development Indicator, available for a broad sample of countries, ranging from 0 to 9.2% of 
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GDP in our sample of democratic countries. The median value is 1.62% of GDP; the mean is 
1.8%. This measure allows for straightforward comparisons internationally and across time.1  
Our primary independent variable is the interaction of two measures described below. First is the 
percentage of women in the lower (or single) house of parliament in a country each year (V-Dem 
2016). For the time-period that overlaps with the availability of our dependent variable, this 
measure ranges from 0% to 47.3%, with a median of just over 12%. 
The Center for Systemic Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset provides measures 
for domestic security environments, coding episodes of political violence resulting in at least 500 
deaths. Each magnitude is assigned a number on an 11-point scale from 0 (no episodes of 
political violence) to 10 (Extermination and Annihilation). Magnitude scores reflect women’s 
particular sense of vulnerability in insecure environments: effect of violence on human 
resources; population dislocation; costs to societal networks; damage to environment; damage to 
infrastructure and resources; and diminished quality of life.  
Measures are disaggregated as civil war, civil violence, ethnic war, ethnic violence, international 
war, and international violence.2 The distinction between war and violence is made using 
“information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, 
and expressed level of commitment to the use of violence … the designation of “war” carries 
with it a stronger institutional, or institutionalized, component and more definite objectives.” 
This distinction approximates our theoretical distinction between militarized and non-militarized 
violence. International war and international violence are only coded as non-zero values for a 
country if the country and its society are directly affected by the violence. According to the 
codebook, “Countries that engage in military intervention in an episode taking place solely in 
another country are generally not considered to be directly affected by the violence” (Marshall 
2015, 2). Table 1 displays the mean scores, ranges, and percent of countries involved in each 
type of political violence.  
 
 
                                                           
1 Our analysis excludes Israel for statistical and theoretical reasons. First, it is a clear outlier in terms of military 
spending. Over this time-period, Israel’s mean military spending is 9.8%, which is higher than the upper end of the 
range for all other countries. Theoretically, Israel’s military spending is disproportionately influenced by military aid 
from the United States, and thus is determined outside the normal legislative budgeting considerations. While other 
countries also receive military aid from various sources, the data transparency of military assistance from non-U.S. 
sources is low. We use data on U.S. security aid programs from the organization Security Assistance Monitor 
(http://www.securityassistance.org). It is available beginning for the year 2000. Over this time-period, the 
democracies receiving the next highest amounts of aid from the United States are Colombia and Mexico. On average 
between 2000 and 2009, Colombia received less than 30% of the military aid that Israel received and Mexico less 
than 5% of the military aid received by Israel. 
2 They also identify wars of independence. Given the period over which the dependent variable is available and 
exclusion of non-democracies (since it is unclear why or how legislature exert influence over budgets in these 
environments), this variable drops out of the analysis.  
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Table 1: Incidence of Major Episodes of Political Violence 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
% of country-
years >0* 
Civil War 0.048 0 6 1.4% 
Ethnic War 0.187 0 8 4.7% 
International War 0.016 0 3 <1% 
Civil Violence 0.082 0 4 2.5% 
Ethnic Violence 0.063 0 4 4.0% 
International Violence 0.008 0 2 <1% 
 
As robustness checks, we also use alternate measures of conflict. We employ dichotomous 
measures of participation in inter- (1.7% of country-years) and intra-state (4.8% of country-
years) conflict from Clio Infra (drawing on Brecke (2001)). These measures include all violent 
conflicts that meet a criterion of 32 or more deaths, representing a much lower level of violence 
than MEPV’s 500-death threshold. The data further differ from MEPV data in that they include 
minimal involvement in international wars. For example, Canada, France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States are listed as having been involved in international conflict in 1990 and 
1991 in the Clio Infra data, but not according to MEPV data. It also does not code any 
involvement in conflict after 2000. Given the differences in the measures, if both provide 
evidence in favor of an effect of women in the legislature on military spending during conflict, it 
aids our hypotheses. 
We measure democracy using combined Polity V scores, ranging from 10 (most democratic) to -
10 (most autocratic). Conventionally, countries with scores above +6 are considered to have 
some meaningfully democratic features and those below considered either anocracies or 
autocracies. Thus, we restrict our primary analyses to country-years where the country received a 
score of at least 6 on the Polity scale. To test hypothesis 1a, we run identical analyses on the 
sample of countries with scores below 6, since the link we specify between women, security 
environment, and military spending to exist, the legislature must be both meaningfully powerful 
in policy-making and have electoral incentives to respond to their constituencies. 
All analyses control for GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth, democratic durability, election 
years and combined polity scores (V-Dem 2016). We also control for the number of international 
borders the country has, as it may affect the countries’ security environment (MEPV dataset).3 In 
                                                           
3 If all countries had no change in the number of international borders over the time-period examined, this 
variable would drop out in a fixed effects model. However, because our time-period covers some important changes 
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robustness checks, we also include additional controls to account for other possible explanations 
of the relationship we observe.  
ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Both the percent of women in the legislature and the types of domestic security challenges 
correlate with a number of other characteristics of society. This correlation makes it difficult to 
determine if these variables (or other underlying historical or cultural factors) are driving the 
observed correlation with military spending. These unobserved unit-specific factors must be 
modelled to avoid omitted variable bias. A Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) provides 
evidence coefficients would be inconsistent unless we account for these unit-specific factors. 
We, therefore, present the results for an OLS multilevel model with country fixed effects. This 
model controls for time-invariant factors of a country (over the time period 1988 to 2009), 
accounting for the higher level of correlation between error terms for the multiple years of 
observation for the same country.  
             We write the fixed effect model as  
Military expenditure (% GDP)ij =β1Female Legislatorsij + β2Female Legislator ij * Conflict 
Variables ij + β8Xij + αj +ςi + ε ij 
In this analysis, all time invariant country-specific effects are subsumed into αj (a dummy 
variable for each country), such that the beta coefficients explain the within-country changes due 
to changes in levels of conflict and levels of female representation. Year fixed effects are 
included and denoted by the ςi variables. The year controls are important because over time the 
percentage of women in legislatures has increased while military spending has decreased. 
Without time-controls, the level of female legislators appears to be significantly and negatively 
correlated with military expenditure. The interaction terms between female legislators and 
different types of conflict are equal to 0 if no conflict is present or if the lower house of the 
legislature lacks females. They take their highest values where there is both intense conflict and a 
relatively high percent of female legislators. X is a matrix of controls.  
RESULTS 
Model 1 in Table 2 shows the results of panel OLS fixed effects analysis on the full sample of 
democracies (as determined by a combined Polity score of 6 or higher) using the combined 
measures for any type of war (civil, ethnic or international) and any type of violence. Model 2 
presents the results for democracies using the dichotomous war variable. Our primary interest in 
the coefficient on the interaction term Women LegislatorsXWar. Our argument is that the 
coefficient should be positive and significant, or that, in the presence of conflict, a higher 
percentage of women legislators should lead to higher levels of military spending. The results for 
the interaction term do show that military spending increases when there are more women and 
conflict. This is true whether the conflict measure is dichotomous or increasing as the magnitude 
                                                           
in the international system, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the state of Yugoslavia (and these 
changes are correlated with conflict in several cases), the variable does not drop out of a fixed effect model and we 
deem it important to include as a control. 
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of the conflict increases (as measured by the MEPV data), confirming hypotheses 1 and 3.  In 
this broader sample of countries over this shorter time-period, the data do not replicate Koch and 
Fulton’s (2011) result, but, in the absence of conflict, more women in the legislature produce 
lower levels of spending. The sign is in the correct direction, but the result is not significant.  
Substantively, as presented in the table the coefficient may seem small. However, the dependent 
variable is a percentage of GDP; even fractions of a percent amount to changes in millions or 
billions of dollars. Furthermore, it is a coefficient on an interaction term of two variables, 
ranging from 0 to over 30, so the impact on military spending as a percent of GDP can be 
substantively significant.  
For example, if two countries move from no conflict to serious, but low-level warfare (a move 
from 0 to 4 on the 11-point magnitude scale employed by MEPV coders) and one has no women 
and the other has the median percentage of women in the country-years included in this sample 
(about 12%), the country with women will increase military spending by 0.29% of GDP (where 
the median military expenditure is only 1.62% of GDP) more than the country without.  
To better understand the meaning of an interaction between two continuous variables, Figure 2 
shows the effects on military spending of four different levels of female legislative 
representation. There, we choose to represent the quartiles of women’s representation in the 
country-years included in our panel analysis. Thus, we show the effect when there are no women 
in the legislature and when the legislature is 7.6% female (the 25th percentile of the measure in 
our sample), 12% female (the median percentage of women in our sample), and 20% female. The 
four dashed lines show the marginal effects (and the shaded areas the accompanying confidence 
intervals) of women in the legislature as the magnitude of conflict increases. The graph 
demonstrates that the greater the representation of women, the more that increasing the level of 
conflict in the country increases military expenditure.  
These analyses, however, do not support Hypothesis 2, as the violence measures indicate that 
political violence, even if not militarized, also interacts with the percentage of women in the 
legislature to increase military spending.  
Models 3 and 4 replicate models 1 and 2 on the sample of non-democracies and show that the 
relationship between women in the legislature and conflict does not exist in these cases. This 
lends credibility to the argument that the results stem from changes in the internal processes of a 
meaningfully powerful legislature with a meaningful electoral connection to the public.  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As robustness checks, we control for the effects of the chief executive on military spending. 
Obviously, the executive also has influence over policy (both directly and in his or her role as a 
party leader with influence over co-partisans in the legislature) and faces electoral incentives to 
deal with any security threats facing the country. We, thus, control for the executive’s party 
orientation and also whether the executive is female, as previous research has shown that these 
factors affect military spending. Executive party orientation is coded as 1 for right orientation, 2 
for centrist party positions; and 3 for left party orientation. It is expected that increasing values of 
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this measure will be associated with lower levels of military spending.  Data on the presence of 
female executives are taken from the Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership 
(www.guide2womenleaders.com) and includes women heads of state and women heads of 
government. Democracies have female executives in 11.7% of the country years included in 
these analyses. We expect that female executives will increase military spending, due to the 
pressure they face to be “hawkish” (Koch and Fulton 2011). We repeat the analysis in models 1 
and 2 from Table 1 with these controls. We repeat the analyses on the sample of non-
democracies using the control for female executives, but not partisanship of the executive, 
because partisanship of the executive is missing for 64% of the non-democratic country-years in 
our sample and missingness is significantly correlated with the country’s level of autocracy, 
which would significantly bias the results of this analysis. The results are shown in Table 2.  
These analyses support the findings from the previous section, except that the coefficient on the 
violence variables are not robust to inclusion of controls for the executive’s characteristics, as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes the effect of women legislators on military spending where military 
spending is not dedicated to international interventions or extended deterrence, but to close 
security threats. The analyses demonstrate that, over a broad class of democratic countries, where 
women hold political power in societies experiencing militarized conflict within or close to their 
borders, governments dedicate more to military spending than in countries with similar levels of 
conflict and fewer women policy-makers. We believe that the explanation for this pattern in 
military spending is that gender gap in preferences for military spending is a function of the 
domestic security environment. Where risks to the domestic public and infrastructure are remote 
or non-military in nature, women prefer to buy butter rather than invest in guns. However, given 
the high gendered costs of militarized threats to domestic society, in women’s presence the 
tradeoff between the two types of spending becomes much less steep.  
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Military expenditure % GDP Democracy 6-
9 
% Women in Legislature 0.004 
 (0.007) 
%Women*Intrastate war 0.008 
 (0.005)* 




Quota for Women (Leg) 0.217 
 (0.101)** 




Democracy (Polity) -0.124 
 (0.036)*** 
Autocracy (Polity) 0.132 
 (0.039)*** 
GDP per capita -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Life expectancy at birth 0.007 
 (0.012) 
# of Border 0.263 
 (0.088)*** 
Intrastate war 0.074 
 (0.059) 








* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Multi-level fixed effects model, includes controls for years 
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ABSTRACT 
Since the passing of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, gender mainstreaming 
policies - or those that assess the gendered implications of any planned state action with the hope 
of promoting gender equality - have become increasingly popular in security sector reform 
(SSR). However, little is understood regarding the systematic patterns of adoption of these 
reforms. This paper examines the influence of conflict on the adoption of national gender 
balancing and gender mainstreaming policies in the security sector. Specifically, this study 
analyzes how the experience of intrastate conflict increases the domestic political will, need, and 
resources available for security sector gender reforms. Using logistic regression and a unique 
dataset on security sector gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms between 1988 and 
2012, this study strongly demonstrates that conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more 
likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector 
compared to non-conflict states. As the first cross-national quantitative examination of the role of 
conflict in gender security policy adoption, this study advances our understanding of the dynamic 
processes that influence security sector reform. 
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In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, 
Peace, and Security (WPS), which promoted women's right to participate in security and peace 
processes. Governments sought to comply by increasing women’s participation in their security 
forces, establishing specialized gender units, and adopting other security sector gender reforms. 
However, a great degree of variation exists among countries in the number and character of their 
security sector gender reforms.4 While the progress of individual states has been increasingly 
documented, little is understood about gendered security sector reform (SSR) cross-nationally.  
This paper examines how conflict alters a state's willingness and ability to adopt security sector 
gender reforms by challenging traditional gender roles, increasing mobilization needs, 
delegitimizing the security sector, highlighting women's insecurity, and increasing international 
influence. Using a unique dataset on security sector gender reform, this paper demonstrates that 
conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt security sector gender 
balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict states. Further, it illustrates that 
the character of security sector gender reform differs slightly in conflict and post-conflict states. 
Additionally, post-conflict states only became more likely to adopt these policies after the 
adoption of UNSCR 1325.5  
GENDERED SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
Although women have long participated in security, security sectors remain highly masculinized, 
both in composition and values (Sjoberg 2007).6 However, highly masculinized security sectors 
are increasingly criticized as less effective, less comprehensive, and more abusive.7 As a result, 
international commitments calling for security sector gender reform have been adopted and 
governments have committed to integrate more women and women's perspectives into security. 8  
There are many types of gender reforms undertaken by security sectors under the banner of 
gender mainstreaming.9 Gender mainstreaming seeks to break down the masculinized values, 
hierarchies, and composition of security sectors to create a new institutional culture which values 
male and female characteristics, perspectives, bodies, and voices equally. Examples of gender 
mainstreaming in SSR include the recruitment of women, appointment of women into decision-
making, establishment of sexual harassment policies, creation of gender equality offices or units, 
                                                           
4 The terms “countries” and “states” are used interchangeably in this study. 
5 In this study, the terms “policies” and “reforms” are used interchangeably since in general, gender 
mainstreaming policies are reform policies since they challenge existing, primarily male-dominated, norms of the 
security sector. 
6 Security sector institutions consist of organizations that have the authority to use force to protect individuals 
and the state, including the armed forces, police forces, federal agents, border and immigration agents, and 
intelligence services. The `security sector' refers to the state's security apparatus, including all the civil and military 
personnel (Meharg 2010; Jacob 2009). 
7 See Cohen and Nordas (2013), Nordas and Rustad (2014), Enloe (1989, 2000), Goldstein (2003), Sjoberg and 
Via (2010), Higate (2004, 2009), Karim and Beardsely (2013, 2017), Karim (2016), and Tickner (1992, 1998, 2005).  
8 See the Beijing Platform for Action (1995),  UNSCR 1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 
(2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013), UNSCR 2242 
(2015). 
9 As defined by the UN, gender mainstreaming is “The process of assessing the implications for women and 




building of female facilities and equipment, gender sensitization training, and creation of 
National Action Plans (NAP) for UNSCR 1325. One type of gender mainstreaming reform is 
gender balancing, which specifically seeks to increase women's physical representation relative 
to men's representation.10 Gender balancing is one component of gender mainstreaming, but is 
not sufficient because women's presence alone does not guarantee gender equality (Karim and 
Beardsley 2017). Therefore, gender balancing must take place with other reforms to change the 
institutional culture in addition to the physical composition of security personnel.  
Despite increased interest in gendered SSR, relatively little is understood about why states adopt 
gender mainstreaming policies as there is no cross-national, systematic comparison of the 
adoption of security sector gender reforms.11 A wide range of compliance exists with gendered 
SSR. For example, women's representation in police and military forces range from 1% to 56% 
and 0.5% to 26%.12 Further, only 66 states have adopted NAPs for UNSCR 1325. Finally, a 
sample of 150 states in 2016 shows that only 54 states had official gender recruitment targets or 
quotas. This variation highlights a puzzle: why do states adopt security sector gender reforms 
and why are some states more likely to adopt these reforms than others? 
CONFLICT: OPENING DOORS FOR SECURITY SECTOR GENDER REFORM 
The conflict and post-conflict environment shifts political will to favor gender mainstreaming in 
SSR by altering the needs and will of the government, the security sector, and the population. 
First, conflict leads to increased mobilization into the security sector and its related institutions. 
As mobilization demand begins to outstrip the availability of men, the government may turn to 
women to bolster security personnel (Goldstein 2003). For example, Thomas and Bond (2015) 
examine how insurgent competition led to the recruitment of women despite ideological 
reluctance. Additionally, there may be greater female mobilization into war-related activities, 
such as weapons-making and medical care, as seen during World War II (Golstein 2003). 
Therefore, as mobilization needs increase, the security sector is more likely to engage in gender 
reform. 
Second, conflict may also challenge traditional gender roles that bar or dissuade women from 
joining the security sector. Gender roles are most directly challenged by women's participating as 
combatants, which shatters ideals of feminine innocence, weakness, and nonviolence and 
demonstrates that women are capable of excelling in security roles (Sjoberg Forthcoming). 
Therefore, female combatants' experience may degrade gender norms that women are not 
suitable for the security sector.13 Short of direct participation in combat, women's experiences in 
                                                           
10 Gender balancing includes actions such as recruitment drives that specifically target women, gender quotas, 
the creation of gendered units or offices, the removal of bans of women from certain positions, the promotion of 
women to high-ranking offices, and the creation of a NAP for UNSCR 1325. 
11 See Huber and Karim (Forthcoming) for a cross-national analysis of gender balancing policies in post-
conflict states. This study moves beyond that original examination by investigating the role of conflict in the process 
of gendered security sector reform, developing a theory which applies to both conflict-affected and non-conflict 
affected states, and incorporating a broader range of reforms. 
12 Data based on 2012 figures from the author's random sample of 88 states. 
13 For example, Karim (2016) found that after the Liberian civil war, Liberians evaluated the competency of 
Liberian female police officers higher than foreign female peacekeepers potentially because they had directly 
witnessed Liberian women's strength and abilities as security agents during the conflict.  
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conflict may challenge traditional gender roles in other ways. For example, during conflict, 
women often fill male roles, such as economic laborers, family and community leaders, and 
politicians (Carpenter 2005; Tripp 2015). Further, women may mobilize as part of a peace 
movement.14 After conflicts, women may use this experience to gain political representation, 
such as women's unmatched representation in the Rwandan legislature or the election of the first 
African female president in Liberia (Thomas and Adams 2010; Berry 2015). Therefore, during 
and after conflict, women gain influence over their homes, communities, and country, 
challenging traditional gender roles and demonstrating their agency, increasing the likelihood 
that women will be deemed capable for security roles. 
Third, conflict also contributes to women’s insecurity as they are displaced, disconnected from 
their communities, and economically and physically vulnerable (Bennoune 2007). This 
insecurity is predominantly expressed through increased threat of sexual and gender based 
violence (SGBV) (Cohen and Nordas 2014; Nordas and Rustad 2013; Manjoo and McRaith 
2011; Karim and Beardlsley 2016; Karim and Beardsley 2017). Therefore, the security sector 
may feel obligated to address women's insecurity by undertaking gender mainstreaming.15 
Similarly, the population may distrust the security sector for its participation in destructive 
conflict. Therefore, the security sector may undertake gender reforms in the hope of leveraging 
stereotypes that women are less corrupt, less violent, and more concerned about vulnerable 
populations to distance itself from its conflict behavior (Karim 2016).  
Finally, during and after conflict, new actors may gain influence over policymaking. Conflict 
may weaken policymaking abilities by damaging infrastructure, limiting resources, and 
increasing political dysfunction, leading states to rely upon foreign donors. Therefore, states, 
IGOs, and NGOs intervening to end the conflict, prevent conflict resurgence, and assist in 
reconstruction gain influence over the reforms adopted. International actors may specifically 
promote security gender mainstreaming due to the norm’s growing popularity since UNSCR 
1325. For example, Huber and Karim (Forthcoming) and Bush (2011) find that peacekeeping 
missions increase the likelihood that post-conflict states will adopt security sector gender 
balancing reforms and legislative gender quotas. 
While conflict may provide an opportunity for gender mainstreaming in security, it is not 
sufficient to ensure gender equality. In many ways, conflict is directly damaging to gender 
equality.16 However, this theory examines how normative changes regarding gender 
mainstreaming in the past twenty years may challenge traditional ideas regarding conflict and 
gender. Specifically, while previously the WPS norm was underdeveloped and had little support, 
it is now increasingly important, which may alter state behavior. While the concern that SSR 
                                                           
14 For example, in Liberia, women famously launched a nonviolent peace campaign, which demanded an end to 
the civil war and called for more women's participation in peacemaking efforts. Similar women's movements for 
peace include the Woman's Peace Party in the USA during World War I, Mothers Against Silence in Israel during 
Israel's war with Lebanon, Women in Black in Israel starting during the Intifada, and the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo in Argentina after the Dirty War. 
15 Women's heightened security needs alone may not be sufficient to cause gender reform, but may act as a 
rallying point around which gender reform advocates organize to pressure the security sector for gendered SSR. 
16 See Goldstein (2003), Enloe (1989, 2000), and Hudson et al. (2013) for arguments that conflict, 




gender mainstreaming does not actually promote gender equality is valid, this study focuses 
primarily on adoption. While the larger outcome of these policies is important, this theory is 
limited to examining which states adopt these policies regardless of effect.17  
Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming 
and gender balancing reforms than their non-conflict affected counterparts.18 
Hypothesis 1: Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms 
than non-conflict affected states. 
Hypothesis 2: Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming 
reforms than non-conflict affected states. 
However, while both active conflict and post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt 
gender mainstreaming and balancing reforms, the expression of these reforms may differ. This is 
most strongly observed in the increased need for mobilization in conflict states. During conflict, 
the security sector expands, causing the government to turn to women. In contrast, after conflict, 
the government may decrease the size of the military, decreasing the need for women.19  
Hypothesis 3: Active conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms 
compared to post-conflict states. 
Similarly, although the need for SSR gender mainstreaming may be great in both conflict and 
post-conflict states, there may be more awareness, political will, and resources in post-conflict 
states. After conflict, states may be able to focus more on the equality of the security sector since 
militarization demands have decreased. Further, after conflict, awareness of SGBV, concerns for 
legitimacy, and international pressure may increase greatly. Therefore, SSR gender 
mainstreaming should be especially likely after conflict. 
Hypothesis 4: Post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms 
compared to conflict states. 
Finally, while gendered SSR has occurred for decades, UNSCR 1325 represented the first time 
that gendered SSR was declared to be an international and national obligation.  
Hypothesis 5: Active conflict states should be especially likely to adopt SSR gender balancing 
reforms after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. 
Hypothesis 6: Post-conflict states should be especially likely to adopt SSR gender mainstreaming 
reforms after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. 
                                                           
17 This may include states which adopt these policies in hopes of improving gender relations and those states 
that adopt them simply to appease demand. Future research planned by the author will examine how conflict affects 
the implementation and outcome of these policies. 
18 “Conflict affected” refers to active conflict and post-conflict states. 
19 This may only occur if the government is willing to retain the same troops it used during conflict. 
219





To test these hypotheses, this analysis uses a unique cross-national dataset on gender 
mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms in 150 states between 1988 and 2016.20 Logistic 
regression models with state-clustered standard errors are used to account for autocorrelation.21 
The main dependent variables are SSR Gender Balance and SSR Gender Mainstream. SSR 
Gender Balance is a dichotomous indicator of whether a gender balancing reform was adopted 
by the security sector in the state-year. Gender balancing reforms were defined as the adoption or 
creation of a female recruitment target or quota, female-focused recruitment campaign, gendered 
office or unit, associations for female security personnel, a NAP for UNSCR 1325, the removal 
of barriers to women's participation, and the first promotion of women to high-ranking 
positions.22 This indicator varies from year to year, recording gender balancing only if a reform 
was adopted in that year.23 This examines whether conflict has any effect on gender reform, 
rather than the effect’s magnitude.24 Gender balancing reforms occur in 15.1% of state-years and 
in the majority of the states.  
SSR Gender Mainstream is a dichotomous variable indicating adoption of a security gender 
mainstreaming policy in the state-year, defined as any government led or approved reform to 
increase security sector gender equality or sensitivity to gendered issues.25 All reforms included 
within SSR Gender Balance are included in addition to other reforms, such as gender 
sensitization trainings, SGBV training, sexual harassment or gender equality policies, the 
building of female facilities or equipment, and policies for gendered crimes. SSR Gender 
Mainstream also varies from state-year and is coded as 1 in the state-year when a policy is first 
adopted. 19.6% of state-years across 141 states observed the adoption of gender mainstreaming 
reforms.26 The most reforms adopted by one state is 13.27 
                                                           
20 Countries included in the dataset were chosen randomly. A list of the countries can be found in the appendix. 
The state-year dataset contains 4,227 observations. 
21 Alternative model specifications, including Generalized Estimating Equations and Negative Binomial 
Regressions, can be found in the appendix. 
22 Reforms were largely recorded based on newspaper articles or country SSR gender mainstreaming reviews, 
such as country reports published by the UN or NGOs. This variable expands on the same variable in the Karim, 
Wagstaff, and Huber (n.d.) dataset, extending it to non-conflict countries, standardizing the yearly range, and 
altering some coding rules. 
23 This coding not only allows for an examination specifically of adoption patterns, but also is more reliable 
since it is difficult to determine how long most gender policies are in place. 
24 However, an alternative measure of the dependent variable as a count of the number of reforms adopted is 
used with a negative binomial regression in the appendix to analyze the magnitude of the effect. Further, pending the 
collection of further data, future studies should examine the gender reformed status of the security sector. 
25 This coding excludes programs supported NGOs without the government's direct support and collaboration. 
This was done to ensure that the variable only recorded programs that were directly supported by the government, 
rather than programs that are done independently from or without the involvement of the government. 
26 It should be noted that instances of gender mainstreaming are likely to be underreported compared to gender 
balancing. However, there does not appear to be any systematic country differences in the degree of underreporting. 
27 The correlation between SSR Gender Balance and SSR Gender Mainstream is 0.85. The high correlation is 
expected given that gender balancing reforms are part of gender mainstreaming reforms and because it is likely that 




Two sets of independent variables are used. The first is a dichotomous indicator of whether the 
state-year is “conflict affected.” Conflict Affected indicates the state-year was either experiencing 
civil conflict with 25 battle deaths or had experienced conflict within ten years (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). This variable is lagged by one year. About 39% of state-years are conflict-affected. The 
second set of independent variables, Active Conflict and Post-Conflict, indicate whether the state 
is experiencing an active conflict with more than 25 battle deaths or not and whether the state has 
experienced a conflict within 10 years but is not currently experiencing conflict.28 These 
variables are lagged by one year. Around 19.2% of observations are active conflict and 19.6% 
are post-conflict. Further, UNSCR 1325 indicates whether the state-year is after the passing of 
UNSCR 1325 in 2000.29  
Control variables include the number of years since Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ratification, the fertility rate,30 regime type,31 state-
year transition to democracy, the percentage GDP per capita growth, and whether the state was 
majority Muslim.32 All controls are lagged by one year. To account for autocorrelation, cubic 
polynomials of the number of the years since the previous gender balancing or mainstreaming 
reform was adopted are included (Carter and Signorino 2010).33 Finally, a dummy variable 
indicating whether large-scale, non-gendered SSR was adopted in the state-year is included for a 
sub-set of states to account for the possibility that conflict-affected states are simply more open 
to SSR.34 This variable is only available for a random sample of 2,473 state-years.35 Results are 
presented with and without this variable.  
                                                           
28 Alternative measures of post-conflict, namely post-conflict as ending five years after a conflict ends or as a 
permanent state, are included in the robustness checks. 
29 2000 is not included in the dummy variable because UNSCR 1325 was adopted in October, meaning that 
most states would not have had time to incorporate gender mainstreaming policies by the end of the year. 
30 As a robustness check, several alternative measures for gender equality are used, including female-to-male 
secondary school ratios, female legislative representation, and labor force ratios. 
31 Polity II score (Marshall, Gur, and Jaggers 2015) 
32 The World Religion's Dataset only includes data on the percentage of Muslims within a country in five year 
intervals. The coding recorded at each interval was continued for the next four years until the next interval. Since 
this is a dichotomous interval and the percent of the population which practices Islam is unlikely to change rapidly 
within a four-year period, this coding is likely to be accurate. 
33 Additional robustness checks include the use of these variables as time variable dummies and the use of a 
generalized estimation equation (GEE) without time variables. The results remain consistent. 
34 Non-gendered SSR was defined as the establishment of a national or institutional plan to reform an institution 
of the security sector, the creation or dissolution of a security institution or office, the establishment of a 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program, the institution of an oversight committee, or the creation of 
funding programs to improve the security sector. 
35 A list of countries from which some state-years are included is in the appendix. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results strongly demonstrate that intrastate conflict increases the probability that a state 
adopts security sector gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms. Table 2 shows the 
results of logistic regression models 1 through 4.36 
Models 1 and 2 strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Conflict Affected is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating active and post-conflict states are significantly 
more likely to adopt gender balancing or gender mainstreaming reforms. Substantively, a 
conflict-affected state is 8% more likely to adopt a gender balancing reform, increasing the 
probability of gender mainstreaming policy adoption from 37% to 45%. Model 3 similarly 
supports Hypothesis 3. Active conflict states are statistically more likely to adopt gender 
balancing reforms than non-conflict states, increasingly the likelihood of adoption from 39% to 
50%, while post-conflict states do not have a statistically significant relationship with gender 
balancing reforms. Model 4 demonstrates that both conflict and post-conflict states are 
significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict states.  
                                                           
36 Models 1 and 2 examine whether conflict affected states are more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender 
mainstreaming reforms in the security sector. Model 3 tests whether conflict states are especially likely to adopt 
gender balancing reforms compared to post-conflict states. Finally, Model 4 tests whether post-conflict states are 













However, in contrast to expectations, the size of this effect is larger in active conflict states than 
post-conflict states. While non-conflict states have about a 33% probability of gender 
mainstreaming reform, conflict and post-conflict states have a 43% and 40% likelihood (this is 
not a statistically significant difference between active conflict and post-conflict states).  
Models 5 and 6 demonstrate interesting results. First, Model 5 examines whether SSR gender 
balancing and mainstreaming become more likely after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. 
Surprisingly neither conflict nor post-conflict states are more likely to adopt gender balancing 
reforms before or after UNSCR 1325 than non-conflict states. This may indicate that gender 
balancing reforms are driven primarily by need in conflict-affected states and therefore, are 
unaffected by the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Interestingly, after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, 
non-conflict states do become statistically more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms, which 
may imply that UNSCR 1325 was successful in changing the behavior of non-conflict states. 
Model 6 demonstrates that while neither conflict nor post-conflict states were more likely to 
adopt gender mainstreaming reforms before the adoption of UNSCR 1325, post-conflict states 
are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms after 2000. It appears that 
UNSCR 1325 may have had success in increasing the adoption of these policies in post-conflict 
states. As seen in Figure 1, before UNSCR 1325, post-conflict states and non-conflict states had 




states have a 62% probability of adoption. Further, conflict states are not more likely to adopt 
either gender mainstreaming or gender balancing reforms after UNSCR 1325, indicating that 
conflict states may continue prioritize traditional security concerns.  
Finally, Models 7 through 11 demonstrate that gender balancing and gender mainstreaming 
reforms appear to be adopted independently from non-gender SSR programs. The results remain 
consistent with those in Table 2 with Conflict Affected, Active Conflict, and Post-Conflict 
increasing the probability of gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms. 
 
 


















The results generally remain robust to the operationalization of post-conflict as a permanent state and as 
lasting five years. However, when post-conflict is operationalized as 5 years, in Model 5 neither 
conflict nor post-conflict states have significant interactions with UNSCR 1325 and in Model 6, both 
have a significant interaction. Finally, when operationalized as a permanent state, active conflict states 
have a significant interaction in both Models 5 and 6, whereas post-conflict states do not.  Additionally, 
an alternative measure of gender mainstreaming which excludes reforms that primarily recruit more 
women produced consistent results except in Model 4 as Conflict loses its significance and Post-
Conflict increases in magnitude, which supports Hypothesis 4.37 Further the models are robust to GDP 
instead of GDPPC Growth, alternative measures for gender equality,38 majority Catholic or Christian 
controls, communist controls, regional controls, an individual empowerment index (Cingranelli, 
Richards, and Clay 2014), and conflict controls, such as conflict intensity,39 termination, and previous 
conflict history (Kreutz 2010). Additionally, the results remain robust without state clustered standard 
errors, the use of a Generalized Estimating Equation, and when a Negative Binomial Model is used to 
examine the effect of conflict on the number of reforms adopted.40  
The results do appear sensitive to the operationalization of conflict. With a threshold of 1,000 battle 
deaths in intrastate conflicts (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), active conflict states lost significance in 
Models 3 and 4. However, when both interstate and intrastate conflicts with 1,000 battle deaths (Reiter, 
Stam and Horowitz Forthcoming) are included, the results are consistent, except active conflict states 
lose their significance in Model 4. These results underscore that even low intensity conflicts prompt 
gender reforms.  
CONCLUSION 
This study is the first cross-national, quantitative analysis of gender balancing and gender 
mainstreaming polices in the security sector. In the past fifteen years, gender equality has been 
increasingly recognized as vital to international and national security. These findings 
demonstrate that conflict-affected states are more likely to adopt gender reforms in SSR.  
These findings hold important theoretical and policy implications. First, they demonstrate that 
conflict can sometimes act as a powerful agent of social change. Second, the results underscore 
that security gender reform may have great implications for civilians, the state, and the 
international community as adoption may improve responses to SGBV, improve relations with 
civilians, increase gender equality, and decrease state violence. Finally, the findings indicate the 
rise of a new international norm and some success of UNSCR 1325 by highlighting that states 
are attempting to incorporate more women into security and become more responsive to women's 
differing security needs, wants, and challenges. 
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